The paper aims to analyse how information warfare can be conducted in cyberspace and to look at this issue from the perspective of Central and Eastern European Countries. It argues that this form of hostile actions will be increasingly utilized in the region. The main assumption, following Alvin Toffler’s theory, is that “information” – as an increasingly important element of modern societies and as their strategic resource – also serves as a significant tool of modern conflicts. Since information is nowadays strongly related to new technologies, mainly the aspects connected to cybersecurity are analysed. The article looks closer at different aspects of cyberthreats and explains their possible consequences. It may serve as good material for further research and recommendations on countermeasures that may increase security in Europe. 

The purpose of the article is to explore the basic principles of information policy formation in Ukraine in the context of hybrid information warfare; identification of features and problems of information policy and its impact on the public administration system. The results of the study show that since the beginning of Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine and the widespread hybrid information war, the state’s information policy has changed its vectors and priorities. Confirmation of this was the adoption of a number of legislative documents, which identified the external enemy of the aggressor and outlined directions for the protection of national interests. It is analyzed that one of the main tasks in the information confrontation of the hybrid war is the formation of appropriate information policy and information security. It was pointed out that in the conditions of a hybrid war, a systematic approach should be devised to adequately respond to the state’s power structures to the challenges related to information confrontation. In order to minimize the spread of manipulative influences in the national information space, the formation of practical mechanisms for implementing the country’s information policy, establishing communication with civil society and raising the overall level of media literacy of society is a necessary question.

Zarówno dezinformacja, jak i propaganda nie są działaniami nowymi, ale towarzyszą społeczeństwom praktycznie od samego ich powstania. Co więcej, ich użyteczność w działaniach państw potwierdzają nie tylko liczne przykłady historyczne, ale również te, których jesteśmy obecnie świadkami i są ściśle związane z rozprzestrzenianiem się pandemii COVID-19. Artykuł jest próbą zdefi niowania i opisania nie tylko rosyjskiego ekosystemu dezinformacji i propagandy w dobie pandemii, ale również próbą odpowiedzi na pytanie, w jaki sposób różne fi lary tego ekosystemu odgrywają różne role, wzajemnie się zasilają oraz wzmacniają.

The subject of Ukraine’s national security has been continuously receiving a new discourse considering the uncovered aggression of the Russian Federation ongoing since 2014, followed by the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Eastern regions of the country. As a result of agression, the governmental agencies of Ukraine adopted several strategic documents that directly relate to such a component of national security as information. The Information Security Strategy, adopted by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine in December 2021, defines priorities in information security, particularly identifying current challenges and threats to Ukraine’s national security in the information sphere. The Strategy also sets strategic goals and objectives aimed at counteracting such threats. An unprovoked full-scale invasion of Russia to Ukraine on 24 February 2022 proves that the information space becomes a combat field in the reality of war. The Russian federative propaganda machine is fueling the conflict as well as the high levels of support of brutal actions of the state’s president Putin (according to various sources from 51% to 71% of Russians support war in Ukraine). This, as well as the generally increasing role of the information factor in modern spaces of society, incurs the relevance of the research topic. The article aims to systematically determine the features of the conceptual and applied aspects of the information security of Ukraine. The realisation of the purpose identified assumes achievement of the following objectives:
1. Identify the key characteristics of the information space of Ukraine.
2. Determine the characteristics of risks, challenges and threats in the information space.
3. Define the source of the information aggression against Ukraine.
4. Develop recommendations for enhancing the procedure of reacting towards such aggressions.
In the process of solving research problems, such general scientific methods as analysis and synthesis have been applied to identify the factors that have had the most significant impact on the information space of Ukraine. challenges, information threat, information risks.

This scientific article highlights the issue of ensuring the investment component of information security of the state in martial law. Theoretical and practical interest in the study of the problems of legal security of military security is primarily related to the social, economic and geopolitical metamorphoses that have taken place in the world in recent years. In the current realities of Ukraine, it faces a number of issues, the solution of which is directly related to the identification and analysis of sources of real and potential threats to national interests. A significant number of global threats require the creation of special administrative and legal mechanisms for regulating public relations that arise in emergencies of military, social, man-made and natural nature. The purpose of this article is to study some forms of investment support for state information security of Ukraine in martial law. The authors conclude that the business has continued to pay taxes to the state budget and even pays them in advance. In February 2022, the general fund of the state budget received UAH 104.6 billion (overfulfillment of the monthly schedule by 29.3%, or UAH 23.7 billion). With the planned deficit of UAH 66.2 billion in the first two months of 2022, the general fund surplus amounted to UAH 13.1 billion, and the state budget of Ukraine as a whole – UAH 24 billion. The NBU promptly transferred part of the profits for distribution in the amount of almost UAH 19 billion to the state budget of Ukraine to finance the functioning of the state under martial law. International organizations and partner countries have pledged large amounts of funding to strengthen defense capabilities, support Ukraine’s economy and humanitarian issues. According to the NBU, the total international financial, technical and humanitarian support is more than $ 15 billion, of which more than $ 5 billion – immediately to the budget.

The author of the article has conducted a comprehensive theoretical and legal research of the principles for reforming national security in the domestic jurisprudence. The author has defined the priorities and directions of the reform in the national security sector, and more important – its theoretical and methodological basis. It has been outlined that theory of national security is currently undergoing a stage of active formation and dynamic development. The search for reliable theoretical principles for the organization of the strategic planning system in the national security sector requires its consideration in terms of the application of the most general political and legal methods and tools of the state’s activities, built on the basic principles of complex and systematic nature and aimed at achieving the highest level of the national security. It has been concluded that the formation and implementation of state national security policy in Ukraine is one of the main problems of effective management of a transforming society. Ukrainian political practice indicates that the technology of implementing the doctrines, strategies, concepts and programs of the state policy in the national security sector should objectively integrate all components of political activity of the state and should be based on sound theoretical principles and historical experience. It has been determined that the main purpose of the national security reform is such a quality improvement of legislation and governance in the national security sector, which can provide quality strengthening the protection of key national interests from external and internal, real and potential threats, in accordance with еру current and future needs of society. It may provide the creation or substantial renewal of the activities of existing entities that ensure the national security, a significant change (“reformatting”, “resetting”) of the national security sector in accordance with existing social needs.

A questionnaire-based study conducted in October 2021 provided analytical material on the degree and sources of disinformation in Polish society. The material has representative qualities and is the first comprehensive research project in Poland to cover issues regarding information security in such breadth and detail. The paper aims to analyse and present a study on disinformation in Polish society conducted on a representative group of Poles in 2021. The project's key research questions are: How receptive is the Polish public to disinformation content? What are the channels of information provided to Poles? Is the notion of disinformation familiar to the Polish audience, and do the recipients of media content search for methods to verify disinformation? The analysis and interpretation of the results identified some important features of the Polish disinformation map. The concept of disinformation is now commonly familiar to the Polish public (86%), and the sensitivity to content credibility can be regarded as high; the respondents were found to verify information, actively searching through various sources. Disinformation is rife in climate, energy (52%), and health (44%).