THE EASTERN DIMENSION OF THE EU'S AND POLAND'S POLICY

WYMIAR WSCHODNI POLITYKI UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ I POLSKI

Tetiana Sydoruk, Dmytro Tyshchenko***

— ABSTRACT —

The article seeks to assess the degree to which Poland exercises power and influence in the Eastern policy of the European Union (EU) from the early 21st century until now, focusing on the attributes of Poland's latest contribution to the EU policies – the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The article examines also challenges and discussions on Polish strategy towards Eastern Europe. The authors prove that the main points of Poland's Eastern policy are that the improper attention to it will result in loss of status positions in the international arena; Poland should not be limited by the role of the architect artist in Franco-German project in Europe; *European perspective* is the only incentive that can encourage the reforms in Eastern Europe; the failure to provide such a perspective would lead to social and economic instability in the region and the drift towards the participation in reintegration projects in post-Soviet space with Moscow; the Eastern Partnership should be considered as a step towards the joining the EU; Europe will take Poland into consideration only as a regional

— ABSTRAKT —

Artykuł stara się oszacować, w jakim stopniu Polska sprawuje władzę i wykorzystuje wpływ w ramach polityki wschodniej Unii Europejskiej (UE) od początku XXI wieku do chwili obecnej, skupiając się na właściwościach ostatniego wkładu Polski w politykę Unii, mianowicie programu Partnerstwa Wschodniego (EaP). W artykule poddano również badaniu wyzwania i dyskusje dotyczące polskiej strategii wobec Europy Wschodniej. Autorzy dowodzą, że główne punkty polskiej polityki wschodniej koncentrują się wokół następujących zagadnień: 1) Niewłaściwa uwaga przywiązywana do tej polityki będzie skutkować utratą statusu na arenie międzynarodowej; 2) Polska nie powinna być ograniczana rolą statysty we francusko-niemieckim projekcie dla Europy; 3) *Perspektywa europejska* jest jedynym bodźcem zdolnym pobudzić proces reform w Europie Wschodniej; 4) Porażka w promowaniu takiej perspektywy może prowadzić do społecznego i ekonomicznego zachwiania w regionie, a tym samym do pchnięcia go w kierunku udziału w projektach reintegracyjnych odbywających

* National University of Ostroh Academy, Ostroh, Ukraine.

** University of Lisbon, Portugal.

leader; Russian neo-imperialism is a challenge for Poland's security and needs a strict reaction.

Keywords: Eastern Europe, European Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Partnership, Polish foreign policy

się w przestrzeni postsowieckiej pod dyktando Moskwy; 5) Partnerstwo Wschodnie powinno być postrzegane jako krok w kierunku integracji z Unią Europejską; 6) Europa będzie liczyć się z Polską tylko jako liderem regionu; 7) Rosyjski neoimperializm stanowi wyzwanie dla bezpieczeństwa Polski i wymaga zdecydowanej reakcji.

Słowa kluczowe: Europa Wschodnia, europejska polityka sąsiedztwa, Partnerstwo Wschodnie, polska polityka zagraniczna

INTRODUCTION

Eastern European countries have a special place in the Polish external policy. Their stabilisation through democratisation and structure of the market economy is one of the most important priorities for Poland. Despite some, not always reasonable, doubts and hesitations, which took place in Polish politics in the 1990s, Poland since 1989 tried to become a European lawyer to its eastern neighbours. This position stemmed from the fact that not only the political elite, but also Polish society saw their democracy as the best realisation of its own national interests and benefits for Europe.

The article is focused upon the influence and contribution of Poland in developing of Eastern policy of the European Union. Further, it aims to achieve these objectives: to analyse the Polish contribution in the European Neighbourhood Policy elaboration and the Eastern Partnership, to determine challenges for Poland in Eastern Europe and to consider discussion on Polish strategy towards Eastern neighbours.

POLAND AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

After Poland's accession to NATO (1999) and the EU (2004), East became the main vector of Polish foreign policy. The role of Poland in relations between the European Union and the countries of Eastern Europe has several factors. The key ones are: historical (good awareness on Eastern policy, understanding of important cultural aspects), economic (interests in bilateral trade, energy,

competition, etc.), status reasons (location, Polish role and influence in the EU, according to many Polish politicians, depend on Poland's ability to assume the role of 'provider' in Eastern policy).

