Any discussion of human rights in post-colonial countries of Asia conducted from the perspective of Western civilization faces many obstacles, particularly related to existing differences, or even cultural barriers and different traditions. Postcolonial states, despite the remaining remnants of the colonial era-visible in their legal systems, that still contain normative acts adopted before obtaining sovereignty – very firmly resist to the adoption of the universal catalog of human rights set out in the UN Covenants, as well as the use of standards in their observance that are compatible with those made within the United Nations. Both – the so-called ideology of Asian values, as well as the concept of the ASEAN community is not conducive to the creation of international binding legal framework and does not allow (or even leading in the future) to create a universal system of human rights protection. On the contrary – it leads to the deepening ideological differences or even philosophical, in the further development of democracy among Western countries and Asia. From the perspective of European constitutional law, it may be interesting to see the arguments of post-colonial Asia judges on the issue of the division of power in the context of judicial activism and the protection of constitutional values. The purpose of this publication is to present the views of Singapore’s judiciary in connection with the reforms introduced in 2013 that abolish the mandatory death penalty for certain crimes together with the possibility of replacing it by a court decision with life imprisonment and flogging.

Rationalization of Polish political institutions with the application of the solutions of the modern states

The article is an attempt to identify the constitutional authorities of Poland, whose functioning can be improved through the application of solutions operating in other countries. The change in the way the Senate is elected is seen as an opportunity to improve the quality of the statutes passed in Poland. The appointment of the vice president is to improve the functioning of the office of the President of the Republic and to make him independent of the parliament. Entrusting the constitutional review of the law to the Supreme Court can contribute to the depoliticization of this process. A similar effect can be attained in the case of constitutional responsibility, provided that its common courts are enforced.

On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence. Over twelve years after the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, the issue of universal, international acknowledgment of Kosovo still has not been resolved. The foundation for the establishment of the Republic of Kosovo was international society, which created the legal framework for the future statehood of Kosovo. The problem of the functioning of the constitutional judiciary was one of the key issues during the creation of the basic law of the Republic of Kosovo. This article s to analyze the constitutional position of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo in the state system established under the Constitution of 2008. It presents the composition of the Court, its competence, and principles of organization and functioning. The solution applied in the Kosovo basic law fits into the broadly understood model of the European constitutional judiciary.

This paper, examining the Hungarian example argues that that the price is high if a constitutional moment to adopt a constitution based on wide societal compromise has been missed. The constitution-making process might then be completed either by activist courts or by activist political forces. Hungary experienced two major constitutional reforms, both missing a consensual constitutional momentum. The first transformation in 1989–90, which replaced the socialist authoritarian system by democracy, was brought about by political elites, lacking democratic legitimacy, keeping the formal legal framework of the socialist constitution. The second reform in 2011 brought a formally new constitution (Fundamental Law of Hungary), initiated and adopted solely by the governing party (FIDESZ) with a constitutional majority, without consensus. The Constitutional Court both times attempted to play an active, corrective role in the aftermath of the constitution-making.

The article critically analyses the models of the constitutionality inspection adopted in Portugal and in Poland. For this purpose the comparative method has been applied, comparing Portuguese and Polish approaches. Theoretical aspects of the constitutionality inspection are discussed and the notions of the centralised and the diffuse inspection model are introduced. Then the paper analysis the actual inspection practices in both countries discussing the diffuse and concentrated inspection separately. Constitutional rules pertaining to the direct effect of the constitutions, constitutional jurisdiction of judges and operation of the constitutional courts are considered. The article concludes that in both countries different models of constitutionality inspection operate. In Portugal operates the mixed constitutionality inspection model while in Poland, despite views advocating for permissibility of the diffuse control, the centralised model functions.

In 1803, the Supreme Court of the U.S. gave a judgment in the case of Marbury v. Madison. The 220th anniversary of this event is a good occasion to describe the Polish model of constitutional review in the context of the American-style model. Although most countries have written constitutions, their constitutional review models can vary significantly. This research study was conducted to illustrate similarities and differences between the American and European models of constitutional review. In the study, the model of constitutional review in the United States and Poland was analysed. The author’s result of analyses of respective provisions of constitution and case-law in these countries presented that there are significant differences between the discussed models with regard to their organisation and functioning

Gloss to the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of January 11, 2024, file ref. no. K 23/23

The commentary concerns the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of January 11, 2024, in which the Tribunal performed a self-consistent review and declared as unconstitutional a provision of the Law on the State Tribunal due to a particular interpretation of a legislative omission. The text indicates the objections to such a ruling and outlines the consequences of such a departure from the principle of accusatorial procedure.