Author: Hector Calleros
E-mail: h.calleros@uw.edu.pl
Institution: University of Warsaw (Poland)
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5689-5075
Year of publication: 2020
Source: Show
Pages: 71-91
DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy2020205
PDF: ppsy/49-2/ppsy2020205.pdf

The paper examines the conflict over the control of the integration of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal (CT) that evolved into a constitutional crisis in October 2015 - and has extended for more than two years. It identifies issues that help understand how the Polish Democracy does not impede the erosion of constitutional democracy as the conflict has undermined the CT and the function of judicial review (JR). The article examines issues of legitimacy that emerge from the crisis; it also examines the extent to which the institutional settings condition the operation of the JR function; in particular, it looks at the role of executive actors (the Government and the President), and the role of the political/parliamentary party in bridging the separation of powers.

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