The present legal status of Transnistria neither seems to be obvious, nor distinctly determined. Its estimation in the context of the region’s statehood has been a subject of disputes of, and divides at the same time, the theorists of state, international lawyers, as well as experts in international relations and political sciences. The hereby paper is an attempt of making the analysis of the selected issues determining Transdniester’s status, first and foremost from the perspective of the theory of state and constitutional law, but also taking into account the international law point of view. It aims at finding an answer to the question on its legal and constitutional status as it is seen by both the unrecognized Transnistria’s state and Moldavia. The subject of the work contains the analysis of the elements of a state’s definition in the context of Transnistria. Moreover, it comprises considerations over the right of nations to self-determination and the problem of sovereignty as regards to the region. It also concentrates on the analysis of Transnistria’s status based on the Moldavian legislation, as well as different possibilities and opportunities/chances to solve the conflict lasting for almost thirty years.

Co-princes or co-principes? Some remarks on the status of the  President of France and the Bishop of Urgell as head of the state  in the context of the political system of Andorra

The constitutional system of Andorra is not a popular subject of study of science either in Poland or abroad. In Poland, after 1993 (the year the adoption of the current constitution) were published only a few articles or fragments of larger studies on this topic. As a result, the vast majority of these studies have mainly reporting character. Many interesting issues have been mentioned only in footnotes. Among them: the question of the status of specific, Andorran head of state and (resulting) the correct indication of the form of Andorran state. Co-principes are translated into Polish as „co-princes”. It consequently, automatically determined Andorra as a „principality”, ie the state of monarchical system, and even a constitutional monarchy . This should be considered , at least as controversial. The author formulates two hypotheses and subjected them to verify. Firstly – Andorra is a principate (not a principality) – a mixed form of political system combines elements of monarchy and republic, outweigh the latter, in addition to the relics of the former. Head of State in principate should be referred to as „princeps”, and in the case of Andorra, specifically: co-princeps. In this way we will avoid misleading comparisons with „a prince”, as monarchical, hereditary head of state. Secondly – despite the adoption of a modern constitution, there are remaining relics of feudal times in the political system of Andorra, resulting from the former status of „condominium”. This is particularly evident in the form of the Andorran heads of state institution. It also gives a partial capacity to influence decisions of the co-principes by their home country’s authorities.

The model of EU citizenship in the light of the  Habermas’ concept of shared sovereignty

The paper is discussing the concept of shared sovereignty, coined by Jürgen Habermas, along with his theory of citizenship of the European Union. In particular, the Author of the paper makes reference to Habermas’ model of EU citizenship in the light of the current legislation, policy and practice. The reference is made in an attempt to release whether the current shape, or condition, of European citizenship corresponds to its conceptual content and to clarify the general direction for the change as it could be fully implemented. All those issues are mentioned with a view to answer a very fundamental question, namely how to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the European Union?

Constitutional right of a Polish citizen for diplomatic and consular protection – a few remarks in the light of art. 36 of the Polish Constitution

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland provides for Polish citizens the right to diplomatic and consular protection, which may be implemented during their stay abroad. The article draws attention to the need to interpret the provision of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, taking into account the regulations of international law. It also formulates the thesis that the current international relations of a political or economic nature have a significant influence on the manner of applying the discussed law. The rest of the article discusses the subject matter of art. 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and associates the right to care abroad with the institution of citizenship. The issues of the so-called abandonment of the citizen and the possibility of taking care of people who do not have Polish citizenship. The last part of the study is devoted to the issue of the content of the right to care. Attention was drawn to the indefinability of the concepts of diplomatic care and consular protection. What is also important there is the practical aspect, consisting in the virtually unlimited right of the state to represent its citizen abroad.

Constitutional Duty to Obey the Law vs Civil Disobedience

Article 83 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland states that “Everyone is obliged to obey the law of the Republic of Poland”. The obligation to obey the law cannot, however, imply absolute obedience to any law established by the state. That means that no state has the authority to violate human rights, because they are above the state law. Therefore, as the author stresses, in every modern constitution the right of sovereignty to defend values such as sovereignty, division of powers or human rights is guaranteed. The main thesis of the article indicates that a bad law may be the beginning of civil disobedience, understood as a symbolic, intentional manifestation of disobedience to the law carried out in the name of the conviction of its validity and superiority of other values and non-legal norms, including the possibility of incurring negative legal consequences – sanctions. Civil insubordination is therefore an instrument which, taking into account all its limitations, can be used in countries with democratic systems as a guarantee of protection of civil rights against the action of the authorities. Our constitution does not know the concept of civil disobedience or the older right of resistance. In Article 2 it is clearly emphasized that the Republic of Poland is a democratic legal state and the observance of the law should be understood as such conduct of citizens. and state bodies, which is in accordance with the binding regulations (Article 7 of the Constitution – the principle of legalism). Another issue raised in the article is the problem of justification of civil disobedience. The author does not share the view on the justification of civil disobedience. If the justification of civil insubordination entails the postulate of impunity, the concept of civil disobedience would become contradictory. At the same time he stresses that legalism cannot dictate absolute obedience to the existing law.

The position of the constitutions of the Member States of the European Union – a few remarks against the background of current conditions and the relationship of the Court of Justice of the European Union with national courts

The subject of the study is to demonstrate that the possibilities and prospects of federalizing the European Union are questionable in the context of current facts – pandemia, economic crisis, the internal situation of economically, socially and culturally diverse member states, and as a consequence of a significant legal event – the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany of May 5, 2020. With the above judgment, the German Constitutional Court refused to recognize the binding force in Germany of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union. This may affect the relations of the CJEU with the constitutional courts of the states, including the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, as the vast majority of them recognize the primacy of national constitutions.

State sovereignty and the rule of law: the codification of private law in China

The main issue of this article is a comparison of codification of private law in the Republic of China (1912–1949) with the current fifth attempt to codify civil law in the People’s Republic of China, which is planned to be enacted in 2020. The aim of the paper is to prove that in both the most important factors for drafting new laws were not the internal needs of the state, but the necessity to regulate the position of the country on the international arena. The analysis is based on two main concepts: sovereignty and the rule of law, which are crucial for understanding this issue.

The Constitutional Expression of the Principle of Independence of the State and Religious Associations

The aim of the study is to specify and analyze the expression of the principle of independence of the state and religious associations in contemporary constitutions. This is preceded by an attempt to establish the ideological roots of the principle of independence of the above-mentioned entities. Primarily, the formal-dogmatic and legal-comparative methods were used. The historical and legal method was used as a subsidiary. The texts of all binding constitutions were analyzed in terms of the articulation of the aforementioned principle of religious relations. The principle of independence of the state and religious associations is one of the main normative directives of religious relations in contemporary Poland. It has ideological roots not only in Catholic social teaching, but also in the liberal doctrine. Since the end of the 20th century, it has found a permanent place in the constitutionalism of a number of European secular (non-religious) states and some Latin American states.

EU member states: a new paradigm of sovereignty? An outline of the issue

Political and economic integration of countries taking place within the European Union leads to the modification of certain traditional features of the state’s sovereignty, such as, for example, exclusive judiciary competence within the state’s territory or independent financial, budget and fiscal policy. This calls for the analysis whether, and if so, to what extent, being the EU member state influences the country’s sovereignty. There are two contrasting views regarding this matter: some theoreticians claim that this integration limits or even eliminates the country’s sovereignty, while others argue that countries retain their sovereignty, and integration is the manifestation of sovereignty. The aim of the article is to reflect on these theories in the context of a new paradigm of EU member states’s sovereignty, which takes into account new relations between such agents as an individual, society, nation, or state.