Grenlandia, będąc terytorium autonomicznym Królestwa Danii, potwierdza swoje aspiracje niepodległościowe. W ostatnich latach zauważalne jest poszerzenie zakresu samo-dzielności tego terytorium. Obecnie podstawy ustroju Grenlandii reguluje Akt o samodzielności Grenlandii z 2009 r., który przede wszystkim koncentruje się na politycznychi ekonomicznych relacjach z Danią, wyznaczając jednocześnie drogę do niepodległości. Niepodległość ta w dużej mierze uzależniona jest jednak od stworzenia podstaw finansowych istnienia przyszłej państwowości. Nie ma wątpliwości, że system organów w Grenlandii dostosowany jest już do przy-szłej państwowości. W dużej mierze jest on wzorowany na rozwiązaniach znanych z państw nordyckich. Władzę ustawodawczą wykonuje jednoizbowy parlament (Inatsi-sartut), który pochodzi z wyborów powszechnych. Składa się on z 31 deputowanych wyłonionych w oparciu o zasadę proporcjonalności. Poza funkcją ustawodawczą pełni on również funkcję kontrolną i funkcję finansową. Władza wykonawcza należy natomiast do rządu (Naalakkersuisut), ponoszącego odpowiedzialność polityczną przed parlamentem. Zwraca uwagę, że pozycja Wysokiego Komisarza, czyli reprezentanta Danii, ma w zasadzie wyłącznie charakter reprezentacyjny.

Solutions imposed in peace agreement signed in November 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, USA, make the system of Bosnia and Herzegovina doubtlessly the most unusual, and not only in Europe. Starting from the collegiate three-member heads of state, through specific design of the parliament, elected similarly as head of state in not fully democratic election, ending on the Constitutional Court, which includes foreign nationals. Particular attention should be paid also to the atypical state structure, based on the asymmetric units, to an equally unique condominium, as well as to the institution of the Special Representative of the international community, who holds nearly unlimited control over all government bodies at all levels. All these features distinguish Bosnia and Herzegovina, and make that its system eludes of a clear and simple analysis

The acceptance of the general formula of the horizontal effect of constitutional rights and freedoms in the form of appropriate regulation at the constitutional level is original solution present in few countries, for example in Republic of South Africa and Greece. The article shows the background and the consequences of the introduction of these regulations in the light of statements of legal doctrine and judicature. It is also noticed on an example of Federal Republic of Germany, that the lack of distinct regulation is not a hindrance to practical recognition of the horizontality of particular rights and freedoms in jurisprudence. In the article are presented crucial arguments of followers and oponents of horizontal effect of constitutional rights and freedoms. Research done for the article lead to the general conclusion that the legal doctrine in the world is ready to accept in principle only indirect third party effect of constitutional rigts via the general provisions of private law.

The article discusses some methods of interpretation of the constitution aimed at concretization of its precepts and analyzes their implications for the normative character of the constitution. The author departs from the assumption that traditional directives of interpretation designed for the interpretation of statutory laws prove insufficient for the construction of constitutional precepts. Due to their general character, synthetic wording and structural openness constitutional provisions require not only an explicatory but also a concretizing construction. The elements of a norm which have not been explicitly expressed in the text of the constitution are discovered in the process of argumentation in which elements of social reality as well as subjective stances of an interpreter play a considerable role. This process can be subjected to methodological directives only with difficulty that is why in order to define the scope of the interpreter’s latitude and to ensure the objective character of the interpretation there is a need to resort to a theory of the constitution enshrined in the text of the constitution.

Profession of judge’s assistant in Polish judiciary is common for more than eleven years. The intention of the legislature he had to fill a gap in the structure of the judiciary by creating highly qualified workers with higher legal education, appointed to carry out a number of substantive steps to settle the matter. Young graduates of law in this profession see their chance to become a judge, gain the necessary experience, knowledge, skills, application of the law and reasoning. This is the reasons why it should not be missing applications to take up this work. But the reality is something else. Despite constantly occurring listings of competitions organized who are willing constantly missing. The reasons for this state of affairs should be seen primarily in the ever-changing rules for judge’s assistant, who, paradoxically, do not solve the main problems: continuously incrementing the requirements of the task, the salaries and working conditions. Recently emerged clearly these issues, to which 8 July 2013, the amendments, among which the most important is to remove the requirement to complete the application by the candidate for the judge’s assistant. The article is to outline the systematic position of judge’s assistant in the Polish legal system, including practical and applicable state of law.

The article contains a comparative analysis of the provisions concerning the vote of confidence currently in force in Germany and Poland. The aim of the article is to evaluate the level of the parliamentary system’s rationalization in both countries, as far as the aforementioned legal institution is concerned. The concept of the rationalization of parliamentarism is construed by the author as aiming at political stability and effectiveness by means of properly formed legal tools, through strengthening of the government at the expense of the legislative power. The multifunctional character of the German vote of confidence and, especially, the lack of the chancellor’s obligation to dismiss in case of defeat at the voting on the motion in the parliament, justify the conclusion that the German version of the analyzed institution fulfills the concept of the rationalized parliamentarism more accurately than its Polish counterpart.

Relations between the Polish Parliamentary (Sejm) committees and the Polish Constitutional Court. The issues presented in this paper concern the relation between the Parliamentary (Sejm) committees and the Constitutional Court. Special emphasis was put on the problem of influence of herein mentioned committees on the activities of the Constitutional Court.

The article consists of a review of judicial decisions and scholarly opinions with respect to the treasury’s liability for damages. The historical review part discusses the regulation binding in this respect during the Second Republic of Poland (1918–1939) and the People’s Republic of Poland (1944–1989). The part devoted to article 77 of the current Constitution of Poland reviews the opinions of Polish scholars concerning the legal character of this norm. The basic aim of the paper was to provide an answer to the question whether the said norm is legally binding or it is just a declaration. An attempt was also made to determine whether the broadly understood rule of compensation for damages is adequately regulated by the provisions of article 417¹ § 1 of the Polish Civil Code. The article also presents an analysis of article 77 with regard to grounds for liability. The final part of the article describes the relation between article 77 of the Constitution and article 417¹ § 1 of the Polish Civil Code which regulates the state’s responsibility for legal injustice (a situation where a legal act is found inconsistent with superior laws and therefore damage has occurred).