- Year of publication: 2011
- Source: Show
- Pages: 279-284
- DOI Address: -
The article describes the most important changes in electoral law brought in by The electoral code, passed in January, 5 th 2011. There are (among others): ex- ceptions of personal polling rule, postal ballot, new rules of creating of constitu- encies, new regulations regarding electoral organs, election campaign and – new in Poland – single member plurality system in elections to the Senat and also – regulations regarding parity in electoral lists.
This article concentrates on estimates and propositions in the area of elector- al law which were presented in „The Constitutional Poll”, arranged by „The In- stitute Of Public Affairs” in 2010 and 2011. Those propositions, reported by the Polish constitutionalists, concern the scope and detail of regulation, its form, the various principles of electoral law, especially new regulatory issues in the context of the needs of their constitutionalization. Author focuses on electoral law to the both diet of Polish parliament, the President office and the organs of self-gov- ernment, incidentally analyzing the process of The Constitutional Court mem- bers’ election.
The analyses presented are meaningful only if it is accepted that such beneficial income disparities can be achieved exclusively as a result of a limited redistribution conducted by the government. In other words, this is possible only if the values G to Y on the left-right scale of political preferences are relatively mediocre. As result, it can be stated that, from the perspective of the welfare state philosophy, a given government’s continuous attempts at balancing the income disparities are not an optimal mode of operation, and thus cannot be justified. The reason for this is the fact that there is no rational left-wing oriented spread (with the values G to Y being high) of political preferences, which would result in a dominant aversion to disparities, and which would justify such actions by the government from the economic perspective.
In addition, the concluding remarks also need to include the statement that, even though Down defines in his model the maximisation of the votes received by each party as a primary goal, while neglecting in his studies the various dimensions of the welfare policy of a democratic state under the rule of law, it can still be stated that the policy of focusing on income redistribution, aimed at aiding the less wealthy voters, is suboptimal from the analysed perspective. Therefore, a political party which includes a high level of income redistribution as a goal in its political manifesto is bound to fail during the elections. The reason for this is the concentration of the highest number of voters in the centre. For such citizens an overly high level of income redistribution would entail, as a result of the aversion to equality, a great decrease in the utility function. To be more direct, an overly high income redistribution (with the G to Y value being high) leads to a loss of votes from the centre that is far greater than the amount of votes gained from the left side of the voting stage.
In this article author concentrates on analysis of the effect of the electoral sys- tem and its individual elements on the functioning of the political party system in several states. Obviously the electoral system could not be treated as sole de- terminant of the creation of the political scene, but it has the huge influence for the shape of that scene. However the choice of majority or proportional system is not only one determinant. In that last case it is impossible to omit the size of constituencies or the level of electoral threshold. Also the supplementary seats have the important role for creation of multiparty system. As the effect it is pos- sible to say that majority systems and proportional systems with small electoral constituencies (excluding the usage of single transferable vote system) lead to the formation of bipolar political scene (two-party system or two-coalition system), while the proportional systems with large constituencies contribute to the emer- gence of multiparty systems.
The elections, and their course in particular, are an immensely significant ele- ment of the society’s participation in the public life and, as such, they should be placed under the special protection of the state. This can be justified by the pecu- liar role of elections – that of the core of democracy. The means of protection in- clude the penal regulations which sanction breaches of the voting rules. As a re- sult of the analysis of the current trend in the evolution of the criminalisation of various acts aimed against voting, one may notice that those regulations are in- troduced in a dual manner. Initially, the actions which violate the voting rules were specified as a part of the penal legislation, however, after 1989, they are also included in the election acts.
This Article is based on two, the most famous episodes from American Par- liamentarian and Presidential Election History. For 200 years in USA we have a two-party system, which caused that two major parties had played a main role in political system. During the elections (Congressional or Presidential) only two main parties were taken into consideration by electors and society. When third parties have appeared at American political scene it was also a sign for pol- iticians that American Society were demanded changes. Third parties and their candidates were encouraged to take a part in elections and fight for large amount of American voters. Profiles of presidential candidates, Ross Perot and Ralph Nader show what kind of changes American system need.
The article attempts to present the phased structure of electoral change in New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom. Together the comparison of the suc- cessful alteration of the first past the post formula in 1993 in New Zealand, the wave of electoral reforms in Canada that started in 2004 in British Columbia and the British referendum on 5th May 2011, allow to distinguish 8 phases of elector- al system revision: injustice of the first part the post formula suffered by one of two main parties, leading to alteration initiatives; mobilisation of public opin- ion; withdrawal of the reform’s initiators from the process; loss of control by the initiators over the electoral change process; creation of the appropriate body re- sponsible for the selection of the optimal voting formula; indication by the cho- sen body of the optimal alternative electoral formula to the first past the post for- mula; referendum; growth of support for the first past the post system.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms enjoys good opinion of the constitutional act orders European legal space of human rights. The pearl in the Convention crown is European Court of Human Rights, which case-law creates European standards of human rights in contemporary way. Being obligatory, Lisbon Treaty and Charter of Fundamen- tal Rights of European Union change the previous situation. Instrumentarium of the human rights protection in Europe has been enriched. However a number of questions about the relation between Convention and Charter arise and the relation between European Court of Human Rights and Court of Justice of Eu- ropean Union as well as the case-law of both European courts. Are the relations going to be complementary or use confrontation?
© 2017 Adam Marszałek Publishing House. All rights reserved.
Projekt i wykonanie Pollyart