The paper deals with distinguishing features of presidential systems of government adopted in the current or former constitutions of some Francophone African countries, such as Benin, Djibouti, Ivory Coast or the Republic of Congo. Particular attention has been devoted to the internal structure of the executive branch of government (the existence of the prime minister as a separate body) as well as to the reception of diverse mechanisms of rationalised parliamentarianism created previously in the constitution of the French Fifth Republic. The dynamics of constitutional changes leading to the adoption of presidentialism in place of semi-presidentialism and vice versa in such countries as Niger or Senegal has also been taken into account. In the light of the findings, it can be stated that the specific properties of presidentialism in Francophone Africa prove its apparent distinctness from certain typical assumptions of this model.

The article is devoted to the characteristics of the minority cabinet in the Scandinavian political systems and especially in Norway and its influence on political regime. Some interesting aspects has been chosen to illustrate the problem of minority government in Norway. Author explains normative and non-normative systemic factors that influenced the formation of the government cabinets without a sufficient majority in the parliament. The main thesis is that creation of minority governments is closely associated with the evolution of the party system and can be understood as a norm of political life in Scandinavia.

Rationalized parliamentarism a là polonaise – a reflection from the perspective of twenty years of the Constitution of 1997

The purpose of this article is critical analysis of polish model of the government, adopted in the Constitution of 2nd April 1997, in the bearing of adopted factors of the rationalization. The key assumption of this article is to proof, that the legal constructions, reffered in the Constitution of 2nd April 1997, in the relation to political practice, don’t satisfy the conditions, typical for the ratinalized parliamentarism in its classical versions, for example in the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic of 1958 and in the 1949 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.

Reception of the chancellery model of governance in Poland

The Polish executive governance model assumes the existence of a two-part executive, in which the strength of the government lies in its constitutional competences and the power of the president is legitimized by his being selected in general elections. Such situation creates a space for conflict between the highest authorities. It is therefore worth to consider the desirability of making changes in the Polish governance model in the future and introducing into the system of governance a model based on the German system of chancellery governance.

The Political System in the Republic of Poland: Its Characteristics  and the Diagnosis of Doubts. Introductory Remarks

The shaping of structural and functional relations between bodies of state authority is one of the key characteristics of any political system and – at the juridical level – of any constitutional system. The choice of basic solutions in this regard determines the method of exercising authority in the state, i.e. its system of rule; also referred to as a system of government. From the methodological perspective, we may distinguish at least two levels of the analysis of the state power mechanism (referred to as the „system of government”), i.e. the normative (constitutional-legal) system of government and the practical (political-behavioural) one. In Poland, when developing the constitutional „system of government,” in the course of work on the drafts of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the relevant points of reference included: a) the parliamentary-cabinet system (particularly in the „rationalized” form), b) the parliamentary-presidential system (referred to as, quite ambiguously, an „indirect system”), and – to a lesser degree - the „system of presidential rule” (presidential system).

System of Government of the Republic of Poland in the light  of the proposals of its changes

System of government of the Republic of Poland, based upon the Constitution of 2 April 1997, is considered as an appropriate. It created a base for the stable governments and alternation of power without conflicts. Since its introduction, not major government’s crisis was noted. Some tensions between President and the Premier Minister has occurred, however, during a cohabitation between President Lech Kaczyński and Premier Minister Donald Tusk (1997–2000). Controversies in the question of representation of the Republic of Poland in the European Council has been solved by the Constitutional Tribunal. It occurred however a problem, whether level of 3/5 to override presidential veto is not too high in situation, when President has backed an opposition and make impossible to fulfill the fundamental reforms introduced by the Committee of Ministers. The death of President Kaczyński make this controversies un-actual. When occasion of changes of Constitution may occurred, this problem should be analyzed in the context of rationalization of those regulation.

The parliamentarisation of the Moroccan system of government  on the basis of the constitution of July 29, 2011

The paper concerns the phenomenon of parliamentarisation of the Moroccan system of government in the light of the constitution of 2011. The act was adopted as a result of civil unrest known as the so-called Arab Spring. The new constitution replaced the basic law of 1996. According to the new constitutional provisions, the role of the monarch has been limited. At the same time, the constitution has improved the position of the government headed by the prime minister. Moreover, the status of the parliament has been changed. By the way of example, the king appoints the prime minister from within the political party, which wins the parliamentary elections, and with a view to their results. In comparison with the previous constitution, the government seems to be more strongly connected with the parliament – especially with the first chamber. The latter has better tools for parliamentary oversight. Currently, the Moroccan system of government is closer to the European model of parliamentarianism.

