Constructivism is one of the most popular and fastest growing paradigm in recent pedagogy. The fundamental assumption of constructivism is the thesis that knowledge is always and with necessity human construction. All knowledge about the world around us is the result of our experience. Of course, there are many forms of constructivism, although the Polish educational literature generally mentions two faces of constructivism: the personal (inspired by Piaget’s psychology) and the social (based on the psychology of Vygotski). It appears that radical constructivism has not been given proper discussion in Polish pedagogy. This theory, what is important, is the most famous and important kind of constructivism because of its epistemological and educational assumptions and consequences. Therefore in this article I want to achieve two goals: 1) to present the principal assumptions and the thesis of radical constructivism as articulated by Ernst von Glasersfeld; 2) to discuss selected controversies that this model of knowledge and learning has brought about.

Fanaticism as an educational problem

Education is such an introduction into values thanks to which they become a constant point of reference in action, and in this way the habit of referring to the norms indicated by these values and their application is perpetuated. However, unconditional, ruthless and passionate compliance with the norms is a symptom of fanaticism. Referring to two philosophical concepts, the article is an attempt to answer the question of how to educate people to opt for the values while avoiding shaping a fanatical attitude in the educated person. The approach of L. Kołakowski and R. Rorty, emphasizing the principle of inconsistency, and the approach of A. MacIntyre pointing to the virtue ethics are analyzed.

This book in an accessible manner examines education disciplines in one handy volume. It provides well prepared study activities and extra notes to texts, figures and journals of particular education disciplines. In chapter one Barry Dufour presents an introduction to the history of education. Next chapter reveals the political, economic and social context for changes in contemporary education. The third chapter considers the fundamental philosophical ideas beginning with Greek philosophers and taking us forward in time to today by looking at the influential educational ideas (Dufour, Curtis, 2011). Chapter four depicts the most significant areas of the economics of education. The main sociological perspectives in education are presented in chapter five. Next chapter presents behavior, learning and intelligence as parts of the psychology of education. Comparative education through the prism of research is presented in the last chapter.

The study tries to define the anthropology of dialogue as a specific way of thinking on human being; it grounds mainly in Tzvetan Todorov's findings. It comments basic theses of Buber, Levinas, Bachtin, Habermas and Todorov while underlining their mutual interpretability as well as similarity. Because of possible significance of this anthropological conception for professional teacher training, it recommends to reserve some space for the anthropology of dialogue in the area of the philosophy of education thus enabling it to come out of the shadow of more influential anthropological conceptions.

The article attempts to solve the problem of updating higher education content to form a modern worldview of the individual through the interdisciplinary course “Biophilosophy”. Biophilosophical knowledge and cognition content is studied at the fundamental and applied levels using methods of description, explanation, and analysis. The obtained results make it possible to formulate conclusions and perspectives regarding updating the content of philosophical knowledge in higher education, where biophilosophy can be a new worldview paradigm for preserving human culture and civilisation.

Stop and think. Thinking against fanaticism

Piotr Kowzan’s polemic proved that the issue of fanaticism remains an important educational problem, but also more broadly: a social one. Formulating a response to a polemic allows for rethinking and clarifying some themes. It also turns out to be important to return to the very definition of fanaticism as well as to point out that the problem is important because fanaticism threatens primarily people of value: those who perceive values and are actively engaged in their realization. In our response to the polemic, we try to point out three issues that are important in our opinion. Firstly, we emphasize that fanaticism is always harmful, and although this harmfulness is not always significant, even in the best case, fanaticism is harmful at least to the fanatic himself. Secondly, we oppose the claim that countering fanaticism can be as destructive as fanaticism itself. Thirdly, we maintain the claim that the basic symptoms of fanaticism are: an inability to make any compromises and a rejection of the very possibility of making an exception to an accepted rule of action. In conclusion, we recall Hannah Arend’s vitally important call to maintain a balance between activity and reflexivity.