With the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (hereinafter ENP) in 2003–2004, which defined the format of relations between the enlarged EU and its new neighbours to the East, Poland has been continually emphasizing the necessity to intensify efforts to strengthen the relations between the EU and its Eastern neighbours. It has been for many years advocating an *Open Door Policy* of the European Union to the countries of Eastern Europe. Moreover, Warsaw believes that although the EU dialogue and cooperation with Russia is necessary, this should not lead to the perception and evaluation of EU initiatives in Eastern Neighbourhood in terms of Russian interests (Wojna, Gniazdowski, 2009). Poland believes that aid in the socio-political and economic transformations in Eastern Europe must be one of the main objectives of the EU, achievement of which cannot be treated depending on the development of relations between the EU and Russia.

Poland has shown a particular interest in the future development of the relations of the enlarged EU and its eastern neighbours early in its efforts to join the European Union in 1998. It was confirmed and clearly outlined in the document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, adopted in July 2001, entitled *Eastern Policy of the European Union in the context of its enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: the Polish vision*. In December 2002, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs detailed the Polish approach to the EU's Eastern policy as a non-paper with Polish proposals for future relations between the enlarged EU and its new eastern neighbours (Non-paper, 2003). This document was provided for future EU membership for the countries of Eastern Europe, which was to serve the main EU policy instrument towards Ukraine, Moldova and possibly Belarus, aimed to encourage the modernisation processes in these countries. It was obvious that the priority was given to relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, while Russia was assigned to the secondary role.

The Polish paper emphasizes the particular importance of Ukraine to Europe: "As far as Ukraine is concerned, it is in our opinion in the interest of the enlarged EU to recognise the European choice of this country, which is so important for stability and security in the eastern part of the continent. It is also in its interest to appreciate gearing long-term European policy towards the country's membership of the EU. Although Ukraine's progress in reforms and some aspects of its internal as well as foreign policy are disappointing and are a source of our

concern, the policy of critical engagement, dialogue and developing co-operation combined with assistance seems for us to be the most effective and relevant. Otherwise we would risk weakening reformist and pro-European forces in Ukraine” (Non-paper, 2003, p. 88).

Polish offers were discussed during the debate on the future relationship of the enlarged EU with its Eastern neighbours. This discussion ended with a result of a concept of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which was implemented in May 2004. However, not being a member of the EU then, Poland had a restricted impact on the final format of the EU policy towards its eastern neighbours.

After joining the EU, Poland has been actively involved in various activities aimed at developing the EU’s Eastern policy. Warsaw collaborates closely with other Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) to strengthen the eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Menkiszak, 2014). These problems often become the subject of consultation with the Baltic countries. Poland aims to revise and improve the ENP so that it takes into account the expectations of the Eastern European countries, as well as to convince the *old* EU members to develop closer relationships with the latter.

In 2006–2007, the Polish government institutions prepared the following documents: *The European Neighbourhood Policy – Eastern Dimension*, and *The EU–Ukraine Relations: Polish proposals*, which emphasised that the format of the European Neighbourhood Policy was unsatisfactory because it combined different states of historical, geographical and civilizational ways of regions (Eastern Europe and North Africa). While the EU eastern neighbours are European neighbours, European countries, the neighbours on the South are not European ones. Moreover, Poland required balancing in funding the Eastern and Southern areas of the ENP. In April 2008, the Polish Sejm Speaker B. Komorowski criticized the fact that 70% of funds for Neighbourhood goes to the South (Menkiszak, 2014).

Poland has also repeatedly pointed on differences between Southern and Eastern dimensions of the ENP, in particular, that the latter lacks the mechanisms of multilateral cooperation. Polish efforts in this direction led to adopt by the European Council in December 2007 the Polish–Lithuanian Proposals to develop the Southern and Eastern dimensions of the ENP by not only bilateral but also by multilateral action (Wojna, Gniazdowski, 2009).

Polish government continues to advocate for further enlargement of the EU, with a special focus on Ukraine. President Kaczynski at all occasions stressed that his country was interested in maintaining *Door to Europe* open for Ukraine and that the EU needs further enlargement (Mościbrodzki, 2015, p. 28). President

Komorowski in October 2010 noted that the European Union should not stop the enlargement process and close to Ukraine the European integration prospects (Mościbrodzki, 2015, p. 28).

