The notion of ‘style’ with reference to power is inherently vague and non-existent in the research terminology of social science. On the other hand though, it is difficult to find a more adequate expression to describe a peculiar, individual way of making use of powers deriving not so much from systematic adjustments as from the personality of a leader. Political power does not simply come down to a simple mechanism of giving and executing orders. It is a sort of performance demanding appropriate requisites lights, prestige and actors. As Herman suitably states: authority by its very nature seeks obedience and enhances prestige. Adopting a common view that each leader is a product of his own age, the personality of a president, therefore, incorporates both individual features and a shared experience of his generation. Considering the ways of realization the presidential power in Poland after 1989 it should be referred not only to its institutional or political aspects but also to historical and cultural background as factors co-determining this peculiar model of leadership.

The relations between Georgia and Western Europe and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1453–1783

The article presents the history of contacts between Georgia and Western Europe as well as Georgia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth between the mid-15th and the end of the 18th centuries. In the article, the role of the Georgian diplomatic missions is emphasized in the process of forging anti-Osman coalitions.

On October 17, 2017, President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid an official visit to Warsaw upon the invitation of the President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda. The main subject of the talks was political, economic and cultural cooperation. Issues of security were also addressed. President Erdoğan had last visited Warsaw during the NATO summit on July 8–9, 2016. During the meeting in October, the two presidents signed five bilateral agreements. This paper provides an analysis of the effects of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit and prospects regarding the development of friendly relations between Poland and Turkey from Ankara’s perspective. In the paper we applied the test analysis method, the historical method and the institutional and legal one. We pose a thesis that the aim of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit was to identify mutual relations in the economic, political and cultural dimension. According to the Turkish government, these relations are beneficial for both sides. What should be particularly important for Poland is the prospect of opening new cooperation opportunities in the economic sphere. Turkey, in turn, apart from defining the broad framework of business cooperation, is undoubtedly determined to find a partner which could be its ally in the European Union.

The Polish National Assembly is a constitutional governing body, endowed with unique powers that cannot be exercised by any other body. However, the status of the Assembly as a separate state organ raises doubts. Since the restoration of the Assembly, its position in the system has changed significantly, which was related to the multiple modification of the competences of this organ. The evolution of this organ in 1989-2020 allows treating it as an interesting research case. Especially since the competences of the National Assembly are crucial for ensuring the continuity of state power.

The security of the II Republic – assessments 1 September 1939 – „unexpected” war with the III Reich and the „surprise” of the 17 September aggression by the Soviet Union

The Wehrmacht (German armed forces) attacked Poland without declaration of war on 1 September 1939, on the orders of the leader of the III Reich. Then, on 17 September, the Red Army forced the borders of the Polish II Republic. The title of the article reflects what Polish historiography will forever struggle with – whether the aggression by its western neighbour was “unexpected” and whether we can consider the invasion from its eastern neighbour a “surprise”. Above all, the question is whether the military (General Staff; military intelligence) and political leadership (Foreign Ministry) of the state foresaw beforehand the possibility of rift in Polish-German relations and the renewal of a German-Soviet alliance/pact (cooperation), which in consequence brought about undeclared war with Poland’s eastern neighbour. The presented article is in sections and presented in chronological order.

From Mikołaj Kozakiewicz to Maciej Płażyński. Sketches for the portrait of the Marshals of the Sejm in 1989–2011

The aim of the article is to present the biographies of the first five marshals of Polish parliaments in 1989–2011. The Marshals of the Sejm presented in short biographical sketches are figures who played an important role in Polish politics. Among them were politicians from various political groups. Two activists associated with the Polish people’s movement (Mikołaj Kozakiewicz and Józef Zych), one socialist from the former post-communist camp (Józef Oleksy) and two with a beautiful card in the anti-communist opposition and strongly associated with the Catholic Church (Wiesław Chrzanowksi and Maciej Płażyński). The Marshal of the Sejm is the speaker of the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish parliament. The office traces its origins to the 15th century. In modern Poland, the full title is Marshal of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland. Today the Marshal of the Sejm is the chairman of the Presidium of the Sejm and the Convention of Seniors. The Marshal oversees the work of the Sejm, supervises procedural sessions of the Sejm, and convenes and chairs the proceedings of the Convention of Seniors and the Presidium of the Sejm. Since 1989 substitutes for the President of Poland in the event of that office’s vacancy.

