Sartre’s Critique of Freud’s Conception of Emotions

The purpose of this article is to reconstruct Sartre’s critique of selected elements of Freud’s psychoanalysis as far as the emotions theory is concerned. I am analysing those assumptions of Freud’s teachings which became subjected to Sartre’s critique and why. I also point out the fact that some of the elements of psychoanalysis where emphasised by Sartre as important for the development of the emotions theory. My deliberations are based largely on Sartre’s Sketch for a Theory of the Emotion.

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