podział władzy

  • Hungarian understanding of the division of powers

    Author: Radosław Grabowski
    E-mail: drgrabowski@wp.pl
    Institution: Uniwersytet Rzeszowski
    Author: Ivan Halász
    E-mail: halivan@freemail.hu
    Institution: Uniwersytet Śląski w Opawie
    Year of publication: 2016
    Source: Show
    Pages: 59-78
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2016.06.03
    PDF: ppk/34/ppk3403.pdf

    Hungarian constitutional system has a number of characteristics, including division of power. This is a result atypical evolution of the political system in Hungary after 1989. Most of the countries of Central and Eastern made a thorough reconstruction of the political system in the nineties of the twentieth century, many constitutions were adopted in 1991–1994. Otherwise had done Hungarians, making a 1989 amendment to the Constitution of 1949. and the adoption of a new constitution putting off indefinitely. Completely new Fundamental Law was adopted only in 2011., in force since 1 January 2012. It introduced in the Hungarian constitutional system significant changes, modifying the way the principle the division of powers. The changes seem to be rational, and therefore to be expected that the Hungarian model finds followers.

  • Mechanisms of curbing statutory power in a situation of political uniformity of the legislative and executive (comments in the light of RP Constitution of 2 April 1997)

    Author: Krzysztof Eckhardt
    E-mail: krzysztof.eckhardt@gmail.com
    Institution: Uniwersytet Rzeszowski
    Year of publication: 2016
    Source: Show
    Pages: 283-295
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2016.06.15
    PDF: ppk/34/ppk3415.pdf

    In a situation of uniformity of President’s political orientation, of parliamentary majority which means the government, statutory veto motivated by a difference in a substantial evaluation of acts ceases to operate. In such a situation a task to curb the legislative must reside exclusively in the judiciary, thus in particular in the Constitutional Tribunal. In order to fulfil this task effectively the constitutional tribunal must be free from an allegation that its jurisdiction is motivated by anything else than compatibility with the constitution. From this point of view a way in which judges of the Tribunal are appointed has the key meaning. The issue consists in how to free the composition of the Tribunal from the political system existing in parliament.

  • Miejsce Senatu w porządku ustrojowym Rumunii – analiza systemowa

    Author: Magdalena Maksymiuk
    E-mail: saczukm@gmail.com
    Institution: Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
    Year of publication: 2018
    Source: Show
    Pages: 263-281
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2018.04.15
    PDF: ppk/44/ppk4415.pdf

    Artykuł dotyczy Senatu, który jest drugą izbą parlamentu Rumunii. Pokazuje, w jakim środowisku prawno-ustrojowym został on po niemal 50 latach przywrócony do porządku konstytucjonalnego państwa. Opisuje całą procedurę wyborczą, w tym sposób wyboru kandydatów na deputowanych. Ponadto wskazuje na kompetencje Senatu w zakresie oddziaływania na władzę wykonawczą i sądowniczą, a także pokazuje jego działania na arenie międzynarodowej. Przedstawia przebieg procesu legislacyjnego wraz z rolą drugiej izby parlamentu, a także opisuje jej funkcję kontrolną oraz kreacyjną. Pozwala to pokazać, że w parlamencie Rumunii panuje model dwuizbowości symetrycznej.

  • Szef rządu we współczesnych systemach ustrojowych

    Author: Bogusław Banaszak
    Institution: Uniwersytet Wrocławski
    Year of publication: 2011
    Source: Show
    Pages: 133-159
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2011.02.07
    PDF: ppk/06/ppk607.pdf

    Accepting the separation of powers as a basis for existence of contemporary countries caused the distinction of the executive power. This article, devoted to the executive, presents in detail the model solutions of that power (monocratic; dualistic together with its branches; departmental and directorial). Most of the article is devoted to the position of the Prime Minister in contemporary political model.

  • Odpowiedzialność dyscyplinarna rzecznika dyscyplinarnego z tytułu naruszenia niezawisłości sędziowskiej

    Author: Piotr Kardas
    E-mail: pkardas@kardas.com.pl
    Institution: Uniwersytet Jagielloński
    ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8903-241
    Year of publication: 2020
    Source: Show
    Pages: 93-107
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2020.04.04
    PDF: ppk/56/ppk5604.pdf

    Disciplinary Responsibility of a Disciplinary Spokesman for Breach of Judicial Independence

    The following article comprises an analysis of the basis and scope of disciplinary liability of a disciplinary spokesman for breach of judicial independence. It indicates the inherent interdependence between judicial disciplinary liability and the constitutionally protected principle of independence. The author believes that a separate judicial disciplinary liability constitutes one of the guarantees of independence. The protection of independence is further enhanced by the autonomy of the disciplinary proceedings and the means of determining the basis for such liability, the limits of which are delineated by independence. Nevertheless, it serves to outline the spokesman’s competences and thus the scope of legal acts. Abuse of the aforementioned competences in this regard is equal to an abuse of independence. What is more, the commentary sets out to introduce a two-tier understanding of the notion of abuse of independence, that is internal and external breaches. Under the current law, it is impossible for a spokesman to be in breach of independence, for he does not boast one. However, a spokesman can undertake to externally abuse another party’s - i.a. a judge’s - independence. Such abuse can be caused by non-adherence to the established limits of judicial disciplinary liability. Under such circumstances, a spokesman is in breach of his competences, which is subsequently reflected in a material violation of judicial independence. The bases of disciplinary liability of a disciplinary spokesman are set forth in the provisions pertaining to the disciplinary liability of the judiciary and the prosecution. Hence, a disciplinary spokesman’s liability is a sub-type of the general disciplinary liability of the judge (or prosecutor) who serves as a spokesman.

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