In the article author analyses the experience of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia in applying temporary adjustment in examining constitutional complaints submitted by persons. In view of the case law of the Constitutional Court, the rulings of the Constitutional Court regarding issues not envisaged in the Constitutional Court procedure are analysed as well. Thus, the article provides answers to questions – whether the Constitutional Court may suspend legal proceedings and legislation procedure.

In the latest literature on the subject, one can notice an increase in interest in direct de- mocracy on the one hand, and on the other – a clear increase in the skepticism of research- ers towards the idea of making binding and important decisions for the state by popu- lar vote. The purpose of this article is to present and analyze the latest views of foreign doctrine of constitutional law (and, in addition: political science) about the institution of the referendum and to compare them with the (general) analysis of the legal regula- tion of this institution in Poland, as well as to present the real impact of referendums on the decision-making process and public policies in Poland. As a result, an attempt will be made to assess the Polish legal regulation of referendum institutions in terms of their effectiveness on the one hand, and potential threats (or resistance to threats) to the democratic order on the other. Although direct democracy, and especially a referen- dum, have a wide range of critics in the scientific community accusing it of even being anti-democratic, radical proposals calling for the complete abolition of referendums are rare. The postulates of appropriate changes in the legal regulation concerning the ref- erendum prevail in order to make it resistant to dangerous modern phenomena: popu- lism, political cynicism, manipulation and propaganda. The implementation of all pos- tulates for changes reported by representatives of science will be very difficult. Noticing this fact may cause that the referendum will become a decision-making procedure very rarely launched. This seems to be the intention of researchers who submit their propos- als and reservations – that direct democracy should be only an exception to representa- tive democracy and that the former should not be used against the latter.

On the basis of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the binding effect of the result of the vote in a nationwide referendum depends on attainment the attendance threshold. This threshold was determined as participation in a referendum of more than half of persons entitled to vote. The systemic argumentation in favor of establishing this threshold proves to be weak and unconvincing. The constitutional regulation is characterised in this scope by inconsistency in the form of not covering the constitutional referendum by the requirement of the attendance threshold. Furthermore, the desire to ensure the legal effectiveness of the outcome of the vote in the referendum results in extending time of the vote in the referendum. The conclusion includes the proposal to introduce an amendment to the Constitution consisting in resigning from the threshold in question.