The paper aims to analyse how information warfare can be conducted in cyberspace and to look at this issue from the perspective of Central and Eastern European Countries. It argues that this form of hostile actions will be increasingly utilized in the region. The main assumption, following Alvin Toffler’s theory, is that “information” – as an increasingly important element of modern societies and as their strategic resource – also serves as a significant tool of modern conflicts. Since information is nowadays strongly related to new technologies, mainly the aspects connected to cybersecurity are analysed. The article looks closer at different aspects of cyberthreats and explains their possible consequences. It may serve as good material for further research and recommendations on countermeasures that may increase security in Europe. 

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The article discusses Russian information warfare focusing mainly on propaganda issues, which were used during the conflict in Ukraine, and tries to find an answer to the question of to what extent these undertakings are dangerous to Euro-Atlantic security. It provides a political background of the conflict in order to better understand why Russia is using particular information warfare tools. The article analyzes manipulation techniques and the use of specific elements of Russian identity such as the attitude to history and the role of the Orthodox Church. Finally, it discusses a possible influence these actions may have on security and stability of the EU and NATO and their particular member states.

Experts on information competition between Russia and Western countries are convinced that president Vladimir Putin plans a war against the West as a long-term operation. It is directed on two fronts: internal and the more effective external one. Both can be developed in every country of the World; the opponent may be a compatriot but the ally may be a foreigner. Fortunately, in the West the effectiveness of these operations is lower. Confrontation with the West the Kremlin has many advantages: parental and controlled informational space, technical implements, huge experience based on expert knowledge, likewise a longstanding practice in conducting informational operations. Those actions are strongly concentrated and there are widely used digital platforms and also, they popularise the contents in harmony with Russian Federation politics. Their aim is not only forming internal and external public opinion properly and in line with the Kremlin’s interests, because as the annexation of Crimea has demonstrated that their aim is construction of a new reality of the world. Paradoxically, in the Russian Federation’s policy, media freedom and political pluralism are considered as a weakness of the West. Many communities which have different benefits are sensitive to the Kremlin’ s propaganda.

This paper aims to evaluate the sources of Russia’s soft power as a tool which should enable it to integrate Belarus more closely with Russia. The research question is as follows: what are Russia’s main sources of attractiveness, and what kind of instruments of soft power is the Russian government applying to achieve that aim? To what extent was this soft policy successful? The author applied a qualitative research method. It is inductive and allows the researcher to explore meanings and insights into Russia’s notion of “soft power” in its foreign policy toward Belarus. The basis of it lies in the interpretive approach to the present reality of Russia – Belarus political and economic relations and in the evaluation of Russian efforts to integrate its closest neighbour by using only non-military means.

A questionnaire-based study conducted in October 2021 provided analytical material on the degree and sources of disinformation in Polish society. The material has representative qualities and is the first comprehensive research project in Poland to cover issues regarding information security in such breadth and detail. The paper aims to analyse and present a study on disinformation in Polish society conducted on a representative group of Poles in 2021. The project's key research questions are: How receptive is the Polish public to disinformation content? What are the channels of information provided to Poles? Is the notion of disinformation familiar to the Polish audience, and do the recipients of media content search for methods to verify disinformation? The analysis and interpretation of the results identified some important features of the Polish disinformation map. The concept of disinformation is now commonly familiar to the Polish public (86%), and the sensitivity to content credibility can be regarded as high; the respondents were found to verify information, actively searching through various sources. Disinformation is rife in climate, energy (52%), and health (44%).

This paper aim to explore that Russian propaganda has a long historical tradition and a rich instrumentarium. The development of the internet and social media has increased the possibilities for distributing propaganda messages. The principal objective of Russian propaganda is to influence the public opinion in cooperation with persons acting as translators, and to distribute contents – in various national languages – in conformity with the Russian policy and ideology. A tangible objective is to change the opinion about the Russian Federation and its policy so that one negative opinion is matched with at least three positive ones.

The research covers the early years of Ukraine’s and Poland’s cooperation in their bilateral relations in the context of building up security policies between the NATO and the CSTO in 1991–1994. Various information influences from state and non-state actors, internal and external, made it so the processes of the search for security guarantees ended up quite different between the two neighboring countries. Covering sources and literature that provide evidence for influences from sources such as the Kremlin, the non-lustrated “old guard” former Communist party functionaries in Ukraine, and the former opposition in Poland, the research shows how the two countries’ relations with the NATO differed, and why, though both countries joined the Partnership for Peace program at roughly the same time, Poland managed to start active Euro-Atlantic integration much earlier than Ukraine did. Using sources such as the text of the treaties, the establishing documents and legislature guidebooks of organization, public writings of diplomats and former policy makers, the research shows what exactly were the risks that the NATO assessed in the joining of former Eastern Bloc countries (with the unstated reasons for the small number of contacts of those countries with NATO in the 1991–1994 relevant to the West’s suspicion of post-Soviet intelligence and military), and which points of the first Ukraine-NATO proved “too much” for the former. Furthermore, Ukraine’s early success with the number of NATO exercises it partook in during the first years of the Partnership for Peace became an example to other Eastern Europe countries seeking better relations with NATO and defense sector reforms, including the Republic of Poland. The paper also highlights the tendencies of cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Poland in the context of NATO enlargement and the various aspects of Atlantic integration. The most important among them was cooperation in security and defense, both bilateral and within the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace Program.

This paper aims to evaluate the sources of Russia’s soft power as a tool which should enable it to integrate Belarus more closely with Russia. The research question is as follows: what are Russia’s main sources of attractiveness, and what kind of instruments of soft power is the Russian government applying to achieve that aim? To what extent was this soft policy successful? The author applied a qualitative research method. It is inductive and allows the researcher to explore meanings and insights into Russia’s notion of “soft power” in its foreign policy toward Belarus. The basis of it lies in the interpretive approach to the present reality of Russia – Belarus political and economic relations and in the evaluation of Russian efforts to integrate its closest neighbour by using only non-military means.

Research objective – The aim of this article is to analyse the specifics of Russian information warfare. Starting from the definition of the concept of political strategy, the author tries to show that information warfare is one of the key instruments in the confrontation with Western states, and that the war in Ukraine has intensified Russia’s activities in this area, also towards Central European states. The means and tools used are an instrument for influencing the political and social processes taking place in other countries. Methodology – The study used a comparative method, collecting and analysing historical data and comparing theoretical approaches to categories such as political strategy, information warfare and hybrid warfare. Findings – The correlation analysis of Russian geopolitics and information warfare confirms that it is a dangerous weapon: a means of achieving the state’s goals in international, regional and domestic politics, as well as of ensuring its geopolitical superiority regionally and globally. Practical implications – This study aimed to organise and expand the available literature on the analysis of the specifics of Russian information warfare.