POLAND AND THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

The chances of implementation of Polish intentions towards Eastern policy increased in 2008, which was caused by the activities of France in the Mediterranean area. In March 2008, after European Council Meeting where leaders of the EU member states approved the project of the Union for the Mediterranean, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland R. Sikorski promised to soon submit proposals for deepening ties with its Eastern neighbours within the European Neighbourhood Policy. Poland hoped that after the adoption of initiatives aimed at strengthening the Southern dimension of the ENP, it will be easier to obtain support of the EU to deepen relations with its Eastern neighbours (Sydoruk, 2012).

Eastern Partnership initiative was presented jointly by Poland and Sweden at the meeting of foreign ministers on May 26th–27th, 2008. It should be noted that the Czech Republic, thus in April 2008, presented its own initiatives to deepen the Eastern dimension of the ENP, and provided strong support for this initiative. Prague also participated in developing more detailed Polish-Swedish project of the Eastern Partnership, which was submitted to the European Commission in October 2008 (Wojna, Gniazdowski, 2009).

Later Poland focused on campaigning for support for the Eastern Partnership initiative in the EU structures and Member States¹. Polish politicians and government officials held intensive consultations with the European Commission aimed at incorporating proposals contained in the project of the Eastern Partnership and in the European Commission's forthcoming Communication on this issue. Poland also sought to create a *front* of countries that would support Eastern Partnership. November 24th, 2008, in Warsaw, a meeting of the Visegrad Group took place, where Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, and

¹ See: *Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o Zadaniach Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej w 2009 r.* Typescript of the 35th Sitting of the 6th Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 12 February 2009. Retrieved from: www.sejm.gov.pl; [accessed 2.03.2014]; *Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers*. Warsaw, 5 November 2008. Retrieved from: <http://www.msz.gov.pl>; [accessed 2.03.2014].

Sweden also participated. The participants were in favor of the EU to offer its Eastern neighbours new forms of cooperation within the Eastern Partnership in order to help them get closer to EU norms and standards, to create a free trade zone and start the process to facilitate the movement of citizens, which in the long term will *abolish* the visa regime. Poland also conducted intensive consultation with Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other Member States at different levels.

In the onset, the absence of any mention of the possibility of enlargement to the East in the Eastern Partnership project has caused some reservations among some Polish political forces. For example, the largest opposition political party – *Law and Justice* (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*) called the project insufficiently ambitious. Nonetheless, ultimately none of the Polish political forces opposed the Eastern Partnership.

Poland, like other EU Member States who support enlargement eastwards, sees the Eastern Partnership as a pragmatic response to the “enlargement fatigue”. From Polish point of view, if the initiative directly discussed the possibility of the EU enlargement, it would not have any chance of being approved by all its Member States. In addition, the current format of the Eastern Partnership can help the recipients actually become closer to the EU and to prepare them for potential full membership in the future. The Association Agreements, the introduction of free trade area and visa liberalization will play an important role in this process. Finally, a report on foreign policy, presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Sikorski in the Sejm in 2009, also confirms that Poland has not abandoned the pursuit of the EU enlargement to the East.

It seems that Poland, as the largest border country in the eastern part of the EU, should naturally become the representative of the EU’s Eastern policy. Particular stress has been put on relations with Ukraine, which is a new neighbour for the EU, but a traditional partner for Poland, collaborating with responsibility in shaping the EU’s relations with its other eastern partners, e.g., Russia and Belarus, which is sometimes hard.

The Polish government intended to intensify its activity for improving the Eastern Partnership during its Presidency in the second half of 2011. Polish politicians intended to make their first attempts at encouraging other states to strengthen their relations with the Eastern neighbours at the Budapest summit concluding the Hungarian Presidency of the EU. They expected that they would be able to convince, in particular, the countries of the Visegrad Group to strengthen the eastern direction of the EU policy.

Notwithstanding the aims and hopes for Polish Presidency, almost all experts and politicians admit a complete Polish failure in the sphere of Eastern Partnership, namely, Eastern Partnership summit, which took place in September 2011 in Warsaw. European Commissioner for Budget Janusz Lewandowski states that the EU Eastern Partnership Summit could not bring better results. *However, this meeting reminded the EU that Europe does not end on the river Bug... We did everything we could, unfortunately, neither Ukraine nor Belarus helped us*, added Commissioner (Sydoruk, 2012, p. 123).

