rozwiązanie parlamentu

  • Referendum w sprawie rozwiązania parlamentu na Łotwie z 2011 roku

    Author: Andrzej Jackiewicz
    E-mail: jackiewicz@uwb.edu.pl
    Institution: Uniwersytet w Białymstoku
    Year of publication: 2017
    Source: Show
    Pages: 85-100
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2017.05.06
    PDF: ppk/39/ppk3906.pdf

    Of the numerous direct democracy instruments present in the Latvian Satversme, one of the most interesting solutions is the mechanism of a referendum concerning dissolution of the parliament, initiated by the head of state. A spectacular, and so far the only, example of application of this mechanism was the referendum held on 23 July 2011, as a result of which the Latvian Saeima was dissolved. The article analyzes the constitutional provisions that define this form of direct democracy, taking into account the Latvian political practice. The article focuses on the application of this institution in 2011 and emphasizes the associated social and political conditions. On the background of the Latvian constitutional and political system, in particular the mutual relations between the President of the State and the Saeima, the article presents the importance of this instrument to the Latvian political system and an evaluation of its potential with regard to the system of government.

  • Sztywna formuła kadencji brytyjskiego parlamentu i jej ustrojowe implikacje

    Author: Grzegorz Pastuszko
    E-mail: grzegorz.pastuszko@op.pl
    Institution: Uniwersytet Rzeszowski
    Year of publication: 2016
    Source: Show
    Pages: 115-132
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2016.02.06
    PDF: ppk/30/ppk3006.pdf

    W artykule poruszona zostaje problematyka konstrukcji prawnej kadencji Izby Gmin pod rządami przepisów ustawy o sztywnej kadencji parlamentów z 2011 r. Autor dokonuje analizy przyjętych rozwiązań prawnych, wskazując na ich daleko idące konsekwencje ustrojowe. W pierwszej kolejności wyjaśnia on na czym polegała zmiana, na jaką zdecydował się brytyjski ustrojodawca w 2011 r. Następnie przedstawia skutki zniesienia dotychczasowej prerogatywy królewskiej służącej rozwiązywaniu parlamentu. W końcowej części artykułu omawia wreszcie nowe procedury rozwiązywania parlamentu, z założeniem wyeksponowania ich znaczenia dla funkcjonującego nad Tamizą konstytucyjnego systemu państwa.

  • W kierunku skandynawskiego modelu monarchii parlamentarnej? Zmiany w brytyjskim prawie konstytucyjnym wobec Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011

    Author: Marcin Łukaszewski
    E-mail: lukaszewskimarcin@o2.pl
    Institution: Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
    Year of publication: 2014
    Source: Show
    Pages: 29-54
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2014.06.02
    PDF: ppk/22/ppk2202.pdf

    Subject of the paper is Fixed -term Parliaments Act which was adopted in 2011, under which the British monarch lost power to dissolve the parliament, which was in force since the beginning of the English parliamentarism. The author analyzes the few Polish and Anglo-Saxon literature comments to the Act, and also indicates the consequences of different legal solutions to the structure of the British constitution. As a result of the adoption of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 there has been a change in the British Constitution: constitutional convention of Lascelles Principles lost its power, and also the earlier prerogative of the monarch expired and the so-called statute laws was added yet another piece of legislation. The author also notes that the adoption of the Act led to the inhibition of evolutionary strengthening the position of Prime Minister, among other organs of the state.

  • Strategic Use of Early Elections in Japan : Comparison of the Koizumi and Abe Cabinets

    Author: Karol Żakowski
    Institution: University of Łódź
    Year of publication: 2019
    Source: Show
    Pages: 78-91
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2019.63.06
    PDF: apsp/63/apsp6306.pdf

    The aim of this article is to analyze political objectives and repercussions of the dissolutions of the House of Representatives by Prime Ministers Koizumi Jun’ichirō in 2005 and Abe Shinzō in 2014. In both cases dissolutions took place less than two years after the previous elections. The paper argues that the strengthened power of the heads of government after electoral and administrative reforms facilitated them to take advantage of Diet dissolution to overcome opposition by veto players. By appealing to the public Koizumi planned to privatize the Japan Post and Abe intended to postpone the consumption tax hike. In both cases the prime ministers used early elections to enhance their position in the ruling party. As a result, Koizumi managed to overcome pressure from postal employees and Abe gained leverage over Ministry of Finance (MOF) bureaucrats.

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