niezależność sądów

  • Obsadzanie składu sądu konstytucyjnego w Polsce i w innych państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej w kontekście jego niezależności

    Author: Marek Jarentowski
    Institution: Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
    Year of publication: 2017
    Source: Show
    Pages: 201-223
    DOI Address:
    PDF: ppk/39/ppk3912.pdf

    Constitutional courts, in order to perform their function of the constitutional review, should be independent of the creator of that law. Independence can be operationalized as a mechanism for filling and changing the composition of courts as defined in the legislation, and also as a difficulty in changing these rules. In this perspective one can describe the extent of independence of the Polish constitutional court against the background of courts in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It can be said that there is a field to increase the independence of the Polish court, eg by increasing the diversity of entities entitled to fill the court or by introducing regular rotation in the positions of the judges at specific dates (instead of individual mandates). But the greatest degree of court independence threatens, compliant with constitution or inconstitutional interference in the composition and constitutional court system, done in the interest of the ruling majority that makes this interference.

  • Odpowiedzialność władzy sądowniczej a odpowiedzialność dyscyplinarna sędziów

    Author: Anna Machnikowska
    Institution: Uniwersytet Gdański
    Year of publication: 2020
    Source: Show
    Pages: 35-74
    DOI Address:
    PDF: ppk/56/ppk5602.pdf

    Responsibility of the Judicial Power and Disciplinary Responsibility of Judges

    Two circumstances: ineffective legal protection system and controversial cases of abandonment of enforcement of judges’ disciplinary liability have become a basis for justifying amendments to regulations on judges’ disciplinary liability. New solutions are characterised by, among other features, the limiting of the independence of the judiciary and subjecting it to increased control exercised by the legislature and the executive. The rationale behind these changes is to be sought for in a claim that courts of law are not a representative of the people which can be considered qual to the other authorities and that, therefore, having been abused by judges, the rights they have enjoyed hitherto (other than the administration of justice) should be constrained. Some judges and representatives of the jurisprudence reject this argumentation pointing out that rather than being conducive to the declared goals of improving the functioning of courts and of judges’ observance of law, the amendments result in the limiting of the citizen’s right to an independent tribunal. In these circumstances, a dispute has arisen over how a judge should act if the law on disciplinary liability prohibits their right to criticise or legally verify regulations depriving them of the guarantee of independence and impartiality. Do the statutable principles of disciplinary liability also determine all the principles of the judiciary liability? What if there is a difference of opinions between the representatives of the legislature and the executive versus those of the judiciary concerning an interpretation of the citizen’s right to a tribunal and of the notion of “independence of a tribunal”? Analysing the legal and doctrinal argumentation offered by both parties may facilitate answering these questions. This approach may also prove useful in determining whether enforcing the new principles of disciplinary liability will resolve the current crisis in the relationship between courts and the other authorities or, on the contrary, initiate its further stage.

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