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Electoral strategies of the Union of Freedom and the Democratic Party *demokraci.pl*

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Słowa kluczowe: strategie wyborcze, Unia Wolności, Partia Demokratyczna *demokraci.pl*, partie polityczne, wybory

Summary

The aim of the article was to present the electoral strategy of the Freedom Union and The Democratic Party *demokraci.pl*. Strategies that were used during the parliamentary and the government elections were analyzed. In the first case a way of expressing major purposes that both the UW and the PD wanted to achieve by gaining parliamentary representation was discussed.

In the second case the way of conducting self-government campaign, which was carried out using slightly different electoral strategies was discussed. It involved the possibility of joining electoral coalition and gaining seats in local provinces, districts councils, municipal councils and offices of mayors and presidents of cities. The thing that was characteristic of the UW and the PD in the electoral strategies was inefficiency in terms of activities.

Streszczenie

Strategie wyborcze Unii Wolności oraz Partii Demokratycznej *demokraci.pl*

Celem artykułu było przedstawienie strategii wyborczych Unii Wolności oraz Partii Demokratycznej *demokraci.pl*. Analizie poddano te strategie, które wykorzystywano w trak-

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cie wyborów parlamentarnych oraz samorządowych. W pierwszym przypadku mieliśmy do czynienia z przedstawieniem sposobów artykułowania głównych celów, które zarówno UW i PD chciały osiągnąć poprzez zdobycie parlamentarnej reprezentacji.

Natomiast w drugim omówiono sposoby prowadzenia kampanii samorządowych, za pomocą których realizowano nieco odmienne strategie wyborcze. Złożyły się na nie możliwość zawarcia koalicji wyborczej i zdobycia mandatów w sejmikach województw, radach powiatów, radach gmin oraz urzędów wójtów, burmistrzów i prezydentów miast. To, co charakteryzowało UW i PD w zakresie realizowanych strategii wyborczych była nieefektywność w zakresie prowadzonych działań.

I.

The primary aim of any political party, by its definition, is to gain public support needed to get, and then to exercise state power and pursue their own particular interests². In a democratic system of a government, almost every political party sets itself a task of forming public opinion, both among its own members, as well as among general public, the support of which it wants to get. This process undergoes high intensification in a period preceding election and during election campaign. It is related to serving election function by parties, comprising of proper selection of candidates, who may represent the party on a local and national level, creating political programs, shaping a positive image of the party and conducting specific electoral strategy³.

Political parties performing certain activities related to an electoral strategy increasingly more and more often use tools and techniques of electoral marketing. This is determined by using specific marketing instruments applied in political competition⁴. As a result, political parties create their political offers, made during election campaigns and their effectiveness depends on ideological and

² M. Żmigrodzki, *Pojęcie, geneza i badania partii politycznych*, [in:] *Współczesne partie i systemy partyjne: zagadnienia teorii i praktyki politycznej*, eds. W. Sokół, M. Żmigrodzki, Lublin 2003, 16.

³ M. Chmaj, W. Sokół, M. Żmigrodzki, *Teoria partii politycznych*. Lublin 1997, p. 57 et seq.

⁴ R. Wiszniewski, *Marketing wyborczy: studium kampanii wyborczych w systemach prezydenckich i semiprezydenckich (Finlandia, Francja, Polska, Stany Zjednoczone)*, Warszawa 2000, p. 74.

opinion factors, and very often on politicians and party leaders, who are judged by potential voters in a category of people with charisma, personal authority, big ambitions and often political skills, and what is more important, social prestige⁵.

The above features used to reflect members of the Union of Freedom (the UW) and its continuator the Democratic Party *demokraci.pl* (the PD), so the parties that in terms of organization are an example of continuity and a continuation of liberal-democratic environment, present on Polish political scene for over twenty years. The former UW is ranked among historical parties, and its activity was finished in May 2005 when its inner transformation was performed. The PD was established in its place, and it represented a departure from existing principles shared by politicians of the UW, defined as a historical agreement between former solidarity ethos and part of old establishment of the The Polish United Workers' Party. Apart from people promoting the foundation of a new political party: Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Władysław Frasyniuk and Jerzy Hausner, there also appeared Aleksander Kwaśniewski and the then Prime Minister Marek Belka (treated in PD as a potential candidate for the president in the elections of 2005). Withdrawal of their commitment by A. Kwaśniewski and M. Belka caused serious organizational difficulties in PD⁶.

