The short article discusses the competences of ombudsmen in Sweden and Finland in relation to the judiciary. These institutions have controlling and supervisory powers in relation to courts of law, including the determination of the accountability of judges and typical competences of a prosecutor. The Author points out the necessity to read provisions of the constitutions and acts regulating the discussed competences in the light of the principle of the judiciary’s independence. Still, the supervisory rights of ombudsmen in Sweden and Finland are very well developed and may refer to issues approaching closely the sphere of jurisdiction. When assessing the solutions presented, the Author points out the fact that the ombudsmen in both countries have worked out respective practices aimed at such use of available means of control so they cannot be accused of a reasonable and too extended interference with the judiciary sphere.

The Italian Constitutional Court spoke on numerous occasions about the provisions of the Concordat concluded between the Italian Republic and the Roman Catholic Church. Up to the 1970s, the Constitutional Court had ruled for the most part on constitutionality of solutions regarding the Catholic religion. In this period of time the Constitutional Court issued rulings that were very important for the relation between the state and the Church. The article analyzes three significant sentences issued on March 1, 1971 regarding the institution of matrimony, as well as the sentence of July 8, 1971 in which the Constitutional Court resolved the constitutionality of the law allowing church marriages to be dissolved by the Italian civil courts. These rulings are very important due to the fact that the Italian Constitutional Court has referred to them on numerous occasions in the subsequent sentences, in which it considered the issue of the contradiction between the Concordat norms and the Constitution.

Judicial Power in a Crisis of Constitutional Democracy

The article is devoted to the problems of changing the position of the judiciary in Poland in the conditions of crisis of constitutional democracy. Two basic research hypotheses are verified. First of all, after 2015, Poland was one of the countries revising its liberal-democratic political foundations. Such foundations undoubtedly include: the rule of law, the principle of constitutionalism and the principle of division and balance of power. Secondly, the political position of the judiciary has been defined in the liberal-democratic Constitution of the Republic of Poland in a way appropriate for the protection of the above mentioned values, but the political practice shows that the lack of proper will to implement the constitutional provisions (using the arithmetic advantage in parliament without the recognition of minority rights) may violate the „backbone” of constitutional democracy.

If not the Constitutional Tribunal, then What? On Dispersed Constitutional Review in Poland

The discussion on the model of constitutional review of law in Poland gained a new dimension after 2016 in connection with the ongoing constitutional crisis. First of all, there is a question of whether, irrespective of the competences of the Constitutional Tribunal, on the grounds of the binding constitutional provisions, also courts may review the constitutionality of statutory provisions in the process of their application. Although after 1997 the principle became established that the Constitutional Tribunal had exclusive competence to review the constitutionality of acts in Poland, a clear change in this respect is now visible both in doctrine and jurisprudence. The majority of doctrinal representatives justify the admissibility of dispersed judicial review by the inability of the Constitutional Tribunal to perform its basic function, treating it as something exceptional, incidental, determined by the doctrine of necessity. The aim of this paper is to present the debate on the admissibility of dispersed judicial review on the grounds of the Polish Constitution, as well as to indicate the possible directions of its development.

The article examines the concept and legal aspects of creating a special international tribunal regarding the crime of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Although this research topic first emerged after the events of 2014 related to the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, scientific interest in the study of this problem increased after the criminal full-scale invasion of Russia on the territory of the sovereign state of Ukraine. The author considers the evolution of creation of select military tribunals, the specifics of their activities, and the established practice of prosecuting the crimes of aggression. Additionally, the analysis focuses on statements regarding the idea of creating a special international tribunal for the Russian Federation for crimes of aggression against Ukraine. It is substantiated that the highest form of international justice in the modern world is a tribunal, as it provides for a public and inevitable punishment and it acts as one of the elements guaranteeing the inviolability of the international legal order at the same time. The creation of a special tribunal for the Russian Federation will be the impetus for new approaches to expand the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court so that it can prosecute acts of aggression, and Ukraine will serve as an example for responding to aggression. The author determined, the establishment of an international tribunal for the first time is a complex process because it is often necessary to find new and completely original solutions to many legal and practical problems facing the tribunal. Moreover, the sum total of these decisions should provide the basis for a reasonable and universally applicable jurisdiction for future generations, at the same time allowing the tribunal to take into account the social, cultural and historical context of the conflict in question and to reflect this context to some extent in its decisions and practice.