- Year of publication: 2010
- Source: Show
- Pages: 344-347
- DOI Address: -
This article concerns the influence of the government on legislative process in the present political system in Great Britain and the V French Republic in con- nection with parliamentary system of government. The British system does provide a working synthesis of the two things. One of them is the close union and nearly complete fusion of the executive and legislative powers. The Cabinet Ministers, as a rule, are members of one or other of the Houses of Parliament. In a sense, they are representatives of Parliament. On the other hand, the Cabinet is not the mere agent of Parliament, it does not constitute a committee of Parliament. Ministers guide and up to a point deter- mine Parliament’s activities. The responsibility for the initiation and making of laws rests primarily and almost exclusively upon them. Cabinet is well situated to exert a very positive leadership of Parliament. It monopolizes the framing and introduction of all important legislation, controls the allocation of parliamentary time, decides on adjournments and dissolutions, and has an assured majority to back its decisions. According to these conditions, the function of the House of Commons is, therefore, to act as a forum for criticism and a focus of outside opinion. If the Cabinet has a majority, and so long as that majority holds together, the House doesn’t control the government but the government controls the House and shaped the parliamentary legislation. The same effects – but in a different way – achieves the government in the Fifth French Republic. The Constitution of 1958 provides powerful measures for government to control the process of making laws in both Chambers of the French parliament. Among various forms of supervising the internal parliamentary proceedings, exercised by the French government, the most important are, for example, connecting a bill with the vote of confidence, declaring objections to parliamentary amendments to the government’s bills or arranging the vote bloqué procedure. Moreover, an important element forced the domination of French executive branch in parliamentary legislative process is permanent cooperation and good relationship between the government and the President of Republic in conditions of political unity as well as in the state of cohabitation.
The analysis is focused on the issues of governmental legislative initiative as an instrument of legislation planning in the Russian Federation. The author makes a thesis that it is the Government who – due to its legal position and competencies – should be the authority developing legislative changes aimed at building effective state policies. And legislative forecasting, planning and programming of the Government of the Russian Federation should have the features of the state’s legislative forecasting and planning. The paper shows and explains how and in which period the planning and programming of Government legislation are implemented. It also describes conditions that must be met so they become effective.
This paper concerns early termination of representative body’s term of office executed by the head of the state. The competence has a character of sanction that occurs in case of improper parliamentary performance. It takes on an obligatory or optional form. The act of the President does not require countersignature. The major difference between Poland and the Czech Republic consists in the effect of the institution application. It is not automatic in Poland – the period of parliamentary operation is extended in time and expires the day before the Sejm of the new term gathers. Whereas in the Czech Republic we deal with immediate termination of the lower house activity. Unlike in Poland, the end of the lower house term of office does not affect duration of the Senat plenipotentiary pow- ers. Concerning the termination of term of office under the constitutional act, it needs to be emphasized that there are doubts regarding possibility of its passing in Poland. The reasons for that include regulation of the institution expressed in the constitution in the apparently complete way and the lack of separate consti- tutional act in the catalogue of the law sources. The Czech Constitutional Court recognizes such an act as being in contradiction with the Czech constitution, which may be additional argument in the discourse.
This article presents the main ideas of constitutional reform, governments in Italy over the last thirty years. “Blocked Italian democracy” was looking for ways of overcoming the legal framework. Conceived the idea of the great constitutional reform in the late seventies. There are three main ways of that reform: 1) the establishment of the Constituent Assembly, 2) creating a bicameral committee on constitutional reform, 3) by art.138 of the Constitution for its revision. The first solution only enjoyed the support of the right of the political scene. But failed to establish three committees for the bicameral constitutional reform: in the years 1983–1985 A. Bozziego Commission, in 1992–1994 the Commission C. De Mita and N. Iotti, in 1997, the Commission M. D’Alema. Presented by reform projects have failed due to lack of agreement between the main political forces. Thus, the third way of constitutional reform became Article 138 of the Constitution. However, in cases where an amendment has been approved only by an absolute majority of both houses of parliament, it can be put to the vote in a referendum on ratification. Twice held such a constitutional referendum, once on the center-left proposals 7 October 2001 year, the second time against the center-right approach June 25–26, 2006. The last referendum did not obtain public support. So it seems that the idea of the great constitutional reform has failed to deep divisions between the main political parties.