The aim of this article is to present electoral strategies of the UW and the PD in parliamentary and local government elections with special attention paid to internal party documents prepared for the elections. Analysis was made with regards to electoral strategies of parliamentary and municipal elections.

II.

Any attempts associated with creation of a specific image of the UW and the PD should begin with an analysis of election strategies undertaken by the Democratic Union (the UD), the predecessor of the UW and the PD. This party sustained its characteristic image of continuer and guardian of

⁵ H. Pietrzak, J. Gawroński, *Psychologia polityki*, Rzeszów 2012, pp. 368, 371.

⁶ A. Kaszukur, *Rola Partii Demokratycznej – demokraci.pl na polskiej scenie politycznej*, [in:] *Partie i system partyjny III RP: stan i perspektywy*, eds. K. Kowalczyk, Ł. Tomczak, Toruń 2007, pp. 181–182.

everything, what had already been done. Academic nature of the party and its ethos were affirmed, and its professionalism was emphasized, indicating way of life of the UD politicians who represented party's political origins.

The Party's program was diversified and apart from the general message addressed to society, it contained messages tailored to different groups of voters, which were mostly intelligentsia, doctors, teachers, entrepreneurs, craftsmen, merchants and adolescents⁷. These activities were a kind of self-limitation of the electorate and caused inefficiency of election campaigns.

In case of the UW there were two parliamentary campaigns in 1997 and 2001. Two different strategies were implemented then. The first one was developed by Gerald Stanisław Abramczyk and it was to lead to the increase of social support for the UW to about 15–16% and get 75–80 seats in the Parliament and 10–12 seats in the Senate (the so-called stage I). In the final stage of the election campaign G.S. Abramczyk postulated upward trend for public support for the UW in the range of 13–14% (Stage II). This strategy consisted mainly in removal from power the then governmental coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance (the SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (the PSL) and the creation of a positive image of the UW politicians, who were supposed to appear to public as "sensitive to human affairs"⁸. They wanted to establish a direct relationship with voters. The campaign involved many of the leading UW politicians, whose active participation in promoting the party resembled presidential election⁹. Another aspect were activities associated with discouraging voters to vote for the SLD and the PSL (recalling the post-communist origins) and Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP), the choice of which was evaluated as detrimental to Poland. In contrast to the negative view of the political parties mentioned above, UW was presented as a party of experts, well – educated people and architects of the Third Republic¹⁰.

Presentation of the UW electoral slogan "Left? Right? Always ahead!" was met with immediate criticism from political opponents, in the opinion of whom UW was treated as an indecisive party with a vague program, and

⁷ D. Szczepański, *Strategie aktywizacji elektoratu wiejskiego w kampaniach wyborczych ugrupowań liberalno-demokratycznych w Polsce (1993–1997)*, "Myśl Ludowa" 2012, nr 4, pp. 41–53.

⁸ G.P. Abramczyk, *Szkic ogólnej strategii wyborczej UW*, [b.m.w.] 1996, p. 1.

⁹ A. Dudek, *Historia polityczna Polski 1989–2005*, Kraków 2007, p. 349.

¹⁰ *Unia Wolności: podstawowe informacje. Nasze abc...*, Warszawa 1999, p. 3.

therefore the slogan was quickly changed to “A wise choice – a better life”. The adjective “wise” was directed only to those people, who intend to vote for the Union¹¹. Just before the parliamentary elections the criticism of AWS was ceased. A possibility for concluding a coalition was not rejected and politicians began to remind solidarity origins. It was emphasized that only formations derived from the great movement of “Solidarity” were able to remove the SLD–PSL coalition from power and make reforms in the country.

In the election campaign in 2001, the UW was troubled by its own problems. Leaving the coalition with AWS, negative public reception caused by too hastily introduced social reforms and internal party schism eventually influenced the pursued electoral strategy as well as the achieved result. The UW electoral strategy consisted of two phases. The first one concerned a period before the schism in the party, so negotiations with Andrzej Olechowski and participation of UW politicians and members of the Republic for Citizens Association on joint electoral lists. This strategy was implemented from December 2000 to 14 January 2001. The second phase, the period after 14 January 2001, was fulfilled after announcements related to the establishment of the Civic Platform (the PO) and supporting it by former members of the UW. It was then that a strategy to listen to votes of “all social groups – entrepreneurs, workers and farmers” was set out¹². Despite such a declaration they limited their actions just to promoting a “strong middle class” slogan, which included a broad social class encompassing entrepreneurs, intelligentsia, small business owners, professionals, managers, health service workers, professors, teachers, cultural personalities, clerks and many other¹³. The implementation of such a strategy was also a self-limitation of the electorate.