The article studies the legal nature of the introduction of the lawyer’s monopoly in Ukraine. The author notes the introduction of the lawyer’s monopoly in Ukraine had to take four steps. However, at the last stage of the introduction of the lawyer’s monopoly, the legislator amended the procedural codes regulating the course of civil, commercial, and administrative proceedings. With these changes, the legislator expanded the concept “self-representation” by substituting the concept of “representation”. In addition, the legislator brought in a draftto revoke the lawyer’s monopoly which was approved by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. The scientist states that the relevant strategy of abolishing the lawyer’s monopoly is not a positive phenomenon. The introduction of court representation of citizens, business entities, state bodies, central and local authorities by a professional institute of advocacy is an upside in reforming the Ukrainian legal system. However, according to the author, the profession of a lawyer is primarily aimed at providing defense in criminal proceedings or when bringing to administrative responsibility or considering a case of an administrative offense. At the same time, the scientist marks that the reversion to the previous wording of Article 131-2 of the Constitution of Ukraine is inadmissible since the provision of legal services in Ukraine should be carried out professionally. After analyzing the legislation of the Republic of Poland, the author has concluded that lawyers and legal advisers, who carry out practical legal activities on a professional basis and permits, provide the public with legal aid. However, the only difference between a lawyer and a legal adviser in the Republic of Poland is that the latter cannot provide legal assistance in criminal proceedings, unlike a lawyer. Therefore, to create a professional and competitive market of legal services in Ukraine, the researcher proposes to borrow the experience of the Republic of Poland and introduce a professional institute of legal advisers in Ukraine, as this profession is legally identified in Ukraine.

This paper focuses on preserving, translating and analyzing pieces of information on the 2015–2018 Ukrainian- Polish Forum of Historians, allowing for knowledge of this event to be spread beyond Ukraine and Poland. Through this article the author wishes to show that to the governments of Central and Eastern Europe, such as Ukraine and the Republic of Poland, history became a consideration in state policy, due to massive shifts of views on how to approach history between the era of totalitarian Soviet domination and the development of current democratic governments. Although it is something that would be considered outside of state purview in the West, possibly even called “undemocratic”, the government’s interest in how history is told to the population must be viewed in the context of both information warfare, and in how the countries of Central and Eastern Europe approach international relations. Because of this, the Ukrainian-Polish Forum of Historians, organized by Polish and Ukrainian Institutes of National Remembrance (differential in their approaches to what can be considered “shared history”) is of interest as an example of how joint discussions of history, attempts to find a common position, or a compromise, were considered relevant and needed for policy makers in Poland and Ukraine. Analyzing the prerequisites of the events, the topics discussed at the Forum (largely concerning mid-20th century history of Poland and Ukraine), and its results we conclude that, although the differences on how Ukrainian and Polish governments viewed their countries’ history eventually led to the Forum stopping, the initiative led to new actions from independent actors trying to support the idea of shared forgiveness and modern Polish-Ukrainian unity despite different views on various historical events. That shows that politics of memory affect Ukrainian and Polish policymaking, allowing an alternative perspective on the theory of international relations, one that considers not simply realist expectations, but emotional attachments to a country’s past and wishes to see that past respected, or at least not actively opposed, by other nations.

Prosecutor’s Office in the Visegrad Group Countries – History, Comparative Legal Remarks, Cooperation

The public prosecutor’s office is one of the most important state organs responsible for upholding the rule of law and prosecuting crimes. The efficient functioning of the office is one of the guarantees of the implementation of a democratic state ruled by law. After 1989, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, after independence from Soviet influence, the prosecution authorities began to reform, trying to adapt to the new conditions. The exchange of mutual experiences in this area has a special form in the case of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, i.e. the countries making up the so-called Visegrad Group, within which the prosecutors general meet each year to deepen cooperation. The purpose of this article is to present the principles of the functioning of the prosecutor’s office in the V4 countries and to compare them also from a historical perspective.

The research covers the early years of Ukraine’s and Poland’s cooperation in their bilateral relations in the context of building up security policies between the NATO and the CSTO in 1991–1994. Various information influences from state and non-state actors, internal and external, made it so the processes of the search for security guarantees ended up quite different between the two neighboring countries. Covering sources and literature that provide evidence for influences from sources such as the Kremlin, the non-lustrated “old guard” former Communist party functionaries in Ukraine, and the former opposition in Poland, the research shows how the two countries’ relations with the NATO differed, and why, though both countries joined the Partnership for Peace program at roughly the same time, Poland managed to start active Euro-Atlantic integration much earlier than Ukraine did. Using sources such as the text of the treaties, the establishing documents and legislature guidebooks of organization, public writings of diplomats and former policy makers, the research shows what exactly were the risks that the NATO assessed in the joining of former Eastern Bloc countries (with the unstated reasons for the small number of contacts of those countries with NATO in the 1991–1994 relevant to the West’s suspicion of post-Soviet intelligence and military), and which points of the first Ukraine-NATO proved “too much” for the former. Furthermore, Ukraine’s early success with the number of NATO exercises it partook in during the first years of the Partnership for Peace became an example to other Eastern Europe countries seeking better relations with NATO and defense sector reforms, including the Republic of Poland. The paper also highlights the tendencies of cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland in the context of NATO enlargement and the various aspects of Atlantic integration. The most important among them was cooperation in security and defense, both bilateral and within the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace Program.