pojęcie konstytucji

  • Dwa modele relacji wolności i bezpieczeństwa

    Author: Wojciech Włoch
    E-mail: wloch.wojciech@gmail.com
    Institution: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
    Year of publication: 2015
    Source: Show
    Pages: 149-178
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2015.02.08
    PDF: ppk/24/ppk2408.pdf

    The subject matter of the article revolves around two classical models of relationship between freedom and security contained in the theories formulated by T. Hobbes and J. Locke, as well as their conceptual development in the theories by H. Kelsen and J. Rawls. The model presented by Hobbes accentuates the primacy of security, whereas the one proposed by Locke, the primacy of the rights of an individual. A critical analysis of those models illustrates that one may not interpret the necessity of existence of a political power, or the requirement to guarantee the rights of individuals in an absolutist way. The validity of Hobbes’s model is limited to the statement regarding the necessity to establish a „decision-centre” ensuring „collective security”. Locke’s model, on the other hand, is not established upon the construction of an „ideal constitution” but rather it points to democratic forms of guarantying individual rights. This does not mean that one should acknowledge the absolute primacy of legislature. In both the theories proposed by Kelsen and Rawls this function may be fulfilled by constitutional judicature. While the model established by Hobbes is appropriate for the descriptive conceptualisation of constitution, the one offered by Locke serves the prescriptive formulation of this concept.

Wiadomość do:



© 2017 Adam Marszałek Publishing House. All rights reserved.

Projekt i wykonanie Pollyart