The paper aims to introduce the concept of constitutional liability of the President, and the institutions of the President’s constitutional liability. The author presents the liability and its relations with other types of head of state’s liabilities. The presented analysis includes all European countries. 

The subject of this article is the character and meaning of the head of state’s liability. The author notices that this institution is an important factor that determines the systemic and legal position of the supreme body in the country, and adopting different solutions in this matter may make the position of heads of state significantly different, even if they seem to have a similar character. This relation has been shown on the example of regulations of liability of the heads of state in Monaco and Liechtenstein. In both countries, there is an almost identical manner of appointing to the office of a head of state and the scope of their authorities. However, the matter of liability has been regulated in a completely different way in these two countries.

The creation of a special body whose sole purpose is to rule on violations of the constitution or statutes by senior state officials, including the president, is relatively rare. Only Greece and Poland have implemented such a solution and until recently also the French law provided such a possibility but the amendment of the Constitution in 2007 changed the legislation within that scope. The subject of the study is the analysis of Polish regulations concerning the State Tribunal in the context when the National Assembly adopts a resolution to put the President in charge of committing a constitutional delinquency.

The Myth of Constitutional Liability

The article attempts to prove that the mechanism of constitutional liability, generally accepted in democratic countries, is largely based on a systemic myth, which is primarily of historical origin, but which does not correspond to the modern doctrinally distinguished functions of law, constitution and its guarantees. In this context, this particular type of legal liability of high state officials has been subjected mainly to a theoretical functional analysis and taking into account teleological criteria, as well as factors that affect its assumed and actual systemic shape.

Gloss to the Resolution of the Tribunal of State of May 15, 2019, file ref. no. TSZP 1/17

The subject of this gloss is an analysis of the resolution of the Tribunal of State of 15 May 2019 (file ref. no. TSZP 1/17) resolving a legal issue, the essence of which boils down to answering the question whether the interruption of the limitation referred to in Art. 23 of the Tribunal of State Act should be understood in such a way that, after the occurrence of such an event, the limitation runs anew. The author, partly polemicising with the findings of the Tribunal of State, points out that this issue cannot be resolved by using the methods of linguistic and systemic interpretation. Only a functional interpretation supports a positive answer to the question under consideration. Thus, the author confirms the correctness of the Tribunal’s decision, while pointing out the deficiencies of its justification.