większość parlamentarna

  • Przedterminowe zakończenie kadencji jako instrument poszukiwania efektywnej większości parlamentarnej. Uwagi w świetle przepisów Konstytucji Ukrainy

    Author: Krzysztof Eckhardt
    E-mail: krzysztofeckhardt@gmail.com
    Institution: WSPiA Rzeszowska Szkoła Wyższa
    Year of publication: 2017
    Source: Show
    Pages: 143-165
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2017.05.09
    PDF: ppk/39/ppk3909.pdf

    The article discusses the function of early termination of the Parliamentary term consisting of searching for the most effective Parliamentary majority. It was presented in the light of regulations adopted in constitutional law of Ukraine. A mark of lack of positive majority is usually the inability of the Parliament to create the new government. The Constitution of Ukraine provides one more criterion. There was introduced, characteristic only for this state, the institution of legal forcing to create the institutionalized coalition of fractions of deputies covering most of the constitutional composition of the Parliament, under threat of dissolving it by President. The author analyses the effectiveness of this solution in the systemic practice of Ukraine.

  • Powoływanie rządu w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej: analiza porównawcza

    Author: Marek Jarentowski
    E-mail: m.jarentowski@uksw.edu.pl
    Institution: Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
    Year of publication: 2015
    Source: Show
    Pages: 159-180
    DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2015.05.08
    PDF: ppk/27/ppk2708.pdf

    The existence of cabinet in parliamentary systems of government depends on the parliament, which appoints and dismiss cabinet. Aim of the article is comparative analyze of cabinet appointment method in 11 post-communist countries of central and eastern Europe, which are members of European Union, based on constitutional provisions. Research question is whether constitution leave the presidents, who formally nominate the governments, the possibility of real influence on the cast of prime minister post. As a result, I position constitutions on a two dimension scale in which the ends are countries in which the president in principle has no possibility appoint the cabinet against the will of the parliamentary majority (the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland and Slovenia) and countries where the constitution formally leaves the President ability to influence the composition of the government (Lithuania, Hungary and Slovakia). Other countries (Croatia, Romania, Latvia) are in between these extremes.

Wiadomość do:



© 2017 Adam Marszałek Publishing House. All rights reserved.

Projekt i wykonanie Pollyart