Eastern dimension of the Polish Presidency in the EU has been important but turned out to be a big political defeat, said Krzysztof Szczerski, politician of opposition party Law and Justice. He added that in the case of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, steps of progression and regression occurred. Another opposition politician, Konrad Szymański, pointed out that Warsaw allowed French and German position in eastern affairs being imposed upon itself, and their position was reluctant to deepen political and economic relations between the EU and Eastern Partnership countries, namely Ukraine (Sydoruk, 2012, p. 123).

Nevertheless, the Polish authorities claimed success in Eastern policy in the official rapport of the results of Polish Presidency in the EU: *Established development and strengthening of the Eastern Partnership should be considered completed. We have successfully carried out the second Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw. The participants adopted the Joint Declaration, according to the demands of the presidency: the records confirming the intention to further enhance the integration of partner countries with the EU, recognizing their European aspirations, the pursuit of economic integration with the EU market and to establish a visa-free regime, as well as the deepening of cooperation sector and opening of EU agencies and programs for the citizens of the partner countries.* The document also referred to the commitment of the EU to devote to achieving the objectives of the Eastern Partnership of 1.9 billion euro in 2010–2013, this amount was further increased by the EU of 150 million euro, allocated for the period up to 2013... *The unity of the EU concerning the policy towards Belarus during the presidency has been maintained*².

² See: *Przewodnictwo Polski w Radzie Unii Europejskiej*. Raport końcowy z przygotowania i sprawowania prezydencji złożony przez Pełnomocnika Rządu ds. Przygotowania Organów Administracji Rządowej i Sprawowania przez Rzeczpospolitą Polską Przewodnictwa w Radzie Unii Europejskiej na podstawie § 1 pkt 2 Rozporządzenia Rady Ministrów z dnia 15 lipca 2008 r. (Dz.U. Nr 133, poz. 843 z późn. zm.). Rada Ministrów, 2012.

In March 2012, Polish government adopted the first multiannual foreign policy strategy since 1989 – *The Priorities of Polish Foreign Policy 2012–2016* (Priorytety polskiej polityki zagranicznej)³. The strengthening of influence on Polish Eastern policy and European Eastern Neighbourhood was one of the main objectives of this key document. Here was also mentioned that Poland should support the liberalization of visa regime and creation of free trade areas with Eastern European states. Developing relations with Ukraine, as a strategic partner, has a great importance for Warsaw.

POSITION OF POLAND ON THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT

Poland has been responding to the crisis in Ukraine since its early days. The Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, the question of signing the Association Agreement with Ukraine and prevent of further violence in Ukraine were central issues in Polish bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the Ukrainian government and its EU and NATO partners. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, together with his French and German counterparts, were intermediary in negotiations between the protesters and the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich on February 20th, 2014, aiming at ending the violence and encouraging the dialogue between Euromaidan and V. Yanukovich. However, despite its early activity and practical action, Poland was not included into the “Normandy format”.

President Bronisław Komorowski and Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski and Defence Minister Tomasz Siemoniak condemned the annexation of the Crimea and the Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine. B. Komorowski in an interview with German radio station on August 30th, 2014 stated the fact of Russian invasion in Ukraine, warned Europe on the policy of appeasement of Russia, supported sanctions against Moscow, and called for the strengthening of the eastern flank of NATO (Kyrydon, Troyan, 2015).

From then onwards, Poland has been focusing primarily on actions that could be implemented within the European and transatlantic organisations in response to the Russia's behaviour. Within the European Union, Poland supported the visa restrictions and economic sanctions against Moscow, and their expansion in

³ See: *Priorytety Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2012–2016*, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Rzeczpospolita Polska. Retrieved from: http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/priorytety_polityki_zagr_2012_2016; [accessed 2.03.2014].

response to the continuing military aggression of Russia against Ukraine; within NATO, Poland actively advocated for confirmation guarantees of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty through practical steps to strengthen the territorial security of the eastern suburbs of the Alliance. Poland defended the idea of increasing the presence of allied troops on the northeast side during the preparations for the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014.

Poland has allocated 100 million euro credit assistance to Ukraine and 2.5 million to the scholarship programme for students of the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, Crimea (in 2015). Ukraine was also provided a humanitarian assistance by more than \$1 million. The Polish government also allocated 170 000 euro for treatment and rehabilitation of the Ukrainian military (85 people) (Ua.112, 2015).

