Responsibility of the Judicial Power and Disciplinary Responsibility of Judges

Two circumstances: ineffective legal protection system and controversial cases of abandonment of enforcement of judges’ disciplinary liability have become a basis for justifying amendments to regulations on judges’ disciplinary liability. New solutions are characterised by, among other features, the limiting of the independence of the judiciary and subjecting it to increased control exercised by the legislature and the executive. The rationale behind these changes is to be sought for in a claim that courts of law are not a representative of the people which can be considered qual to the other authorities and that, therefore, having been abused by judges, the rights they have enjoyed hitherto (other than the administration of justice) should be constrained. Some judges and representatives of the jurisprudence reject this argumentation pointing out that rather than being conducive to the declared goals of improving the functioning of courts and of judges’ observance of law, the amendments result in the limiting of the citizen’s right to an independent tribunal. In these circumstances, a dispute has arisen over how a judge should act if the law on disciplinary liability prohibits their right to criticise or legally verify regulations depriving them of the guarantee of independence and impartiality. Do the statutable principles of disciplinary liability also determine all the principles of the judiciary liability? What if there is a difference of opinions between the representatives of the legislature and the executive versus those of the judiciary concerning an interpretation of the citizen’s right to a tribunal and of the notion of “independence of a tribunal”? Analysing the legal and doctrinal argumentation offered by both parties may facilitate answering these questions. This approach may also prove useful in determining whether enforcing the new principles of disciplinary liability will resolve the current crisis in the relationship between courts and the other authorities or, on the contrary, initiate its further stage.

Disciplinary Justice in the Context of Constitutional Restrictions

The purpose of this article is to analise the present formula of disciplinary responsibility of the judges in a context of the constitutional rules: independent of judges, independent of courts and right to a fair trial. The Author analises present legal status, as well practice and legal propositions of changes. By the way, he notices a dengerous tenden cy towards transgressing constitutional limits and infringement these regulations with the European Union’s law.

The right to a fair trial is at the forefront of the key individual rights in a broad catalogue of all rights and freedoms, for at least several reasons. Firstly, because it provides for one of the most important procedural mechanisms for the enforcement of all the other rights and freedoms. Secondly, because it protects the individual against potential violation of their rights and freedoms. Thirdly, because it is a reflection of the relation between the individual and the state, indicating all those elements that are today commonly considered as specific measures in the democracy index. As a consequence, the manner in which the right to a fair trial is established and its specific structure determines all other rights and freedoms, and especially their practical application, which determines whether the rights and freedoms are concrete or only appearances.

Constitutional aspects of cassation judgment in the Polish criminal trial

The article shows how the cassation appeal model determines the exercise of the right to a fair trial. The aim was to examine the constitutionality of solutions concerning retrial not considered to a greater extent in the science of the criminal process. The formal and dogmatic method was used in the research. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland does not indicate what the model of the criminal trial is. It does not explicitly contain an order or a prohibition to repeal judgments and refer the case for reconsideration. The legislator, while shaping the right to revoke judgments, including legally binding ones, and to refer the case for reconsideration, must, however, particularly carefully balance all the conflicting values. It must particularly take into account the importance of hearing a case without undue delay and the stability of final court decisions as constitutional values.

The Constitutionality of Hearing Civil Cases by a Single Judge in the Time of the Covid-19 Pandemic

The subject of this article is the analysis of the constitutionality of the principle of hearing cases by a single judge in civil proceedings. Considerations presented in this study first of all address the issue of whether the principle of hearing cases by a single judge is consistent with minimum requirements set by the legislator of the constitutional system towards the ordinary legislator as regards shaping of the institution of the participation of the social factor in the administration of justice. The second aspect of considerations presented in this article is whether the introduction of the principle of hearing cases by a single judge in civil proceedings may be considered a violation of the right to a fair trial. The analysis of the issue in question is undoubtedly of practical importance due to significant consequences of the potential examination of a civil case in a non-constitutional composition.