Balancing the Win-Sets: Agricultural Lobby and Japan’s Accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement

  • Author: Karol Żakowski
  • Institution: University of Łódź
  • Year of publication: 2021
  • Source: Show
  • Pages: 198-216
  • DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2021.71.12
  • PDF: apsp/71/apsp7112.pdf

Due to strong connections with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the agricultural lobby constituted a considerable obstacle in liberalization of trade by Japan. Nevertheless, in the last years, its influence on governmental policy has been waning. Referring to the theory of two-level games, the article analyzes the discourse on accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement to examine the weakening dependence of Japanese politicians on support from the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives. It is argued that the Japanese government managed to sign both the TPP Agreement in 2016 and its successor, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2018, thanks to the institutional strength and negotiation strategy of the Abe administration.

ROLNICZE LOBBY A AKCESJA JAPONII DO POROZUMIENIA TRANSPACYFICZNEGO

Ze względu na silne powiązania z Partią Liberalno- Demokratyczną i Partią Demokratyczną lobby rolnicze stanowiło istotną przeszkodę w liberalizacji handlu przez Japonię. Niemniej jednak w ostatnich latach jego wpływ na politykę rządu osłabł. Nawiązując do teorii gier dwupoziomowych (theory of two-level games), w artykule dokonano analizy dyskursu dotyczącego przystąpienia do Partnerstwa Transpacyficznego (TPP) pod kątem słabnącej zależności japońskich polityków od wsparcia ze strony Centralnego Związku Spółdzielni Rolniczych. Stwierdzono, że rządowi Japonii udało się podpisać zarówno umowę o TPP w 2016 roku, jak i jej kontynuację, Kompleksową i progresywną umowę o partnerstwie transpacyficznym w 2018 roku, dzięki sile instytucjonalnej i strategii negocjacyjnej rządu premiera Abe Shinzō.

BIBLIOGRAFIA:

