The paper aims to define the psychological foundations of lone wolf activism. The analysis that facilitated attaining this goal was based on the Nietzschean concept of resentment theory of compensatory revaluating values that explain the relationships between inferiority and fundamentalism, fanaticism, and ideologically motivated violence. Based on a phenomenological examination of the phenomenon, the author demonstrates that lone wolf activism is founded on two psychologically and sociologically determined successive processes. The first one occurs when a sense of personal inferiority becomes the source of an envy-based hostile attitude toward the world. Later on, this feeling, due to personality defence mechanisms, which bring about the falsification of “primary desires” and the generation of “secondary desires”, transforms into fundamentalism. The second process takes place when, as the result of fundamentalist legitimisation that arise on the level of social rivalry, given fundamentalism is destituted, resulting in fanaticism. The author believes that the knowledge of both processes is necessary to recognise and combat the terrorist activity of lone ideologically motivated individuals.

Fanaticism as an educational problem

Education is such an introduction into values thanks to which they become a constant point of reference in action, and in this way the habit of referring to the norms indicated by these values and their application is perpetuated. However, unconditional, ruthless and passionate compliance with the norms is a symptom of fanaticism. Referring to two philosophical concepts, the article is an attempt to answer the question of how to educate people to opt for the values while avoiding shaping a fanatical attitude in the educated person. The approach of L. Kołakowski and R. Rorty, emphasizing the principle of inconsistency, and the approach of A. MacIntyre pointing to the virtue ethics are analyzed.

Stop and think. Thinking against fanaticism

Piotr Kowzan’s polemic proved that the issue of fanaticism remains an important educational problem, but also more broadly: a social one. Formulating a response to a polemic allows for rethinking and clarifying some themes. It also turns out to be important to return to the very definition of fanaticism as well as to point out that the problem is important because fanaticism threatens primarily people of value: those who perceive values and are actively engaged in their realization. In our response to the polemic, we try to point out three issues that are important in our opinion. Firstly, we emphasize that fanaticism is always harmful, and although this harmfulness is not always significant, even in the best case, fanaticism is harmful at least to the fanatic himself. Secondly, we oppose the claim that countering fanaticism can be as destructive as fanaticism itself. Thirdly, we maintain the claim that the basic symptoms of fanaticism are: an inability to make any compromises and a rejection of the very possibility of making an exception to an accepted rule of action. In conclusion, we recall Hannah Arend’s vitally important call to maintain a balance between activity and reflexivity.