The status and the role of parliamentary opposition in the German Bundestag – chosen issues

The article concerns chosen issues of the institution of the parliamentary opposition in the German parliamentary system. The parliamentary opposition in the German system of governments is a universally accepted phenomenon. Many factors affect its status and the position, from the structure of internal organs and the way of creating them, for specific institutions of the parliamentary law allowing for active participating in the realization of basic functions of the Bundestag. A President of the Bundestag, a Presidium, Advice of Seniors and committees are internal organs of the German Bundestag. The manner of the casting of individual organs, their tasks and the way of proceeding (especially Advice of Seniors) enable opposition groupings in the real way to influence functioning of the Chamber. In the process, in spite of the lack of the legal institutionalization of the phenomenon of the opposition on the federal level, it is possible to tell about political recognizing laws to the parliamentary opposition in Germany.

Discussions about constitutional reform of governance in Italy

This article presents the main ideas of constitutional reform, governments in Italy over the last thirty years. “Blocked Italian democracy” was looking for ways of overcoming the legal framework. Conceived the idea of the great constitutional reform in the late seventies. There are three main ways of that reform: 1) the establishment of the Constituent Assembly, 2) creating a bicameral committee on constitutional reform, 3) by art.138 of the Constitution for its revision. The first solution only enjoyed the support of the right of the political scene. But failed to establish three committees for the bicameral constitutional reform: in the years 1983–1985 A. Bozziego Commission, in 1992–1994 the Commission C. De Mita and N. Iotti, in 1997, the Commission M. D’Alema. Presented by reform projects have failed due to lack of agreement between the main political forces. Thus, the third way of constitutional reform became Article 138 of the Constitution. However, in cases where an amendment has been approved only by an absolute majority of both houses of parliament, it can be put to the vote in a referendum on ratification. Twice held such a constitutional referendum, once on the center-left proposals 7 October 2001 year, the second time against the center-right approach June 25–26, 2006. The last referendum did not obtain public support. So it seems that the idea of the great constitutional reform has failed to deep divisions between the main political parties.

Features of the Spanish political regime

The Spanish political regime can be defined as a system of parliamentary government. The most characteristic features of it are: the dualism of executive, the neutral position of the head of state and the political responsibility of the government before the parliament. Besides, accepted legal solutions allow for the high effectiveness of the governmental action. The specification of the Spanish political stage, formed after 1978, allow to get closer to the model of the parliamentary government (in the case of existence of the majority government) or to the model of parliamentary committee (in the case of the minority government). Thus, the main aim of this article is to present some key features of the Spanish political regime.

The countersignature as a determinant of the system of government

The task undertaken by the Author of the article is to demonstrate that the countersignature is such a significant element of the system of government established in a given state that the existence or lack of the countersignature, as well as the method of incorporating it into the procedure of a given model of government, determines which particular system or which of its modifications had been accepted on the grounds of a given constitution. In the article it has been also proved that the constitutional principles have only general influence on the regulation of the countersignature. Many of them are necessary for the countersignature to function, however their establishment in the constitutional law do not determine the existence of the countersignature. The most important factors that decide whether this institution exist are components of the system of government, such as the dualism of the executive power and the assumption of lack of political responsibility of the head of the state. These features occur together within the parliamentary system. In order to prove the aforementioned thesis, a typology of the systems of government has been presented, then – after indicating the systems in which the countersignature does not exist and presenting the reasons of such situation – the countersignature and the form in which it has been adopted, in regard to the degree of the modification of the system, has been systematized.

In this paper I focus on the creation powers of the President in view of the current problems. I also attempt to find answers to some of the questions related to the issue whether, provided the Constitution of the Slovak Republic concedes the President of the Slovak Republic the power to appoint a constitutional official on the proposal of a collective body or a specific person, the President may refuse to appoint a public official, and what the position of the President is in this kind of appointment, thus what function he performs.

Original solutions of government systems  on the example of the Order of Malta

The article presents governmental system of Order of Malta with methodology applying to description and analyzing the system of state. Author assumes that the Order of Malta is an example of confessional monastic state with features specific for a state like structure of powers, division of powers and other characteristic for republican type of a state.