An element that supported UW’s strategy was the establishment the UW Women’s Forum in March 2001, that promoted 30% participation of women on electoral lists. In addition, the board of UW prepared a “program for residents of cities and towns”, in which politicians of the UW saw the opportu-

¹¹ M. Winclawska, *Unia Wolności: partia polityczna w okresie transformacji*, Warszawa 2010, p. 172.

¹² *Wystąpienie przewodniczącego Unii Wolności Bronisława Geremka*, Warszawa 20.01.2001, “Polska Scena Polityczna” 2000, nr 2, p. 32.

¹³ B. Geremek, *P.T. Posłowie, Senatorowie, Przewodniczący Regionów Unii Wolności*, Warszawa, “Biuletyn UW” 2001, nr 23, p. 4.

nity for entrepreneurship development by creating new jobs and improving educational and professional qualifications¹⁴. Indeed, formulation of such a document clearly indicated a target group of electorate, whose support was sought. For both the UW and the PD the unchanged element of whole campaigns as well as applied strategies was addressing the offer to particular social groups. It was characterized in Table 1.

Slightly different strategies were implemented during local government election campaigns in which the UW participated consecutively in 1994, 1998 and 2002. In the first case they took actions related to promoting and strengthening the image of the UW. It consisted in presenting party's politicians as defenders of local – governments. A disadvantage of this strategy was to address municipalities activists, not voters¹⁵. In 1998, UW promoted the slogan "You choose us – You require of us" which in opinion of political scientist Christopher Andrew Piasecki, was an original sin of UW's politicians¹⁶. This slogan, however, was incomprehensible and later it was heavily criticized. In 2002, on the other hand, UW competed from a position of a party from outside the parliament, so the strategy pursued concerned the so-called "Fight for survival". A decision was made to make alliances with political parties and social organizations, the program of which was ideologically close to UW. As a result of many misconceptions that have overshadowed the election campaign, the UW finally took part in elections alone as The Self-Governing Union, suffering another defeat¹⁷.

Therefore, it is clear that the party with appropriate political potential was extremely weak in terms of election strategies. Within the structures they did not know how to adapt party's program to social needs, and self-restriction of its electorate doomed the party to failure in political competition. Another aspect which should be noted was the inability to make rational decisions. This especially concerned making coalitions and alliances, which instead of supporting the electoral strategy, consequently dismissed the process of making a campaign.

¹⁴ *Program dla mieszkańców miast i miasteczek*, "Polska Scena Polityczna" 2001, nr 7, p. 1.

¹⁵ D. Szczepański, *Unia Wolności: założenia programowe i działalność (1994–2005)*, Rzeszów 2013, p. 46.

¹⁶ A.K. Piasecki, *Wybory parlamentarne, samorządowe, prezydenckie (1989–2002)*, Toruń 2004, p. 169.

¹⁷ D. Szczepański, *Unia Wolności: założenia...*, pp. 51–52.

Table 1. UW and PD voter's profile

Profiles	Potential UW and PD voter
Economic aspect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – opposes state management and authoritarianism; – opposes state interference in economy and citizens' life – is willing to take personal risks; – is for a free market; – positively evaluates the state of economy after 1989 and sees its further improvement in a long term;
Political/institutional aspect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – is pro-institutional – respects the state and its institutions, policies and applicable law; – negates communism and socialism as a form of government; – is for man's freedom; – is against the death penalty; – is satisfied with democracy and demands introduction of necessary reforms;
Social aspects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – trusts people; – is "pro-female" – is less traditional and more modern; – believes in the principle of merit; – thinks independently – negates the widespread distribution; – is less prone to state "protectiveness"
Psychological spect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – is interested in science and world; – is mobile, but sometimes unemployed; – is open to change; – feels healthy, happy; – is optimistic about the future
Sociographical aspekt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – is a resident of large and medium-sized cities; – has a university degree, incomplete higher or at least secondary education; – often works on their own account, in private or budget sector; – occupies leadership positions; – describes himself as "middle class"; – is of "mobile" working age, 18–45 years old;
Poland in the UE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – associates success of Poland with the membership in the EU; – is pro-European; – has less claims to the EU and other countries; – is not afraid of international threats.

