Specyfika głosowania podzielonego w nowozelandzkich trigger electorates. Wnioski z wyborów do Izby Reprezentantów z lat 1996–2020

  • Author: Jeremiasz Salamon
  • Institution: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie
  • ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6028-1188
  • Year of publication: 2024
  • Source: Show
  • Pages: 191–210
  • DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2024.82.11
  • PDF: apsp/82/apsp8211.pdf

The specificity of split-ticket voting in New Zealand trigger electorates. Conclusions from the elections to the House of Representatives from 1996 to 2020

This article characterizes the impact that the alternative electoral threshold operating in the mixed electoral system for the House of Representatives has on the behaviour of a part of the electorate of the two largest New Zealand political parties. This mechanism causes some National Party and Labour Party voters, motivated by the desire to support a potential junior coalition partner in obtaining parliamentary representation, to opt for a strategic ticket-splitting, which follows a different pattern to previously described in the literature. This type of electoral behaviour is particularly characteristic of single-member districts known as trigger electorates, which in the New Zealand electoral system are of crucial importance not only for the parliamentary future of smaller parties but also for the formation of a government majority by the National Party and the Labour Party.

W niniejszym artykule scharakteryzowany został wpływ, jaki na zachowania części elektoratu dwóch największych nowozelandzkich partii politycznych wywiera alternatywny próg wyborczy, funkcjonujący w mieszanym systemie wyborczym do Izby Reprezentantów. Mechanizm ten powoduje, że część wyborców National Party i Labour Party, motywowana chęcią wsparcia potencjalnego mniejszego koalicjanta w uzyskaniu reprezentacji parlamentarnej, decyduje się na strategiczny podział głosów, który przebiega według innego schematu niż dotychczas opisywany w literaturze. Ten rodzaj zachowania wyborczego charakterystyczny jest zwłaszcza dla jednomandatowych okręgów wyborczych, określanych mianem trigger electorates, które w nowozelandzkim systemie wyborczym mają kluczowe znaczenie nie tylko dla parlamentarnej przyszłości mniejszych ugrupowań, ale również dla sformowania większości rządowej przez National Party i Labour Party.

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electoral geography split-ticket voting alternative electoral threshold mixed-member electoral system geografia wyborcza głosowanie podzielone alternatywny próg wyborczy mieszany system wyborczy trigger electorates New Zealand Nowa Zelandia

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