Responsibility of the Judicial Power and Disciplinary Responsibility of Judges

Two circumstances: ineffective legal protection system and controversial cases of abandonment of enforcement of judges’ disciplinary liability have become a basis for justifying amendments to regulations on judges’ disciplinary liability. New solutions are characterised by, among other features, the limiting of the independence of the judiciary and subjecting it to increased control exercised by the legislature and the executive. The rationale behind these changes is to be sought for in a claim that courts of law are not a representative of the people which can be considered qual to the other authorities and that, therefore, having been abused by judges, the rights they have enjoyed hitherto (other than the administration of justice) should be constrained. Some judges and representatives of the jurisprudence reject this argumentation pointing out that rather than being conducive to the declared goals of improving the functioning of courts and of judges’ observance of law, the amendments result in the limiting of the citizen’s right to an independent tribunal. In these circumstances, a dispute has arisen over how a judge should act if the law on disciplinary liability prohibits their right to criticise or legally verify regulations depriving them of the guarantee of independence and impartiality. Do the statutable principles of disciplinary liability also determine all the principles of the judiciary liability? What if there is a difference of opinions between the representatives of the legislature and the executive versus those of the judiciary concerning an interpretation of the citizen’s right to a tribunal and of the notion of “independence of a tribunal”? Analysing the legal and doctrinal argumentation offered by both parties may facilitate answering these questions. This approach may also prove useful in determining whether enforcing the new principles of disciplinary liability will resolve the current crisis in the relationship between courts and the other authorities or, on the contrary, initiate its further stage.

Disciplinary Liability of a Judge of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal

The essence of the article is to present the concept, function and principles of disciplinary liability and the mode of disciplinary proceedings against judges of the Constitutional Tribunal in the context of the ongoing dispute over the independence of each of these constitutional state organs. Disciplinary liability arose from sources of repressive liability and is a special type of criminal liability due to the functions it performs, but also a high degree of ailment. The author argues that despite numerous legal provisions, the model of conduct has not changed, as well as are based on misunderstood axiology, bypassing the principle of nemo iudex in causa sua. I propose, in accordance with the principle of objectivity (impartiality), to submit only disciplinary judges of the Constitutional Tribunal to the Supreme Court for consideration with the simultaneous adoption of an identical mutual principle with respect to judges of the Supreme Court.

Polish System of Disciplinary Liability of Judges in the Light of Standards European Union Law

The study presents current issues of the disciplinary liability of judges, starting with an indication of historical attempts to introduce new, unified regulations intended to cover most of the legal professions, up to the enactment of the statutes of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court and the so-called Disciplinary Law for judges. The author conducts an in-depth analysis of the disciplinary regulations in terms of testing compliance with EU law standards and the need to ensure the effectiveness of EU legal solutions.

In this article selected relationships occurring between the sociology of law and disciplinary law were analyzed. They show the convergence and complementarity of interests of both of these areas of law. Research methods developed in the field of sociology of law can be an excellent tool for research on legal nature of disciplinary responsibility and the problems that arise in this area open up new opportunities for the interests of the sociology of law.

The article is the issue of disciplinary responsibility in a historical perspective. This issue was already developed earlier by Professor Zbigniew Leoński in his book concerning disciplinary responsibility from 1959. So this article is merely a komplement of these findings taking into account the earliest times (antiquity) and the latest (second half of the twentieth century) which professor Z. Leoński did not include or could not have included in his study. In the remaining field the most important findings of professor Z. Leoński were appointed.