Source: self study on the basis of: Archiwum Partii Demokratycznej *demokracy.pl* w Warszawie, *Demokracy.pl_Wybory 2005*, Warszawa 2005; Archiwum Partii Demokratycznej *demokracy.pl* w Warszawie *Lewica i Demokracy: szkic do strategii marki*, Warszawa 2007; *Silna klasa średnia to szansa dla każdego*, Warszawa 2001, p. 2; *Wolność. Bezpieczeństwo. Rozwój. Program Unii Wolności*, Warszawa 1997, p. 3.

III.

In the parliamentary elections in 2005, PD realized the electoral strategy, which first aim was to exceed the election threshold, and the second one was to present the party as a completely new political formation. "Novelty bonus" was also expected. The basic elements that were used in the campaign were frequent emphasis of low public support for the Parliament and that political offer of PD remained "in opposition to whole parliamentary system"¹⁸. The political tactic was determined in internal assumptions and analyses. First and foremost, weaknesses resulting from relatively low social support for the PD, infinitesimal social awareness of the party existence, the lack of knowledge of the PD leaders clear program identification and ideological message were indicated.

The political tactic, on the other hand, comprised of the following factors: indicating contradictions between PO and PiS, especially when joining a coalition, forcing PO to confront the PiS, emphasizing the issues in PD that mostly attracted supporters to the PO (economy, pragmatism, liberalism), attacking the LPR in order to cause radicalization of PiS and emphasizing that SLD "is just a life raft"¹⁹. Such a tactic was supposed to give PD a possibility to exceed the threshold and have its' representatives being elected to the parliament.

In order to encourage potential voters to vote for the PD they presented arguments almost identical to UW's arguments in parliamentary elections in 1997. They comprised of such slogans as: "in the next parliament PD will be a mediator that is pushing matters forward", "PD has a vision of Poland in the EU", "PD will invest in young generation", "The PD has a program where everything is counted and everything works", "The PD is an investment in future, development, experience (Forward, not backward!)"²⁰. In that way, they referred to a professional staff of the PD. In addition, also

¹⁸ T. Alberski, *Kampania wyborcza Partii Demokratycznej – demokraci.pl w 2005 r., czyli strategia bez strategii*, [in:] *Wybory parlamentarne 2005: analiza marketingowa*, ed. M. Jeziński, Toruń 2006, p. 191.

¹⁹ Archiwum Partii Demokratycznej demokracji.pl w Warszawie, *Demokraci.pl Wybory 2005*, Warszawa 2005. Document relating to The Democratic Party demokraci.pl strategy layed down in electronic version as files of presentation Power Point.

²⁰ Ibidem.

the young voters were addressed in a special way, the support of whom was sought, so unconventional methods of marketing were often used. They included, among others, using a storey red bus, often found in the UK, that visited important Polish cities and promoted candidates of the PD, with music of the Rolling Stones, that appealed to passer – bys²¹. The means taken did not bring the expected result. The PD did not exceed a threshold reaching only 2.45% of votes.

In the next parliamentary elections, which were held in 2007 the PD stood for election from an electoral coalition list of the Left and Democrats (the LiD), formed three weeks before the local elections in 2006. A draft strategy that was prepared referred essentially to creation of the LiD's brand, consisting in identifying needs of voters, presentation of the program and its adaptation to expectations of voters, proper communication with voters and actual program implementation. A desired image of LiD was also specified, and it consisted of a "uniform group and not a coalition of parties, an offensive party, party of clear ideas, lot of cheerful people, breaking with the label of a post-communist party, party of future, focusing on a program of tomorrow and not with roots residing in history, party of modern and frequent forms of interactions with voters, party of kept promises – effective while acting for voters"²².

The above assessment of the LiD referred to an attempt to create an alternative to current government and PO, SLD and PSL opposition parties. The social message made use of a simple slogan, such as "corruption starts at the top", which indicated "a terrible state of Polish political class governing Poland and the lack of a political plan that would allow to fully use an economic situation and the fact of joining the European Union". What is important, the assumed electoral strategy emphasized that members of the Left and Democrats were not without a fault, because they had their share in what was being criticized. According to the LiD's, thorough repair of the state required improvement of style, mechanisms and methods of manage-

²¹ A. Kaszukur, *Rola Partii Demokratycznej...*, p. 184.

