The problem of non-conceptual content as a research object

Some mental states of a person can be represented semiotically or objectively even in the case when the subject of such states does not have the concepts necessary to define (qualify and categorize) their content. There is no consensus among researchers as to what the essence of such content is, both in terms of their quality and the forms of their existence in the consciousness (or subconsciousness) of a person. These kinds of functions of human experience include sensory, emotional, and volitional content. The article presents the attempts of a number of philosophers and scientists to consider the issues of conceptual and non-conceptual content. It has been established that most researchers of the content of human consciousness limit themselves either to the study of sensory information or to the study of already conceptualized emotional and volitional content. Moreover, research on emotions and will is often reduced to the analysis of mental or psychophysiological mechanisms themselves. The authors try to present sensuality, emotions and volitional states as a kind of nonconceptual information and define its place in the human information system in relation to conceptual content and in relation to the processes of semiotization.