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Author: Vladimir A. Balobaev
Year of publication: 2012
Source: Show
Pages: 13-20
DOI Number: http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/npw2012101
PDF: npw/02/npw2012101.pdf

Streszczenie:

THE article analyzes the main approaches to the definition of parliamentarism in foreign and Russian political science. Based on comparative analysis of the author comes to the conclusion that neither foreign nor Russian political science have yet developed a unified scientific approach to understanding the parliamentary system, but from the wide range of definitions can be divided into three main groups to consider these phenomena from different points of view.

Author: Robert Kłaczyński
Year of publication: 2012
Source: Show
Pages: 21-38
DOI Number: http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/npw2012102
PDF: npw/02/npw2012102.pdf

Streszczenie:

The article „Strategic Culture of the Russian Federation” deals with the most important problems related to making the safety strategy of the Russian Federation. It does not also lack the reference to the Russian history since it constitutes an essential formation source of the contemporary strategic culture. A lot of space has been given to deliberations about the influences of the East and West cultures upon the formation of the national strategic culture. The image of the Russian Federation’s strategic culture that follows from the deliberations is ambiguous. It comes from a lack of consistent political, systemic and ecomic state transformations being consequently conducted from the basics. Unfortunately, Russian political elites, who gained influence upon the country’s destiny during the turbulent period following the collapse of the USSR, did not manage to lay strong democratic development foundations based upon the principles of democracy and the supremacy of the law. Nowadays Russia seems to be stuck between the authoritarianism and democracy, that is between the values of the West and the civilization of the East. It is also worth mentioning that the choice of the development direction to be made by Russia does not only determine its future but also the future of the whole European Continent or even perhaps of the whole international community.

Author: Wojciech Materski
Year of publication: 2012
Source: Show
Pages: 39-53
DOI Number: http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/npw2012103
PDF: npw/02/npw2012103.pdf

Streszczenie:

Soon after the Soviet authorities had confessed to have committed the Katyn murder and had made public some of the documents connected to the case the Polish government made the legal claim addressed to the government of the Soviet Union to conduct the full rehabilitation its victims. The Military Prosecutor General’s Office of the Soviet Union commenced the investigation of the case (1990–2004). The issue seemed self-evident and yet it provoked and still is provoking a strong resistance on the part of Moscow – despite the documents whose meaning is evident and supports the claims of the Polish government. Moreover, in the first ten years of so after the claim its realization was legally easier than it is now. After 2004 there is a formal obstacle to it in the form of the closing formula of the investigation conducted by the Military Prosecutor General’s Office of – first Soviet Union and then – the Russian Federation. The Katyn Families attempts to conduct the rehabilitation of the Katyn murder victims in the Russian courts of law all failed which made the Katyn Families appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasburg. The case is still open (the appeal procedure) yet taking into consideration the Russian government’s stance its success is doubtful.

Author: Jakub Potulski
Year of publication: 2012
Source: Show
Pages: 54-74
DOI Number: http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/npw2012204
PDF: npw/02/npw2012104.pdf

Streszczenie:

One of the most important decisions during the transformation of the government and the formation of the Russian Federation’s political system has been a creation of the institution of governor – a director of the regional administration appointed by the country’s president. The governor’s institution has become one of the marking elements in the Russian political system. Over time the governor’s authority position was submitted to changes. During the years of political transformation 1992–1996 the sources of regional power legitimization of the administration’s leaders have been various, some of them have been nominated by the president, others by inhabitants of the region. In 1995 a bill had been accepted, according to which all Russian federation leaders will be elected by inhabitants of each regions. The years 1996–1999 have been the full bloom period of the „gubernatorial” Russia, when regional administration’s leaders concentrated in their hands a very wide range of formal and informal competencies and of real authority. The governor’s position was changed after Vladimir Putin’s accession to power. New national elites perceived an excessive authority of regional elites and direct gubernatorial elections as the main source of the country’s instability and as the main threat for security of the state. Therefore a decision has been taken to leave the direct gubernatorial elections in favor of the governors nomination mechanism by the country’s president with the agreement of the local legislatures. The change of the election’s way has implied that administration’s leaders of the federation’s subjects have become part of the federal structure nomenclature, formed by decisions taken at the central level. The governor’s corps has become an instrument in the hands of the central power protecting its control on the sociopolitical and economical processes in the regions. In the last month we could observe a process of correction of the previous political course. Actually it can be heard that the role of citizens should be increased in the social control’s processes and one must go back to the direct elections of governors by Russian regions inhabitants. In January 2012 a corresponding law had been presented to the State Duma. An intended return to direct gubernatorial elections is an important element of the Russian Federation political system’s evolution.

