- Author:
Hector Calleros
- E-mail:
h.calleros@uw.edu.pl
- Institution:
University of Warsaw (Poland)
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5689-5075
- Year of publication:
2020
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
71-91
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy2020205
- PDF:
ppsy/49-2/ppsy2020205.pdf
The paper examines the conflict over the control of the integration of Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal (CT) that evolved into a constitutional crisis in October 2015 - and has extended for more than two years. It identifies issues that help understand how the Polish Democracy does not impede the erosion of constitutional democracy as the conflict has undermined the CT and the function of judicial review (JR). The article examines issues of legitimacy that emerge from the crisis; it also examines the extent to which the institutional settings condition the operation of the JR function; in particular, it looks at the role of executive actors (the Government and the President), and the role of the political/parliamentary party in bridging the separation of powers.
- Author:
Tomasz Słomka
- E-mail:
tomasz.slomka@uw.edu.pl
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Warszawski
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9226-5828
- Year of publication:
2020
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
217-232
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2020.04.11
- PDF:
ppk/56/ppk5611.pdf
Judicial Power in a Crisis of Constitutional Democracy
The article is devoted to the problems of changing the position of the judiciary in Poland in the conditions of crisis of constitutional democracy. Two basic research hypotheses are verified. First of all, after 2015, Poland was one of the countries revising its liberal-democratic political foundations. Such foundations undoubtedly include: the rule of law, the principle of constitutionalism and the principle of division and balance of power. Secondly, the political position of the judiciary has been defined in the liberal-democratic Constitution of the Republic of Poland in a way appropriate for the protection of the above mentioned values, but the political practice shows that the lack of proper will to implement the constitutional provisions (using the arithmetic advantage in parliament without the recognition of minority rights) may violate the „backbone” of constitutional democracy.
- Author:
Wojciech Włoch
- E-mail:
wloch@umk.pl
- Institution:
Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
- ORCID:
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0807-5130
- Year of publication:
2023
- Source:
Show
- Pages:
51-62
- DOI Address:
https://doi.org/10.15804/ppk.2023.02.04
- PDF:
ppk/72/ppk7204.pdf
Constitutionalism Against Constitutional Democracy? Remarks on Martin Loughlin’s Against Constitutionalism
The subject of the article is a polemic with M. Loughlin’s thesis that constitutionalism as a philosophy of governance can be realized only in one form. Referring to the theory of worldviews, it can be said that the styles of constitutional interpretation stem from different experiences and accompany different practices. Although various doctrines may be united by a commitment to democracy, irreducible social pluralism determines the constant dispute over the best interpretation of the constitution. Constitutional democracy can be one of the forms of constitutionalism, if it is perceived as an interpretative concept.