The article is devoted to the study of the mechanisms of influence of the institute of constitutional justice on the processes of balancing power in a democratic state and formulating conclusions on the basic principles of reforming the domestic constitutional model of relevant legal relations. The author states that the special status of constitutional justice bodies within the continental model, in particular the status of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine between branches of government, is due to the important mission of constitutional justice bodies to find a fine line between positive, natural law and political influence of different branches of government. The corresponding task allows to make certain analogies with the status of some other subjects of power. The key difference between the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, as a subject of relations between the branches of government, is much greater, and even in fact - the maximum distance from each of these branches. Such a model becomes especially relevant when the legislature, executive and president are representatives of the same political force, when the body of constitutional jurisdiction actually remains the only entity capable of resisting the possible intentions of the respective forces to “control” the judiciary. At the same time, the special status of the bodies of constitutional justice, along with the institutional provision of their maximum distance from any single branch of government, is also guaranteed by the requirements of professionalism of their staffand a certain degree of independence from electoral sentiment.