The article is a comparative study of constitutional references to natural law, with a particular emphasis on the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The findings presented in the study are both of qualitative and quantitative nature. References to natural law, recognized in the constitutions of 48 countries in the world, relate almost exclusively to fundamental human rights and freedoms. Usually, the constitution-maker assigns the title “natural” or “inherent” to all fundamental rights of person or to some of them. In none of the Basic Laws, natural law has been included into formal sources of law, nor its hierarchical relation to positive law shown. No constitution specifies a definite concept of natural law. The authors of the constitutions, speaking generally about natural rights, have not wanted to engage in philosophical and legal disputes accompanying the category of ius naturale.

The subject of the article is references to the truth in the constitutions of modern states. The comparative study shows multiplicity of contexts in which the category of truth is mentioned in several dozen fundamental laws. The mention of truth in the constitutions as a component of the axiology of the legal and social order, the basis of transitional justice or the principle of court and administrative proceedings should be assessed positively. However, making the truth a limit of freedom of speech raises serious reservations. Granting constitutional protection only to truthful statements can stifle the public debate on socially prominent issues. The conducted analysis does not confirm the thesis of political liberalism that the truth is irrelevant for law and politics.

Happiness (Right to Happiness) as a Constitutional Category – Critical Remarks Against the Background of a Comparative Study of the Constitutions of Contemporary States

The paper presents a synthesis and an analysis of constitutional references to happiness identified within the comparative study of the fundamental laws of contemporary states. Constitutional references to happiness are subjected to a three-element typology into 1) those that capture happiness as a goal or principle of state policy; 2) those that refer to happiness in the context of state symbols and it’s historical and cultural identity, and 3) those that guarantee the right to (pursuit of) happiness as a fundamental right of the individual. The author presents arguments against the formulation of a constitutional right to happiness (or more broadly against its legal positivization), seeing the constitutionalization of this right as a manifestation of the broader phenomenon of inflation and trivialization of human rights. He calls for the development at the statutory level and realization fundamental rights and freedoms that are already expressly guaranteed in constitutions and universally recognised.