The Notion of Repressive Liability (Article 42 of the Constitution) and the Power of Pardon of the President of the Republic of Poland

The aim of this article is to discover in relation to which sanction it is possible to exercise the right of pardon (art. 139 of the Constitution). Basing on the systemic interpretation of the Constitution, the author argues that the power of pardon is the ‘reverse’ of the notion of repressive liability inferred from art. 42 of the Constitution. Consequently, in relation to all repressive sanctions within the meaning of art. 42 of the Constitution it is allowed to grant a pardon. Therefore it is possible to claim that a power of pardon can be applied to, inter alia, disciplinary penalties, lustration penalties, administrative monetary penalties, tax surcharges and penalties imposed on collective entities. Challenges for the doctrine of law – including possible collisions between exercising power of pardon and other constitutional provisions – are indicated.

The Systemic Nature of Pardon and Amnesty in the Context of the Institution of Extradition

The article addresses the issue of the concept, scope and systemic character of pardon and amnesty in correlation with the institution of extradition. It presents the divergent positions of the doctrine regarding the interpretation of the nature of the title measures and possible ways of recognizing the status of a person who has been pardoned or amnestied, and at the same time the request for extradition applies, by international agreements regulating extradition transactions. The aim of the article is to analyze the legal conditions of pardon and amnesty in comparison with binding standards in the field of extradition, both those that qualify the impediment to pardon and amnesty as an obligatory extradition impediment, and those that do not give it the indicated character. As part of the work, research methods traditionally applied in legal sciences were used, the formal-dogmatic method, the comparative method and the historical-legal method.

Gloss to the Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 2 June 2023 file ref. no. Kpt 1/17

The article refers to the judgment of the Tribunal Court of 2 June 2023, file ref. no. Kpt 1/17. In this jurisdiction, the Tribunal resolves a competence dispute between the Supreme Court and the President of the Republic. In the resolution of 31 May 2017 file ref. no. I KZP 4/17 the Supreme Court climes that The President is not supposed to apply the law of pardon to people, who are not finally sentenced. The Tribunal decides that the Supreme Court doesn’t have a competence, which allows controlling the President’s individual acts. The Author of the article criticizes the Tribunal’s judgment and climes that in this particular case there is no a competence dispute. The Tribunal intends to present formally binding interpretation of the article no 139 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Supreme Court and common courts are entitled to control President’s applying the right of pardon during fulfilling their function of the administration of justice.