Balancing the Win-Sets: Agricultural Lobby and Japan’s Accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
- Institution: University of Łódź
- Year of publication: 2021
- Source: Show
- Pages: 198-216
- DOI Address: https://doi.org/10.15804/athena.2021.71.12
- PDF: apsp/71/apsp7112.pdf
Due to strong connections with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the agricultural lobby constituted a considerable obstacle in liberalization of trade by Japan. Nevertheless, in the last years, its influence on governmental policy has been waning. Referring to the theory of two-level games, the article analyzes the discourse on accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement to examine the weakening dependence of Japanese politicians on support from the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives. It is argued that the Japanese government managed to sign both the TPP Agreement in 2016 and its successor, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2018, thanks to the institutional strength and negotiation strategy of the Abe administration.