retroaktywność

  • Zasada „lex retro non agit”. Czy prawo nie działa wstecz?

    Author: Justyna Kornaszewska
    E-mail: justyna.kornaszewska@gmail.com
    Institution: Uniwersytet Warszawski
    Year of publication: 2018
    Source: Show
    Pages: 171-183
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2018.02.09
    PDF: ppk/42/ppk4209.pdf

    The principle of non-retroactivity is recognized as one of the foundations of the civilized system of the modern state. The essence of the principle of non-retroactivity can be reduced to the assertion that the law should, in principle, act “for the future”, therefore it should not be legal norms that would apply to events that occurred and ended before their entry into force. In other words, the legal consequences of events taking place under the old norms should be assessed according to these norms, even if new regulations are already in force at the moment of making such an assessment. The retroactive act of the regulations is when the lawmaker orders certain relevant legal facts, existing before the day of entry into force of the new provisions, assessed in the light of these new provisions, introducing a fiction that these provisions were already in force on the date of the assessed facts. If the regulation contained in the regulation obviously acts “for the future” and at the same time has legal effects only 3 months after the entry into force of the act, it does not violate the principle of non-retroactivity. This doesn’t mean that without violating the principle of non-retroactivity, the legislator may freely interfere in existing legal relations and modify them freely. The boundary here is, above all, observance of the principle of protection of acquired rights and principles of protection of trust in the state and the law. It is unacceptable to create norms retrospectively, if the entities to whom these standards relate could not rationally anticipate such decisions, and extraordinary circumstances or goods subject to constitutional protection, such decisions do not justify. You can withdraw from it, but only exceptionally and for justified reasons, giving the norms the ability to influence the existing situations, if there were valid reasons, and the interested entities had grounds to expect the adoption of such standards.

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