Problems of the Legal Structure of the Participatory Budgeting

The article subjected the regulation of the participatory budget to a critical analysis as internally contradictory and controversial (including constitutional doubts). It pointed out some resulting paradoxes and discrepancies between practice and jurisprudence in fundamental issues: the eligible participants and the permissibility of using specific personal data. Because such a state of affairs is unacceptable in a democratic legal state and attempts to resolve it through interpretative means have not yielded satisfactory results, selected arguments for providing participatory budgeting with new legal framework are presented. It also highlighted some benefits that could arise from regulating the participatory budget within electoral law (as a distinct type of local referendum) and proposed in an outline some specific solutions.

Implications of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause

Democratic systems entail the need to respect the fundamental principle of equality, especially in the context of electoral laws. However, in the United States of America, a country perceived as the archetype of liberal democracy, this principle does not seem to be fully respected. Gerrymandering, which involves manipulation of the electoral district lines for political gain, has a negative impact on the quality of American democracy. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Rucho v. Common Cause that claims challenging electoral maps as favoring one political party are nonjusticiable as they pose political question, thus being beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This article seeks to demonstrate the threats that the decision reached in Rucho v. Common Cause poses to US electoral processes. The analysis is carried out through a characterization of the gerrymandering and the reasoning applied by the Supreme Court Justices.