  • Akimoto, D. (2019). Japan’s Policy on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in Light of IR Theory and Analytical Eclecticism. Journal of International and Global Studies, 10(2), 1–20.
  • Amari, A. (2016). The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. Asia-Pacific Review, 23(1), 11–20. DOI: 10.1080/13439006.2016.1195948.
  • Bochorodycz, B. (2018a). Abe Cabinet and the TPP Negotiations on “Trade Sensitivities”. In: K. Żakowski, B. Bochorodycz, & M. Socha, Japan’s Foreign Policy Making: Central Government Reforms, Decision-Making Processes, and Diplomacy (pp. 203–231). Cham: Springer.
  • Bochorodycz, B. (2018b). The Issue of Futenma Under the Koizumi and Hatoyama Cabinets. In: K. Żakowski, B. Bochorodycz, & M. Socha, Japan’s Foreign Policy Making: Central Government Reforms, Decision-Making Processes, and Diplomacy (pp. 137–155). Cham: Springer.
  • Cabinet Secretariat (2015, October 20). TPP ni okeru Kanzei Kōshō no Kekka [Result of Negotiations on Tariffs in the TPP]. Retrieved December 29, 2020 from: https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/tpp/tppinfo/2015/pdf/151020_tpp_kanzeikousyoukekka.pdf.
  • Choi, B., & Oh, J.S. (2017). Reversed Asymmetry in Japan’s and Korea’s FTAs: TPP and Beyond. Pacific Focus, 32(2), 232–258. DOI: 10.1111/pafo.12091.
  • George Mulgan, A. (2018). The Abe Administration and the Rise of the Prime Ministerial Executive. London and New York: Routledge.
  • Honma, M., & George Mulgan, A. (2018). Political Economy of Agricultural Reform in Japan under Abe’s Administration. Asian Economic Policy Review, 13(1), 128–144. DOI: 10.1111/aepr.12208.
  • Inoguchi, T., & Iwai, T. (1987). “Zoku Giin” no Kenkyū [A Study on “Parliamentary Tribes”]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha.
  • Kan, N. (2010, October 1). Policy Speech by Prime Minister Naoto Kan at the 176th Extraordinary Session of the Diet. Retrieved October 27, 2020 from: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/kan/statement/201010/01syosin_e.html.
  • Kano, M. (2013). Nōringyo Fukken no Tatakai: Ichinen Kyūkagetsu no Kiseki [Struggle for the Rehabilitation of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries: One Year and Nine Months Path]. Tokyo: Zaikaikenkyūjo.
  • Karube, K. (2018). Kanryōtachi no Abenomikusu. Ikei no Keizai Seisaku ha Ika ni Tukuraretaka [Abenomics of the Bureaucrats: How Was the Odd-looking Economic Policy Created]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
  • Kawamura, K. (2011). Rieki Dantai no Dōtai to Seiken Kōtai – Nōgyōhyō no Yūkai [Change of Government and the Interest Group: Meltdown of the Agricultural Organized Votes]. Nenpō Seijigaku, 2, 33–51.
  • Liberal Democratic Party (2012). Nihon o Torimodosu [Restore Japan]. Retrived October 3, 2020 from: https://jimin.jp-east-2.storage.api.nifcloud.com/pdf/seisaku_ichiban24.pdf?_ga=2.156227707.1712537556.1554297229-464335118.1554297229.
  • Nishikawa, K. (2017). TPP no Shinjitsu: Sōdaina Kyōtei o Matomeageta Otokotachi [Truth About the TPP: The Men Who Finalized the Grand Agreement]. Tokyo: Kaitakusha.
  • Nomura, H. (2018, October 19). End of ‘Gentan’ – Will the End of Regulated Reduction of Cultivated Land Result in the Increase or Decrease of Future Rice Supply in Japan? FFTC Agricultural Policy Platform. Retrieved November 21, 2020 from: https://ap.fftc.org.tw/article/1329.
  • Obama, B. (2011, May 26). Remarks Following a Meeting with Prime Minister Naoto Kan of Japan in Deauville, France. Retrieved March 25, 2020 from: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-following-meeting-with-prime-ministernaoto-kan-japan-deauville-france.
  • Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (2011, November 13). Press Conference by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda on the Occasion of the 19th APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting. Retrieved November 27, 2020 from: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/noda/statement/201111/13naigai_e.html.
  • Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (2013, March 15). Press Conference by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Retrieved December 26, 2020 from: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201303/15kaiken_e.html.
  • Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet (2014, January 22). A New Vision from a New Japan, World Economic Forum 2014 Annual Meeting, Speech by Prime Minister Abe. Retrieved December 15, 2020 from: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201401/22speech_e.html.
  • Putnam, R.D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427–460. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300027697.
  • Sakuyama, T. (2015). Nihon no TPP Kōshō Sanka no Shinjitsu: Sono Seisaku Katei no Kaimei [The Truth of Japan’s Participation in the TPP Negotiations: Revealing Its Policy Process]. Tokyo: Bunshindō.
  • Shimizu, M. (2011). Seiken Kōtai no 600 Nichi [600 Days of Alternation of Power]. In: T. Sasaki, & M. Shimizu (Eds.). Zemināru Gendai Nihon Seiji [Seminar on the Present Japanese Politics] (pp. 1–222). Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppan.
  • Shinoda, T. (2020). Two-Level Game Analysis of Japan in the TPP Negotiations. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 5(4), 337–350. DOI: 10.1177/2057891119865025.
  • Solís, M., & Urata, S. (2018). Abenomics and Japan’s Trade Policy in a New Era. Asian Economic Policy Review, 13(1), 106–123. DOI: 10.1111/aepr.12205.
  • Taniguchi, T. (2018). Abe Shinzō no Shinjitsu [Truth About Abe Shinzō]. Tokyo: Gokū Shuppan.
  • Terada, T. (2016). Japan and Entanglement of Regional Integration in the Asia-Pacific: Combining Cutting-Edge and Traditional Agendas. In: S. Basu Das, & M. Kawai (Eds.). Trade Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific: Developments and Future Challenges (pp. 85–101). Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
  • Terada, T. (2019). Japan and TPP/TPP-11: Opening Black Box of Domestic Political Alignment for Proactive Economic Diplomacy in Face of ‘Trump Shock’. The Pacific Review, 32(6), 1041–1069. DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2019.1617771.
  • Weiner, R.J. (2011). The Evolution of the DPJ: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back. In: L.J. Schoppa (Ed.). The Evolution of Japan’s Party System: Politics and Policy in an Era of Institutional Change (pp. 63–98). Toronto–Buffalo–London: University of Toronto Press.
  • Yamada, M. (2013). TPP Himitsu Kōshō no Shōtai [Truth about TPP Secret Negotiations]. Tokyo: Takeshobō.
  • Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu (2012). Minshu Gakai. Seikai Daikonmei eno 300 Nichi [Collapse of the DPJ: 300 Days towards a Great Confusion of the Political World]. Tokyo: Shinchōsha.
  • Yuasa, H. (1986). Kokkai “Giin Zoku” – Jimintō “Seichō” to Kasumigaseki [“Parliamentary Tribes” – Kasumigaseki and the LDP “PARC”]. Tokyo: Kyōikusha.
  • Zhang, Y. (2011). Riben de Nongye Baohu yu Dongya Diquzhuyi [Japan’s Agricultural Protection and East Asian Regionalism]. Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe.
  • Żakowski, K. (2015). Decision-Making Reform in Japan: The DPJ’s Failed Attempt at a Politician-Led Government. London–New York: Routledge.
  • Żakowski, K. (2019). Revision of Japan’s Foreign Policy After Donald Trump’s Electoral Victory. International Studies: Interdisciplinary Political and Cultural Journal, 23(1), 85–101. DOI: 10.18778/1641-4233.23.06.
  • Żakowski, K. (2021). Gradual Institutional Change in Japan: Kantei Leadership under the Abe Administration. London–New York: Routledge.

Japonia teoria gier dwupoziomowych liberalizacja handlu lobby rolnicze Porozumienie Transpacyficzne two-level game theory liberalization of trade agricultural lobby Japan Trans-Pacific Partnership

Message to:

 

 

© 2017 Adam Marszałek Publishing House. All rights reserved.

Projekt i wykonanie Pollyart