Author: Andrzej Skrzypek
Year of publication: 2012
Source: Show
Pages: 75-81
DOI Number: http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/npw2012105
PDF: npw/02/npw2012105.pdf

Streszczenie:

This article is devoted to the stereotypes about neighbours in a national consciousness of Russians and Poles and their development during the last four hundred years starting from the polish campaign to Moscow in 1612. In this time it appears the first Russian stereotype of a Pole – a proud lord, catholic and crafty plunderer, whereas in the polish consciousness a conviction about the inferiority of the Russian culture and of the Orthodox Church. Even though the internal policy of Peter the Great was an act of impetuous Europeanization in Poland it was perceive as an Eastern tyranny. The imposed constrains and discipline were considered by Poles as faults, which formed an image of the Russian state and society enslaved by each consecutive authority. This authority was personified by bureaucrats, who have done many acts of repressions in the times following the partition of Poland. From this moment we perceive Russia as a land of deportations mainly consisting of Siberia. It is only in the times of Stanislaw Augustus that Poles have proclaimed Russians as an „eternal” enemy. In the face of defeats in all fields Poles have searched for a recompense in the moral sphere charging Russians with inhuman methods of waging war. Successive deportations in 1940–41 and 1944–45 with the Katyn’s crime of genocide have established an opinion about Russians as a cruel nation. In evaluation of military might of Russia Poles, contrarily to the Western nations, have never considered the Russian army as an invincible power. Soviet technical science was considered as non-existing, obsolete and acting by espionage and theft.

Starting from the period following the November Insurrection the Russians consider that the absorbing of Poland has introduced into Russia a component which has slowly disintegrated the Empire. Apart from the Pole-catholic stereotype there is also that of a Pole-rebel. An attitude of Poles towards the Russian revolution of 1917 was generally negative, which follows from the fact that many landowners have lost their property and much more leaseholders their source of income. It was in a good tone to talk about the loses of large estates, which is a source for a general opinion about a gigantic Polish loss in the East. The Soviet Union has tried to recompense its defeat in the war of 1920 in the sphere of propaganda. In its opinion Poland was first of all „lordly” which was worse than „bourgeois” and as bad as „fascist”.

Author: Dorota Probucka
Year of publication: 2012
Pages: 82-89
DOI Number: http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/npw2012106
PDF: npw/02/npw2012106.pdf

Streszczenie:

The aim of the paper is to answer the following questions : how should we understand the concept of forgiveness so that reconciliation between Russia and Poland becomes possible? – Should we continue to hold hard feelings in international relations or should we leave them behind? – If we should remember our resentments, then how should we understand the postulate of memory? – On the other hand, if we should forget, then how should we understand the postulate of forgetting? I underline that the international reconciliation is a long term process. It does not happen immediately. We could compare it to a healing of a painful and deep wound. There are two the most common ways of dealing with suffering, resulting from unhealed wound. Both are false. The first way rests on ignoring, neglecting certain events, historical facts from collective consciousness. Let’s call it ideology of oblivion. The second one rests on scratching a wound, reproaching painful, national blames. Let’s call it ideology of dwelling on the past. Every single ideology is biased and partial. It distorts some historical events and therefore it is false. Either it omits some matters of facts or it exaggerates them. In my opinion, promoting these two above ideologies is a great, political and moral mistake. Because, those methods never lead to reconciliation, never heal the symbolic wound. On the contrary, they will exacerbate the inflammation. What should we do to heal this wound in international relations? We ought to disinfect it. At this case, it means binding the postulate of remembering with the courage to being in the truth. Only truth can relieve us from the evil just like disinfection removes toxins from the wound. Only due to the truth we will be able to avoid the evil in the future. Because, social awareness of wrong doing in the past can persuade us to reflection and bring change in social behavior in the future.

