Engagement of the Judiciary in the Political Activity of the Ruling Camp. A Case Study of the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice

This article aims to define the role played by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in the political system of contemporary Venezuela and determine the extent of the executive branch’s influence on the judiciary. The research problem formulated by the author concerns the determination of the fundamental importance of the Tribunal in keeping the Chavistas in power. The paper compares the substantive legal competencies of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice with the political realities of recent years and shows why the Tribunal’s activities undertaken in recent years have raised so much controversy. It has been pointed out that the Chavistas’ control of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice is a significant factor enabling the supporters of Nicolas Maduro to exercise both judicial and extrajudicial control over the institutions of the judiciary and to influence the legislature, vide the deprivation of legislative powers already accomplished.

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