²² Archiwum Partii Demokratycznej demokracji.pl w Warszawie, *Lewica i Demokraci: kampania wyborcza 2007*, Warszawa 2007; Archiwum Partii Demokratycznej demokracji.pl w Warszawie, *Lewica i Demokraci: szkic do strategii marki*, Warszawa 2007. Document relating to The Lid's strategy layed down in electronic version as files of presentation Power Point.

ment, an implementation of the so-called substantial standards for politicians, replacement of a part of the Polish political class by removing “losers, scandalmongers and fools”, and rejection of old divisions and search for new compromises were advocated. Adoption of such assumptions and the way of communication between the LiD and voters was to lead to the promotion of the next slogan, namely “smart fish in clean water” which was to reflect the political situation after getting power by the Left and Democrats.

A special logo that consisted of an expanded tree symbolizing life, strength, rebirth, wisdom, stability, home and family was also created. As stated in a description of the logotype, “psychologists claim, that in subconscious of every person there is an archetype of a tree, and from its structure – if you ask someone to draw a tree – you can figure out mental condition of a man. A ripe tree with a wide trunk means strength, stability, durability. Strong rooting is respect for the past and history. Deciduous tree with abundant crown is associated with spiritual rebirth, growth and development”²³. The second version of the LiD’s logo was a tree in a frame with orange – red squares, which were supposed to be associated with a window to the world, and to Poland. It also meant openness, freedom and space. The third version of the logo contained branchy tree in a red frame. Red was supposed to emphasise noble intentions, stronger promotion of LiD coalition shortcut and purity of form and ideas. The last logo got recommendation of the Look At Company, which was responsible for preparing the documents.

Important action that were taken, was presentation of the program of “100 particular ideas”, which was also the election slogan. *Demokracy.pl* in parliamentary elections in 2007 registered 94 candidates. Deputy mandates were obtained by Bogdan Lis, Marian Filar and Jan Widacki, while other 94 candidates of PD received total support of 5,71% of votes²⁴. From the point of view of PD the results obtained in election turned out to be relatively good, but inconstant. After breaching the agreement with LiD, the above – mentioned deputies formed in 2008 Democratic Circle of Deputies, and then after leaving PD they joined the Democratic Party.

²³ Archiwum Partii Demokratycznej *demokracy.pl* in Warsaw, *Lewica i Demokraci: kampania wyborcza 2007*, Warszawa 2007.

²⁴ L. Nikolski, *Lewica i Demokraci w wyborach parlamentarnych 2007*, Warszawa 2008, p. 27.

Last activity of the PD in parliamentary elections took place in 2011, and it started as a conversation with leaders of several parties to form an electoral coalition. The newly elected The President of the PD, Brygida Kuźniak, found that PD was ready to cooperate with those parties situated “in a democratic center and moderate, sensible left”²⁵. The Greens and Social Democrats Poland came into play. A possibility to participate in election with The Support of Janusz Palikot Movement was also considered. In the end the idea to create a coalition was abandoned, which was determined by a lack of agreement with the leaders of these parties. Additionally, there were some issues related to campaign financing, which PD could not afford because of insufficient budget.

This situation led to the fact that the PD resigned from defining their own electoral strategy, and also resigned from submitting candidates to the Parliament. Some of them moved to other political parties’ lists, for example, in Łódź, Kraków, Katowice and Lublin districts²⁶. Only two candidates stood for election to the Senate: Grażyna Szalc in electoral district no. 57 (Krosno) and Henryk Krzeczkowski in electoral district no. 13 (Toruń). None of the candidates got the mandate.

The situation of PD was different in the local elections in 2006 and 2010. The first time PD stood for election from LiD coalition lists. As political scientist Łukasz Tomczak noted, signing a contract with PD “reduced a possibility of concluding agreements with groups looking for a sort of «typical leftwing» agreement. It can be supposed that the idea of “expanding the coalition to the center did not maintain similarity of programs. What mattered was the fact of greater capacity to mobilize the electorate and clearly post-Solidarity tradition of democrats”²⁷. Nevertheless, coalition agree-

²⁵ Brygida Kuźniak nową przewodniczącą, [http://www.demokraci.pl/aktualnosci,11,0.11\(2.02.2015\)](http://www.demokraci.pl/aktualnosci,11,0.11(2.02.2015)).

