The book ‘The winning side’, by Huy Duc, is revealing in two ways. First, it presents an account of how the historically crucial episode of the 1968 Tet offensive was, as an event seen as caused by decisions in Hanoi (clearly, these are proximate causes, as the historical context is far greater in scope), ‘decided upon’. Second, in that Huy Duc’s account tells us much about his views of how these decisions were taken, and their political milieu, it tells us how he presents his own views and thinking about that milieu.

Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese School of Diplomacy. A Pragmatic Approach to the Traditional Narrative

The aim of the article is to define and analyze the specific, traditional features of Vietnamese diplomacy that are associated with the international activities of the first Vietnamese president, Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969). The basis of the Vietnamese leader’s official rhetoric is communist (Marxist-Leninist) ideology, which, adapted to Vietnamese realities, is often referred to as hoshiminism. Alongside communist ideas in Ho’s speeches and activities, patriotism and nationalism or sovereign decision-making should be mentioned. These are reflected in the documents of the recent 13th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, a brief analysis of which in the context of contemporary diplomacy is presented in the article. The blending of global and regional trends, the ability to navigate the tangle of interests of the great powers, to extract as much benefit for oneself as possible from the contradictions of their interests, to build an image of a flexible, friendly, pragmatic state have all been adopted from the war period are characteristics reflected in the term used for Vietnam’s diplomacy today – ‘bamboo diplomacy’.