As to the military assistance to Kyiv, officially Warsaw did not take a clear position. It is willing to sell weapons to Ukraine, but does not propose any specific decisions on this matter. The continuous discussions on the weapon supply to Ukraine show that when it comes to the military aspects of the conflict, the Polish reaction to the Russian invasion into Ukraine is not univocal.

Such situation caused a barrage of criticism of the government for allegedly drifting in the conflict in Ukraine. Namely, Poland agreed to limit its military assistance to Ukraine with non-lethal equipment, it postponed the entry into force of the fourth chapter of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU related to the deep and comprehensive free trade area, and had more than modest results at the NATO summit in Wales. The legendary leader of Solidarity Zbigniew Bujak called the passivity of the Polish authorities on Ukraine a “treason” (*Polska na granicy zdrady*, 2015).

The behaviour of the Polish Government follows a certain logic: Poland will not affect the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine, the best that the Polish government can do is act systematically with partners in the EU and NATO. As newly appointed Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz said in her address to the Sejm on October 1st, 2014: *... it is important to prevent the isolation of Poland as a result of unrealistic targets it sets for itself* (Baranowski, Cichocki, 2015, p. 36). Another statement was made by Grzegorz Schetyna, successor of Radosław Sikorski as foreign minister, towards the Sejm on November 6th, 2014: *The rush of isolationism and anti-Western sentiments and denial of European values will build a wall that will separate Russia from Europe. Critical assessment of the policy of Russia does not change the fact that we will remain neighbours and economic partners* (Baranowski, Cichocki, 2015, p. 36).

This position is not surprising, taking into consideration that at the beginning of the first term, the D. Tusk government's Eastern policy was based upon the fact that open scepticism towards the EU co-operation with Russia and too much ambition on EU relations with Ukraine could lead to isolation of Poland on the international arena, as it was under the previous 2005–2008 government. Hence, the Polish government offered Russia a “normalisation” in 2008, hoping that it would return Poland into the mainstream of the policies of the EU and NATO and improve its position in these organisations. Some subsequent events may indicate that this assumption was correct, including D. Tusk election as the President of the European Council.

Despite the importance of the official position of Warsaw, what should be noted is also an extremely high level of support for Ukraine from Polish public. Many Poles, journalists, politicians, diplomats, students, human rights activists, volunteers, have become direct participants of Euromaidan and events in Eastern Ukraine. According to surveys of the Fund “Transatlantic Trends”, 78% of Poles are in favour of economic assistance to Ukraine, 77% supported sanctions against Russia, and 67% supported aid to Ukraine, even if it will increase the danger of conflict with Russia (Baranowski, Cichocki, 2015, p. 35). Jarek Podworski, a member of association “Generation” in Katowice, organiser of humanitarian convoys to the Maidan and ATO combatants, points out: *In Poland, first and foremost, the society worried about Ukraine, not the state... We were collecting warm clothes and money to the Maidan and ATO. This was not done by the state, but by donations of ordinary Poles, private foundations and volunteers...* (Loginov, 2015).

As for the prognosis, we need to talk about the willingness of Poland – at the level of Warsaw officials and Polish society, and systematically at the EU and NATO levels – to continue supporting Ukraine. Poland realises that stability and security in Ukraine is a guarantee of its own stability and security. If the “Normandy format” (repeatedly publicly criticised by Polish President A. Duda as German-French tandem that does not reflect the true position of the EU and whose activities are not always in the interests of Ukraine) exhaust its potential, Warsaw must play a more active role in the new diplomatic forums aimed at resolving the conflict. In this respect, Poland should intensify its activities when it comes to offer new ideas for the long term. It seems that the format of the Weimar triangle, that once worked well in terms of promoting European integration of Poland, could be useful in the settlement of certain aspects of Russian-Ukrainian conflict. These capabilities have been demonstrated during the *Ukrainian crisis*,

as it was discussed above. Today, there are favourable circumstances for deeper involvement of Poland in the EU's Eastern policy formation within the mechanisms of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership – it is the presidency of the former Polish Prime Minister D. Tusk in the European Council and his close interaction with A. Merkel (whose grandfather was Pole).