²⁶ In the case of these cities on behalf of the PD on electoral lists of other political parties were Witold Rosset in Lodz, starting from position no. 10 PO. And in Krakow SLD lists were three members of the PD. They were Elizabeth Bińczycka (no. 2 on the list), Iwona Kimmer-Trzcińska (no. 13 on the list) SLD and Arkadiusz Czudej no. 25 on the list). In Katowice, Wojciech Chmiel started with a list of the SLD (Item no. 23). This politician was associated for a long time with the SLD. In Lublin list of the Palikot Movement no. 3 started Wojciech Chmiel.

²⁷ Ł. Tomczak, *Ugrupowania lewicy i centrolewicy w wyborach parlamentarnych 2007 roku*, “Przegląd Humanistyczny. Pedagogika, Politologia, Filologia” 2008, nr 1, p. 62.

ment was signed on September 3, 2006, and the adopted electoral strategy assumed: firstly to reduce marginalization of the left and center-left parties; secondly, to establish an opposition to right-wing politicians; thirdly, in case of success in the election, to “stay in the game” and achieve a further increase of support²⁸. This strategy was implemented primarily by presentation of main candidates in the elections for mayors, and by promoting the program that included the following principles: democratic and civic self-government that would be supportive, honest and transparent. Forming such postulates was a response to the policy pursued by PO and PiS, which, in the opinion of LiD, were the most important political competitors who were supposed to be deprived of local representation.

In terms of the election result (the PD introduced four councilors to provincial assemblies and some councilors in parish councils in Łódź, Poznań and Warsaw) the coalition of LiD enjoyed a warm reception from journalists and commentators of political scene and was a clear signal concerning adoption of electoral competition of PO and PiS²⁹. It turned out to be unstable, because the agreement was broken in 2008.

In local elections in 2010, the PD has decided to register an election committee and their candidates. From the moment of registration, members and followers of the party did not take action to participate in the election from the list of PD, and district committees registered in Warsaw, Bemowo and Żoliborz districts. Thanks to that a number of councilors were introduced to municipal councils. These activities consequently made impossible the identification of PD on the local political scene and severely restricted its activities.

IV.

When evaluating electoral strategies of the UW and the PD it should be noted, that both parties were accompanied by a belief in the superiority over other political parties and groups in Poland. It resulted mainly from an intellectual background that UW and PD had at their disposal. As a general characteristic of the undertaken initiative related to the implementation

²⁸ L. Nikolski, *Wybory do sejmików województw – 2006 r.*, Warszawa 2006, p. 15.

²⁹ Ibidem, p. 31.

of the strategy and conducting election campaigns it is worth to quote the opinion, which was presented in 1993 on the pages of the party publisher, and which accurately reflects the characteristics of the environment: "The Union, although it is more significant to the party, has its weaknesses. Mean, but friendly ones, claim that one of them results from the fact that average education of a Union's member is close to habilitation. Thus, neither the head to the business, or political locomotive"³⁰.

The above opinion seems to be valid also in relation to the PD, the leaders of which when forming electoral coalitions very often did not achieve their purpose to gain parliamentary or local government representation. The exception is the UW's electoral strategy of 1997. It seems, that the activities of the PD as an independent political entity are doomed to further marginalization.

Electoral strategies, both of the UW and the PD were largely inconsiderate and often not adapted to general public, but narrowly selected social group, which was defined as "the middle class". It resulted in inefficiency of the UW and the PD in terms of action and doomed the entire electoral strategy to defeat. It also affected the strategy of self-governments, where it was forgotten to conduct campaign and reach voters. Instead, emphasis was put on dialogue with potential coalition partners, or internal disputes. Also in this case inefficiency of the activities was apparent. It caused that in the final period the UW and in a lesser extent the PD became not important subjects on a political scene. Currently, this means that PD, as a successor of the UW, will be forced to cease its activities or it will be absorbed by a larger political party.

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³⁰ *Rzecz o... Klubie Parlamentarnym Unia Demokratyczna*, Warszawa 1993, p. 36.

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