Author: Kaja Kowalczewska
Institution: Pedagogical University of Krakow
Year of publication: 2019
Source: Show
Pages: 464-475
DOI Address:
PDF: ppsy/48-3/ppsy2019305.pdf

This paper presents selected conclusions related to the theoretical underpinnings of international humanitarian law, with special focus on the understanding of considerations of humanity and the dictates of public conscience (the Martens clause) and their impact on the regulation of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Despite the fact that different positions can be found in the doctrine, it is argued herein that the general principles of international humanitarian law are not sufficient to properly regulate the disruptive military technologies (new means and methods of warfare) and a new international norm is needed. Consequently, the paper agglomerates extra-legal and cross-cutting arguments stemming from other normative regimes that point to prioritization of the value of human life and the role and quality of the human factor in decision-making procedures relating to the health and life of victims of modern armed conflicts, which should be incorporated in it.


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