Author: Duma i uprzedzenie. Portrety Rosjan i Polaków w filmie „Szwadron” Juliusza Machulskiego
Year of publication: 2012
Pages: 90-101
DOI Number: http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/npw2012107
PDF: npw/02/npw2012107.pdf

Streszczenie:

The article is dedicated to the historical feature film „Squadron” directed in the year 1993 by Juliusz Machulski, being a painful clearance of the difficult past of Polish and Russian peoples. The movie represents a short episode from the history of the January Uprising of 1863 and shows extraordinary attitudes, being characteristic to the representatives of the two fighting nations.

Author: Lech Wyszczelski
Year of publication: 2012
Pages: 102-130
DOI Number: http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/npw2012108
PDF: npw/02/npw2012108.pdf

Streszczenie:

In the history of the Polish–Soviet war in 1919–1920 the problem that evokes many emotions – an aftermath of Moscow’s publicisation propaganda – is the fate of the prisoners of war. The Russian side indicates, without documented justification, that more than 200 thousands Russians have become Polish prisoners of war, among them 130 thousands have been kept in POW camps. The Polish side recounts that number for about 150 thousands prisoners being kept temporarily in a captivity and the number of 100–105 thousands that were kept in POW camps. Almost 76 thousands Red Army’s soldiers have been repatriated, including 10 thousands of allied of Polish Army with the status of an internee. Almost never mentioned is the fate of Polish prisoners of this war, of whom there were more than 50 thousands, from which came back barely 32 thousands, including 5th DSP prisoners – none participants of war. This publication is devoted to the negotiations and the final solution of the fate of those prisoners who survived the captivity, their return to native countries and the propaganda concerning this issue. The treaty for the repatriation of war prisoners had been signed on February 24th, 1921 in Riga and according to it the repartition has been executed. The author has outlined the problems of the civilian’s repatriation and its repercussions a number of Poles in Russia.

Author: Andrzej Chodubski
Year of publication: 2012
Source: Show
Pages: 131-150
DOI Number: http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/npw2012109
PDF: npw/02/npw2012109.pdf

Streszczenie:

It is indicated in the article, that Polish–Ukrainian and Ukrainian–Polish relations are described as difficult, complex, with painful historical memories, but also full of similarities, of ethos and of problems of everyday life. This situation is generated by the geographical location, national contact, cultures, traditions, attitudes, behaviours, social-politic values etc.

Constitutional transformations accomplished during 20 years in Central and East Europe, revealed many new links in Polish–Ukrainian relations, they gained an important international capacity in the nineties. In this aspect the cultural heritage of borderland is very important. On one hand one observes the cultural proximity of both sides, mutual infiltration of attitudes, political and socio-economical behaviours, on the other – the birth of mutual distrust, and even hostility and a self-perception by the prism of an experienced wrong. The borderland heritage is kept away from political elites forming the relations between both sides, also at a lower level it is the object of attention in scientific research. A real interest of cultural and civilisation’s problems of Ukraine is not revealed in Poland. It results in a certain degree from the international strategy of the state, including the marginalisation of Polish eastern problems. In forming a new European order one determines an essential place for the functional arrangement concerning Polish and Ukrainian relations. From this point of view it is important to reach a full normalisation in the aspects of border, minorities and cultural heritage. In the article it is indicated, that the formation of a new international reality after 1989 relations reveals in Polish–Ukrainian relations:

  1. A strong attachment to past experience in both nations, makes the creation of neighbour relations difficult,
  2. Among the barriers of Polish–Ukrainian relations the ethnic stereotypes are still important,
  3. In the strategy of negotiations of agreements and Polish–Ukrainian alliances the European Union standards take priority before actual direct relations and cultural conditions of neighbours,
  4. The concluded arrangements and political agreements between both countries have mainly a declarative character, and not too much attention is paid to execution of established bilateral obligations.
  5. A social-politic position of Poles in Ukraine and Ukrainians in Poland is an important reflection of Polish–Ukrainian and Ukrainian–Polish relations.

Author: Przemysław Żukiewicz
Year of publication: 2012
Source: Show
Pages: 151-166
DOI Number: http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/npw2012110
PDF: npw/02/npw2012110.pdf

Streszczenie:

In this article the author points out the ways of creating and sustaining coalitions of parties in the Ukrainian political system. He lists the major personality and institutional problems with the coalitions. The first include personal animosity between politicians and strongy personalization of the parties, while the second –transformation of the political regime taken not only by the parliament, but also by the Constitutional Court. In conclusion, the author notes that the Ukrainian political system is still dominated by the quasi-coalitions and the constitutional law’s modifications will not contribute to the party system institutionalization.

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