This paper presents some remarks on the theory of hybrid activities. Analysis of relevant texts indicates that at present there is no real theory of hybrid activities. Interpretations and definitions of hybrid activities differ to some extent and certain important features are missing. For example, some authors opine that hybrid activities consist of simultaneous military and non-military operations. This opinion is not necessarily true as non-military activities can precede military activities. Monitoring this phase of hybrid activities is particularly important. The so-called “crisis management” covers (from the viewpoint of praxeology) a too narrow area.

Constitutional Duty to Protect Polish Borders in the Light of the Crisis on the Border with Belarus

The duty of each state established by internal law is to protect its borders. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland, referring to the need to ensure the integrity of the territory and the security and inviolability of its borders, gives this duty priority. The crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border poses a serious threat to both the Baltic countries and the European Union. The methods and means used to end it are primarily intended to ensure border security, which is a particularly difficult task given the hybrid nature of the actions carried out by Belarus. The possibility of response and reaction of Polish services is limited by the need to respect human rights, international law regulations and democratic rules, which the Republic of Belarus does not feel bound by. The use of the state of emergency made it possible to focus efforts on combating the crisis, but the question arises how the situation will develop after it is lifted.

Trying to explain the term and essence of hybrid wars

Russian-Ukrainian conflict has contributed to the spread in the media and politics the term hybrid war. The purpose of this article is to encourage researchers to reflect on the pertinence of the use of the term and on the need to clarify it. The most important question highlighted in the course of analysis, lean toward determining of characteristics that would allow state clearly what kind of conflicts, using what techniques and from which point, you may to be called hybrid war

The article discusses selected theoretical and practical problems of the ongoing Russian Ukrainian war since 2014 from the perspective of Carl von Clausewitz’s political theory of war. It argues, first, that defining the first phase of the conflict as “hybrid war” on theoretical grounds is an unnecessary exercise that obscures the methodologically important difference between war and peace. Second, despite technological innovations, the concepts of “fog of war” and “friction” remain relevant. Third, the current phase of the conflict shows that the spontaneous and grassroots involvement of citizens in the war was a transitional phenomenon that became subordinated to central command structures. It also shows that from the perspective of Clausewitz’s theory, Russia’s strategic failure in the first part of the second phase of the conflict is completely understandable.