evolutionary models

  • Studying Political Violence Using Game Theory Models: Research Approaches and Assumptions

    Author: Mateusz Wajzer
    Institution: University of Silesia in Katowice (Poland)
    ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3108-883X
    Author: Monika Cukier-Syguła
    Institution: University of Silesia in Katowice (Poland)
    ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6211-3500
    Year of publication: 2020
    Source: Show
    Pages: 143-157
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy2020208
    PDF: ppsy/49-2/ppsy2020208.pdf

    The purpose of the paper is to concisely present basic applications of game theory models for a scientific description of political violence. The paper is divided into four parts. The first part discusses the key theoretical issues including: the assumption of the players’ rationality, the assumption of the players’ common knowledge of their rationality, the Nash equilibrium concept, Pareto optimality, the Nash arbitration scheme and the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies. The second and third parts contain examples of uses of selected models of classical and evolutionary games in the studies on political violence. The following two interaction schemes were used to that end: the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken. The paper ends with a summary and discussion. The key feature of the discussed models is their methodological simplicity, as demonstrated by the lack of need to use complicated mathematical methods. This is why the paper is mainly addressed to individuals who had not studied game theory before or who have insufficient knowledge in the field to conduct own studies.

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