In Poland, freedom of press is a systemic principle that protects the rule of law. Relevant regulations regarding this matter are included in the constitution in force since 1997. However, other legal regulations contain solutions that raise objections of the journalistic environment and are described as repressive towards the media. The Article 212 of the Penal Code provides for example a criminal penalty of up to one-year imprisonment for the offense of defamation using mass media. According to journalistic circles, such a provision negatively affects journalistic practice causing the so-called “chilling effect”, i.e. unwillingness to undertake controversial subjects. The discussed issue is analyzed in the light of the provisions of the Constitution, jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Press Law Act, as well as selected articles of the Penal Code.

The paper examines the conflict over the control of the integration of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal (CT) that evolved into a constitutional crisis in October 2015 - and has extended for more than two years. It identifies issues that help understand how the Polish Democracy does not impede the erosion of constitutional democracy as the conflict has undermined the CT and the function of judicial review (JR). The article examines issues of legitimacy that emerge from the crisis; it also examines the extent to which the institutional settings condition the operation of the JR function; in particular, it looks at the role of executive actors (the Government and the President), and the role of the political/parliamentary party in bridging the separation of powers.

The purpose of the article is to draw attention to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal in the context of the issue related to the same principles of access to public service, which are guaranteed by the Art. 60 of the Polish Constitution.The analysis of the Court’s judgments makes it possible to relate the interpretation of this provision to the principle of proportionality and equality before the law. Both in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal and the Supreme Court, attention is paid to the transparency and openness of the rules used to determine the requirements related to taking up public office functions.

In 2015-2020, support for the Law and Justice party was to remain stable. In autumn 2020 political decisions were made on issues that polarized public opinion. At the same time, a decline in polling support for the government was observed. The aim of the article is to explain changes in support with the use of a circular matrix.

Civil Service in the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal

The civil service (c.s.) is a key element of any nation of law. As an institution responsible for exercising the public authority c.s. is not free from political pressure and takeover attempts for the purposes of the party. Polish experience in the creation of a politically neutral c.s. has not been impressive. The first regulation was created during the interwar period. After the World War II, the idea of an independent and professional c.s. was gradually dismantled to be completely abandoned in 1974. After the collapse of PRL, until 1996, there were several unsuccessful attempts to revive c.s. In that year the parliament adopted a basis for the c.s. system but even that attempt was subsequently revised in upcoming years by further changes (three new acts of law). Moreover, it has to be pointed out that during those years the actions of decision-makers concerning the c.s. have been the subject of jurisprudence by the Constitutional Tribunal. The rulings issued by the Tribunal have shaped the operational conditions which are important for c.s. and have developed an interpretation of the constitutional axioms of that institution. Analysis of key sentences of the Constitutional Court is the subject of this paper.

Constitutional complaint and allegations of breaches of the legislative procedure

I am in favour of the possibility of questioning the course of the legislative process in a constitutional complaint. The objection/the allegation could only concern the procedure of adopting a normative act containing a provision constituting the legal basis of an act of applying the law. The act of applying the law must concern the constitutional rights or freedoms of the complainant. With the current procedural regulation, I believe that there is an obligation to examine this issue ex officio by the Constitutional Tribunal. Practice shows that the Tribunal does not examine the correctness of the legislative process in the proceedings initiated by the complaint, neither on the allegation of the applicant nor ex officio.

The essence and status of the constitutional principle of sustainable development (according to the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal)

The term „sustainable development” is a”constitutional” term in Poland – in the sense that the Constitution uses, but does not define it. In the Polish legal language, it is a relatively new concept, formed in the early 1990s. By not introducing a definition of „sustainable development” into the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the lawmakers of the constitutional system left it, in practice, relatively open to interpretation. The current study aims to analyze the decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland, especially concerning the scope of art. 5 of the Constitution, on the basis of which, among others, the principle of sustainable development was put forward.

If not the Constitutional Tribunal, then What? On Dispersed Constitutional Review in Poland

The discussion on the model of constitutional review of law in Poland gained a new dimension after 2016 in connection with the ongoing constitutional crisis. First of all, there is a question of whether, irrespective of the competences of the Constitutional Tribunal, on the grounds of the binding constitutional provisions, also courts may review the constitutionality of statutory provisions in the process of their application. Although after 1997 the principle became established that the Constitutional Tribunal had exclusive competence to review the constitutionality of acts in Poland, a clear change in this respect is now visible both in doctrine and jurisprudence. The majority of doctrinal representatives justify the admissibility of dispersed judicial review by the inability of the Constitutional Tribunal to perform its basic function, treating it as something exceptional, incidental, determined by the doctrine of necessity. The aim of this paper is to present the debate on the admissibility of dispersed judicial review on the grounds of the Polish Constitution, as well as to indicate the possible directions of its development.

The Illiberal Constitutional Court in Poland on the Example of the Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal on Abortion, file ref. no. K 1/20

The paper discusses the characteristics of the Constitutional Tribunal as an illiberal constitutional court. After the political remodelling initiated in 2015 and the capture of the Tribunal, this body gained a new role in developing, protecting and stabilizing illiberal constitutionalism. The Tribunal, as an illiberal constitutional court, often adjudicates in panels inconsistent with constitutional rules, is abusively activated by the ruling option and issues judgments that are beneficial to the rulers and justify their constitutionally questionable actions. How an illiberal constitutional court operates is presented in the example of an abortion judgment, file ref. no. K 1/20. This case also shows the illiberal ground of the new system.

