prokurator generalny

  • Prokuratura w nowej ustawie z 2016 roku Eksperyment z podległością władzy wykonawczej

    Author: Halina Zięba-Załucka
    E-mail: hzalucka@onet.eu
    Institution: Uniwersytet Rzeszowski
    Year of publication: 2016
    Source: Show
    Pages: 111-124
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2016.05.07
    PDF: ppk/33/ppk3307.pdf

    Artykuł pokazuje, iż prokuratura jako organ pozakonstytucyjny podlega wpływom politycznym. Autorka prezentuje, jak wygląda podporządkowanie prokuratury w Polsce i innych krajach Unii Europejskiej. Wskazuje, iż zapoczątkowana w 2010 r. reforma prokuratury i rozłączenie funkcji prokuratora generalnego i ministra sprawiedliwości nie przyniosło oczekiwanych rezultatów, ponieważ reforma Prokuratury nie została zakończona. Również nie wzmocniła pozycji procesowej proukratora generalnego, ale ją osłabiła. Ustawa przyniosła bowiem wiele przepisów, które z jednej strony były przyczynkiem do niezależności prokuratury, a z drugiej strony narzędziem kontroli nad prokuraturą (art. 10e i 10f), czyniąc tę niezależność iluzoryczną. Dlatego zdaniem autorki, należy dać szanse nowej regulacji, mimo zastrzeżeń. Realizacja w praktyce ustawy z 2016 r. ma doprowadzić do odzyskania przez proukratora generalnego silnej pozycji zarówno wobec podległych prokuratorów, jak i organów zewnętrznych.

  • Kilka uwag w sprawie dekonstytucjonalizacji prokuratury

    Author: Przemysław Witkowski
    Institution: Uniwersytet Marii Curie - Skłodowskiej w Lublinie
    Year of publication: 2010
    Source: Show
    Pages: 203-220
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2010.01.16
    PDF: ppk/01/ppk116.pdf

    The article is an attempt to show that reasons of deconstitutionalisation of public prosecutor’s office are not obsolete. The author argues, that the omission regulations of public prosecution’s office in the Constitution of the Poland Republic was caused by the adoption of the concept of personal junction Attorney General and Minister of Justice, which could not be reconciled with the postulate of the independence of the prosecutors. The article presents the impact of the adoption of the concept of personal union of Attorney General and Minister of Justice on the course of parliamentary work on the assumption of the Constitution, in relation to the prosecutor’s office. The author concludes that the current model of the prosecutor’s office – establishing the separation of function Attorney General from posi- tion of Minister of Justice – does not justify the continuation of the state deconstitutionalisation of this institution. The lack of constitutional responsibility for the actions of the Attorney General and the incompleteness of the model prosecutor’s office as an agency of legal protection make, that the stipulation of constitutionali- sation of public prosecutor’s office seems to be indispensable, although with regard for the current political situation, it is difficult to implement.

  • Kreacyjne uprawnienia prezydenta Republiki Słowackiej

    Author: Tomáš Majerčák
    Institution: Uniwersytet Pawła Józefa Szafarika w Koszycach
    Year of publication: 2013
    Source: Show
    Pages: 111-142
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2013.01.06
    PDF: ppk/13/ppk1306.pdf

    In this paper I focus on the creation powers of the President in view of the current problems. I also attempt to find answers to some of the questions related to the issue whether, provided the Constitution of the Slovak Republic concedes the President of the Slovak Republic the power to appoint a constitutional official on the proposal of a collective body or a specific person, the President may refuse to appoint a public official, and what the position of the President is in this kind of appointment, thus what function he performs.

  • Prokuratura a Rada Ministrów (na marginesie oceny sprawozdania prokuratora generalnego przez prezesa Rady Ministrów)

    Author: Halina Zięba-Załucka
    Institution: Uniwersytet Rzeszowski
    Year of publication: 2014
    Source: Show
    Pages: 195-211
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2014.03.09
    PDF: ppk/19/ppk1909.pdf

    The time of the prosecutor’s office functioning within the new political system allowed for determination of deficiencies in terms of legal regulations and correction of the legal instruments of the prosecutor’s office operation. Present legal regulations give the autonomy to the Public Prosecutor General, which is expressed in the fact that the prosecutor’s office is not subordinate to any other state authority. However, placement within the state authorities’ structures does not involve breaking up the institutional bonds between the Public Prosecutor General and other public authorities, especially with the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Justice. Pursuant to the idea of separation of powers in the democratic state of law, apart from the principle of competences distribution, the principle of public authorities’ co-operation is underlined. In the context of the activity of the Public Prosecutor General and yearly report which is submitted by him to the Council of Ministers the author presents the dilemmas which result from the situation. She indicates which direction the changes shall go with reference to it, in the new act on the prosecutor’s office right which is under preparation by the government. The main objective of the new bill is to allow for the parliamentary, yearly debate over the prosecutor’s office activity and introduction of institutional solutions which would allow for good co-operation of the Council of Ministers with the Public Prosecutor General, what does not always happen. The author thinks that the act does not specify any deadline in which the President of the Council of Ministers has to evaluate the report. Such a state of uncertainty is a major threat for the prosecutor’s office functioning. It may have a negative impact on the act of undertaking organizational and functional changes which improve the work of the prosecutor’s office, while the Public Prosecutor General being afraid of the prime minister’s decision may avoid public speaking in important issues. This is why the prime minister shall be bound with the specified deadline for giving the decision. Additionally, the President of the Council of Ministers may apply to the Seym with the motion to recall the Public Prosecutor General before the end of the period which he was appointed for. The article indicates then issues that have to be changed in the new act in order to assure the efficient functioning of the prosecutor’s office.

  • Prokurator Generalny w postępowaniu przed Trybunałem Konstytucyjnym – udział w rzeczywistej ochronie praworządności

    Author: Marcin Dorochowicz
    E-mail: m.dorochowicz@wp.pl
    Institution: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
    ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2750-712X
    Author: Kamil Kapica
    E-mail: kapica.kamil@gmail.com
    Institution: Uniwersytet Warszawski
    ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5932-4953
    Year of publication: 2021
    Source: Show
    Pages: 57-75
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2021.01.03
    PDF: ppk/59/ppk5903.pdf

    The General Prosecutor, due to the unrestricted legitimacy, its role in protecting the rule of law and authorities from Constitutional Tribunal act, is a legal entity of great importance in regard to proceeding before the Constitutional Tribunal. The actions of the General Prosecutor are required to be assessed in correspondence with the implementation of statutory and constitutional authorities, effectiveness in requesting Constitutional Tribunal, presenting written statements, as well as overall activity before the Constitutional Tribunal. In conclusions the remarks on the General Prosecutors’s contribution in protection rule of law are presented.

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