Author: Łukasz Dominiak
Institution: Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Year of publication: 2015
Source: Show
Pages: 90–106
DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2015.48.07
PDF: apsp/48/apsp4807.pdf

In the present paper, I investigate the relation between the institution of obligatory child support and libertarianism, particularly a libertarian theory of distributive justice. I demonstrate that the institution of obligatory child support is incompatible with the classical libertarian theory of distributive justice as represented by Murray N. Rothbard, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Walter Block, Stephan Kinsella or Robert Nozick. However, the main research question that I address in the paper is: What construal of the libertarian theory of distributive justice is the institution of obligatory child support compatible with? I hypothesise that obligatory child support is compatible with the libertarian theory of distributive justice interpreted in terms of the “finders-creators ethic”, as represented by Israel M. Kirzner. To inquire into the main research problem, I employ the method of reflective equilibrium.

Libertarianizm a problem alimentów na dzieci

Przedmiotem dociekań niniejszego artykułu jest relacja pomiędzy libertarianizmem a instytucją alimentów na dzieci. Artykuł wskazuje, że instytucja ta jest niekompatybilna z klasyczną libertariańską teorią sprawiedliwości dystrybutywnej, reprezentowaną przez takich libertariańskich filozofów polityki, jak: Murray N. Rothbard, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Walter Block, Stephan Kinsella czy Robert Nozick. Pomimo tej niekompatybilności z klasycznym libertarianizmem głównym problemem badawczym artykułu jest pytanie o to, z którą interpretacją libertariańskiej teorii sprawiedliwości dystrybutywnej instytucja ta może być kompatybilna. Tezą, którą stawia niniejszy artykuł, jest twierdzenie, że tą interpretacją jest teoria Israela M. Kirznera bazująca na tak zwanej etyce odkrywcy-twórcy. W badaniach użyto metody równowagi refleksyjnej.

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