The analyses presented are meaningful only if it is accepted that such beneficial income disparities can be achieved exclusively as a result of a limited redistribution conducted by the government. In other words, this is possible only if the values G to Y on the left-right scale of political preferences are relatively mediocre. As result, it can be stated that, from the perspective of the welfare state philosophy, a given government’s continuous attempts at balancing the income disparities are not an optimal mode of operation, and thus cannot be justified. The reason for this is the fact that there is no rational left-wing oriented spread (with the values G to Y being high) of political preferences, which would result in a dominant aversion to disparities, and which would justify such actions by the government from the economic perspective.
In addition, the concluding remarks also need to include the statement that, even though Down defines in his model the maximisation of the votes received by each party as a primary goal, while neglecting in his studies the various dimensions of the welfare policy of a democratic state under the rule of law, it can still be stated that the policy of focusing on income redistribution, aimed at aiding the less wealthy voters, is suboptimal from the analysed perspective. Therefore, a political party which includes a high level of income redistribution as a goal in its political manifesto is bound to fail during the elections. The reason for this is the concentration of the highest number of voters in the centre. For such citizens an overly high level of income redistribution would entail, as a result of the aversion to equality, a great decrease in the utility function. To be more direct, an overly high income redistribution (with the G to Y value being high) leads to a loss of votes from the centre that is far greater than the amount of votes gained from the left side of the voting stage.