Original solutions of government systems  on the example of the Sultanate of Oman

The article provides a snapshot of Oman’s leading political institutions. It also contains description of Oman’s political power structure. At the beginning author presents a historical background of the events that led to the taking of power by the current ruling sultan. Subsequently, the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and suffrage are discussed. In conclusion, the author makes a brief assessment of a functioning system of government in Oman.

Vice-Presidency in the Structure of the Presidential System of Government. The Overview of Legal Regulations in Selected Countries

Vice presidents inscribed into the institutional frameworks of the most typical systems of government (presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, parliamentarianism) exist in more than a quarter of the modern world. The vast majority of them operate – as in the United States – under presidential systems. The aim of the article is to indicate common features of vice presidents existing in the institutional context of presidentialism as well as to identify the most significant differences between the constitutional regulations that relate to them. The author concludes that in some cases the impact on the regulations regarding vice presidents is exerted to a lesser extent by the very architecture of the presidential system of government, and to a greater extent by non-legal factors such as the socio-ethnic structure of a given country and even current political needs of governing elites.

Vice-Presidency Within Constitutional Structures of Parliamentarianism and Semi-Presidentialism

Vice-Presidents exist mainly in the states adopting the presidential system o government. The overview of contemporary legal regulations proves, however, that the vice-presidency may also be found, though much less often, in the two remaining basic regimes, that is parliamentarianism and semi-presidentialism. The purpose of the article is to analyze constitutional provisions that relate to vice presidency in six countries in which one or the other of the two aforementioned systems was adopted. The author draws attention to the typical and specific features of this institution, arriving at the conclusion that its embedding in the systems of government other than the presidential one is not a factor that essentially distinguishes the construction of the vice-presidency from that occurring in a typical or modified (compared to the model known from the US) presidentialism.

Everything has already been done, i.e. the heritage of the Polish parliamentarism of the 20th century

The Article is an attempt to evaluate the experiences of Polish parliamentarism in the twentieth century. The author analyzes Polish constitutional regulations and parliamentary practice, with a particular focus on the solutions adopted in the years 1919–1935, as well the impact of these regulations on the evolution of Polish parliamentarism after the Second World War, also taking into account the current political experiences. The analysis leads the author to the conclusion, that the contemporary defects of the system of parliamentary government are to a large extent the result of the historical experiences of Polish parliamentarism.

The real system of government in Poland after the country’s accession to the European Union

The subject of research presented in the article is the system of government in Poland. The considerations concern the relationship between the normative solutions defined in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 and the influence of the EU on the modification of political solutions in Poland. It was hypothesized that after Poland’s accession to the EU, the system of government in Poland changed in terms of political practice. It has been shown that functioning in the EU resulted in a departure from the characteristic rationalization of the system of government and bringing it closer to the parliamentary model. The prediction presents possible further directions of modification of the system of governance depending on the evolution of the EU. The research was based on the following methods: institutional-legal, systemic and comparative.

The System of Government in the Tunisian Constitution of July 25, 2022 Against the Background of the Autocratization Process during the Presidency of Kaïs Saïed

The paper deals with the system of government that was established in the Constitution of Tunisia of July 25, 2022. The author points out that both this legal act and the accompanying constitution-making process should be seen as the result of the rapid departure from democratic mechanisms and standards. The autocratization process was launched during the presidency of Kaïs Saïed, although negative tendencies in this field had already occurred earlier. This led to the 2022 Constitution guaranteeing presidential dominance over the government and parliament, as the position of the head of state was significantly strengthened compared to the previous basic law (it was adopted in 2014, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring). The author argues that due to the imbalance of power, the constitutional system of government in Tunisia corresponds more to the assumptions of undemocratic hyper-presidentialism than the typical presidential model.

The „Shadow Cabinet” in the Westminster System of Government

The „shadow cabinet” appointed by the largest opposition party in the House of Commons is an integral part of the Westminster system of government. The practice of its creation originated in the UK in the second half of the 19th century, where it underwent a significant evolution linked to the coordination of the opposition’s strategy enabling it to become a government cabinet, as well as to the official recognition of the position of opposition party leader, who since 1937 has received a fixed salary. The modern and at the same time permanent appointment of shadow ministers who are at the same time spokespersons of the opposition on specific ministerial issues dates back to the long Conservative Party governments (1951–1964) against which the Labour Party formulated an official „shadow cabinet”. The aim of this article was to show the genesis of the „shadow cabinet”, to define its tasks and functions in the Westminster model of parliamentary-cabinet government.