Politics of Serbia are limited to the rules of a modern parliamentary representa- tive democratic republic. In this system, the Prime Minister of Serbia is the head of government, and of a multi-party system. Executive power is exercised by the government. Legislative power is vested in both the government and the Na- tional Assembly of Serbia. The Judiciary is independent of the executive and the legislature. The Government of Serbia (Vlada Srbije) is the main element of the executive branch of government in Serbia. It is led by the Prime Minister (Predsednik Vlade), commonly abbreviated to premier (premijer). The Prime Minister is chosen by the National Assembly on the proposal of the President who names the designate Prime Minister after talks with all parliamentary leaders. Ministers are nominated by the Prime Minister and confirmed by the Parliament.
The Spanish political regime can be defined as a system of parliamentary government. The most characteristic features of it are: the dualism of executive, the neutral position of the head of state and the political responsibility of the government before the parliament. Besides, accepted legal solutions allow for the high effectiveness of the governmental action.The specification of the Spanish political stage, formed after 1978, allow to getcloser to the model of the parliamentary government (in the case of existence of the majority government) or to the model of parliamentary committee (in the case of the minority government). Thus, the main aim of this article is to present some key features of the Spanish political regime.
The Polish science of the constitutional law is extensively interested in the problem of the purpose of the exitence of the upper house of the parliament in unitary countries. The issue is especially interesting in Poland, where different political parties, in their programs, propose to abolish the Upper House of the Parliament, the Senate. The functioning of the upper chamber of the parliament in the Republic of Croatia seems to be extraordinarily interesting as far as this issue is concerned. Croatia adopted its first constitution on 22 December 1990. According to its first version the House of Parliament was to have two chambers. It consisted of the House of Representatives and the House of Zupanii (the House of Counties). On 28 March 2001 the constitution was mended, as a result the House of Counties was abolished. The article presents the analysis of the reasons for which the House of the Zupanii was created, its structure, references, the functioning and the reasons why it was abolished. The parliamentary traditions in Croatia date back to 13 th century, but in the past Sabor (the Parliament) was never bicameral. The decision to appoint the House of Zupanii, although an important part of the political system, were made in at least curious circumstances. Franjo Tudjman’s opinion had the biggest influence on the creation of the House of Zupanii, it was made, although main experts from the constitutional commission opposed, as they thought it’s against the Croatian tradition. While designing the references and the position of the House in the system, the commission took for example the solutions used in Italy and Spain. The House of Zupanii was supposed to represent the regional interests, which was stressed by the elective system to this chamber. The item literature pointed out that Croatia is considerably different to the countries from which it took the example. The House of Zupanii had limited references, which were mainly to serve as a deliberative body for the lower house of the parliament. It also had a suspensory veto, for the bills passed by the House of Representatives, which it really didn’t use. The decision to abolish the House of Zupanii was made following certain political interest. Despite that it seems that nine years after the liquidation there is no intention to bring the upper house of the parliament in Croatia back to life. We come to a conclusion that the science of the constitutional law and the Croatian political scientists considered the experiment with the upper house of the parliament as a failed one.
The task undertaken by the Author of the article is to demonstrate that the countersignature is such a significant element of the system of government established in a given state that the existence or lack of the countersignature, as well as the method of incorporating it into the procedure of a given model of government, determines which particular system or which of its modifications had been accepted on the grounds of a given constitution.In the article it has been also proved that the constitutional principles have only general influence on the regulation of the countersignature. Many of them are necessary for the countersignature to function, however their establishment in the constitutional law do not determine the existence of the countersignature. The most important factors that decide whether this institution exist are compo- nents of the system of government, such as the dualism of the executive power and the assumption of lack of political responsibility of the head of the state. These features occur together within the parliamentary system. In order to prove the aforementioned thesis, a typology of the systems of government has been presented, then – after indicating the systems in which the countersignature does not exist and presenting the reasons of such situation – the countersignature and the form in which it has been adopted, in regard to the degree of the modification of the system, has been systematized.
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