In the article, the issue of the relationship between the Polish Constitution and European Union law is analysed from the perspective of its shaping in the adjudication of the Constitutional Tribunal. Firstly, the constitutional regulations that define the relationship between the Constitution and EU law will be analysed. This part of the article also includes the issues relating to the legal basis of the most commonly used instrument that shapes this relationship – the EU-friendly interpretation of the Constitution. Secondly, the contexts in which the Constitutional Tribunal refers to EU law are examined. The case study that is undertaken focuses on the instruments that prevent conflicts between EU law and the Constitution, inter alia legislative and interpretative instruments. The application of these methods in recent controversial judgments Ref. no. P 20/07 and Ref. no. K 3/21 concerning the relationship between the Polish Constitution and the EU law will be analysed.

Direct Effect of Applicability of the Ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal after Publishing it

The subject of this elaboration is legal effect of the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal, that arises after it has been published. The purpose of this elaboration is to present doubts related to application of rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal, based on the art. 8 para. 2 of the Constitution due to the art. 118 and 190 of the Constitution. Pursuant to these articles, the ruling is given legal effect after its publication, not earlier. By adjudicating with regard to the provision being at variance with the Constitution, the Constitutional Tribunal actually imposes the effect on the legal system in the form of repeal of this provision. On the one hand the legal system becomes constitutional but on the other a legal loophole may arise from lack of regulations.

In this article, the author argues that the introduction of measures in Poland to remedy violations of the rule of law, particularly regarding the judicial system, does not require so far referring to the principles of transitional justice. The author loosely refers to Ernst Fraenkel’s concept of a dual state which is sometimes used to describe the political reality in contemporary Poland. In a dual state, there are two parallel realities, and apart from politicized organs there may also exist institutions that have not yet been captured by the ruling party, i.e. institutions that do not recognise the current, unconstitutional legal order. Therefore, according to the author, the assessment of the legal legitimacy of certain institutions or persons (including judges), after the restoration of the rule of law in the nearest future, may differ from the classic transition from a completely non-democratic to a democratic regime.

A Constitutional Complaint as an Instrument for Protecting Individual Electoral Rights – Comments in the Context of Constitutional Complaints Considered by the Constitutional Tribunal in 2012–2023

It seems that currently any attempt to undertake a substantive assessment of the activity of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, especially after 2015, is doomed to the need to address the problem of the ongoing constitutional crisis in Poland. Nevertheless, the analysis of statistical data allows us to put forward the thesis that the “popularity” of the constitutional complaint as a means of protecting individual freedoms and rights – at least seemingly – has not been completely wasted even in these difficult conditions. It can be concluded that a constitutional complaint is not a commonly used instrument for the protection of an individual’s electoral rights. Nevertheless, given the constitutional problems raised in the constitutional complaints, the structure of this instrument of protection of the constitutional freedoms and rights of the individual prevents effective protection (ie. the possibility of restoring) the infringed electoral rights of the individual.

Gloss to the Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 2 June 2023 file ref. no. Kpt 1/17

The article refers to the judgment of the Tribunal Court of 2 June 2023, file ref. no. Kpt 1/17. In this jurisdiction, the Tribunal resolves a competence dispute between the Supreme Court and the President of the Republic. In the resolution of 31 May 2017 file ref. no. I KZP 4/17 the Supreme Court climes that The President is not supposed to apply the law of pardon to people, who are not finally sentenced. The Tribunal decides that the Supreme Court doesn’t have a competence, which allows controlling the President’s individual acts. The Author of the article criticizes the Tribunal’s judgment and climes that in this particular case there is no a competence dispute. The Tribunal intends to present formally binding interpretation of the article no 139 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Supreme Court and common courts are entitled to control President’s applying the right of pardon during fulfilling their function of the administration of justice.

The Category of “Legitimation” in the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal – Constructive Semantic Conditions

This paper aims to analyze the Constitutional Tribunal’s (CT) jurisprudence regarding the term “legitimation” to reconstruct its definition and compare it with its lexical meaning. Despite its varied use across multiple contexts, the jurisprudence lacks a uniform definition of legitimation. This situation necessitates reliance on diverse semantic intuitions. A doctrinal-legal method combined with logical-linguistic analysis was employed, analyzing 100 CT rulings that used the term “legitimation”. The CT’s jurisprudence shows that the application of the term is not limited to legal legitimacy but also includes broader contexts such as social perception, alignment with the values of the legal system, or the sovereign’s will. It is used in contexts that align with previous lexical findings, suggesting that legitimation can be viewed both as a state and a process. The analysis confirms the need for a terminological distinction, which could help organize discourse around this concept.

Constitutional Reformism. On the Independence and Effectiveness of the Constitutional Tribunal

The focus of remedial actions to align the system with constitutional democracy standards is on restoring the Constitutional Tribunal’s independence. However, this is just a minimum step. For the reform to benefit the state and citizens, it must not only repair post-2015 damages but also modernize the legal environment. The article examines parliamentary bills on the Constitutional Tribunal and and the Constitutional Tribunal Introductory Provisions, submitted on 6 March 2024, alongside a constitutional amendment bill from 56 senators submitted at the same time. The authors suggest expanding reform efforts, using constitutional reformism, which integrates law, political science, and public life practices, to propose solutions for improving the state’s quality.