CONCLUSIONS

Poland's attempt to reconstruct and consolidate its place in Europe after the collapse of communism plays a significant role in formulating its policies towards its Eastern neighbours and its preferences for EU policies towards its Eastern neighbours. Polish decision-makers clearly see Poland's role in the East as a promoter of the EU's norms, translator of the EU's law, and an *intelligent agent*. The EaP initiative constitutes an important part of Poland's attempt to re-establish itself firmly in Europe through positioning itself as the lynchpin between the West and the East, both in a normative sense and institutionally. Poland's decision-makers realised that becoming a big and influential EU member is possible through negotiation and understanding of the EU's policy-making processes. This contends that the consensus between political realism and idealism in Poland's foreign policy may be possible to achieve through the advancement of European norms and values in Polish foreign policy.

The Polish political and intellectual elites have attempted to reconcile their perception of Poland as a big and important state with the realistic objective of implementing their national objectives in the EU.

REFERENCES:

- Baranowski, M., & Cichocki B. (2015). Poland: Searching for a Strategic Response. In: J. Forbrig (ed.), *A Region Disunited? Central European Responses to the Russia–Ukraine Crisis* (p. 34–38). Washington: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, European Policy Paper 1/2015.
- Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o Zadaniach Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej w 2009 r.* Typescript of the 35th Sitting of the 6th Sejm of the Republic of Poland, 12 February 2009. Retrieved from: www.sejm.gov.pl; [accessed 2.03.2014].
- Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Prime Ministers.* Warsaw, 5 November 2008. Retrieved from: <http://www.msz.gov.pl>; [accessed 2.03.2014].
- Kyrydon, A., & Troian, S. (2015). Súčasný etap ukrajinsko-polských vzťahov: diskurs vzájomnosti. *Zovnishni spravy*, 1, 48–53.

- Loginov, Y. (2015). Słowaczczyna: družhyty z Rosiieiu, dopomagaty Ukraini. *Dzerkalo tyzhnia. Ukraina*, 26, 17 lypnia.
- Menkiszak, M. (2014). *Enhanced European Neighbourhood Policy Towards Eastern European Countries: A Role for the Visegrad Countries? The Foreign Policies of the Visegrad Countries Towards the Eastern Neighbourhood – Areas and Options of Cooperation*, Budapest, 6th–9th December 2007. Retrieved from <http://www.hiia.hu>.
- Mościbrodzki, W. (2012). *Rola Polski w kształtowaniu polityki wschodniej Unii Europejskiej (z uwzględnieniem kwestii Rosji, Ukrainy i Białorusi)*. Retrieved from: <http://docplayer.pl>.
- Non-paper (2003). *Non-paper z polskimi propozycjami w sprawie przyszłego kształtu polityki rozszerzonej EU wobec nowych wschodnich sąsiadów*. In: *Polityka rozszerzonej Unii Europejskiej wobec nowych sąsiadów* (p. 85–98, english version). Warsaw: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego. Retrieved from: http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/nowi_se.pdf.
- Polska na granicy zdrady (2015). *Rzeczpospolita*, January 21.
- Priorytety Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2012–2016, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Rzeczpospolita Polska. Retrieved from: http://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/priorytety_polityki_zagr_2012_2016; [accessed 2.03.2014].
- Przewodnictwo Polski w Radzie Unii Europejskiej*. Raport końcowy z przygotowania i sprawowania prezydencji złożony przez Pełnomocnika Rządu ds. Przygotowania Organów Administracji Rządowej i Sprawowania przez Rzeczpospolitą Polską Przewodnictwa w Radzie Unii Europejskiej na podstawie § 1 pkt 2 Rozporządzenia Rady Ministrów z dnia 15 lipca 2008 r. (Dz.U. Nr 133, poz. 843 z późn. zm.). Rada Ministrów, 2012.
- Sydoruk, T. (2012). *Polityka susidstva Europeiskogo Soiuzu u Schidnii Europi: model integracji bez czlenstwa*. Lviv: PAIS.Ua.112. (2015). Yak susidni krainy dopomagaiut Ukraini protystoiaty rosiiskii agresii. Retrieved from ua.112.ua/220695.htm.
- Wojna, B., & Gniazdowski, M. (2009). *Eastern Partnership. The Opening Report*. Warsaw: The Polish Institute of Foreign Affairs.