On the Limits of Interpreting the Law According to Karl Engisch German Case Study

We are probably not mistaken when we state here that one of the most heatedly debated issues in German legal doctrine remains the problem of the delimitation of the limits of judicial lawmaking (Richterrecht). In other words, and in the most succinct terms, the judge’s right to legislate. For the judicial law is, and it would be difficult not to agree with such an opinion, one of the most interesting but also controversial issues in contemporary legislation. The question as to whether a judge is merely the „mouthpiece of the law”, or whether he or she is allowed to make a creative contribution to its interpretation, cannot be regarded, even today, as not serious or merely outdated. Hence, the attempt of Karl Engisch (1899–1990), one of the most prominent German criminal law theorists of the 20th century, to answer this question can and should be seen not only in terms of casuistic demonstration, but also (and who knows if not primarily) as the evidence of a scholar who rejects seeing the judge as a kind of automaton acting according to cognitive dogmas. From the Polish perspective, this account remains convincing insofar as one takes into consideration Engisch’s rejection of National Socialist delusions in the study as well as in the application of law. An attitude which, as we know, was not typical of this milieu during the Third Reich.