Any discussion of human rights in post-colonial countries of Asia conducted from the perspective of Western civilization faces many obstacles, particularly related to existing differences, or even cultural barriers and different traditions. Postcolonial states, despite the remaining remnants of the colonial era-visible in their legal systems, that still contain normative acts adopted before obtaining sovereignty – very firmly resist to the adoption of the universal catalog of human rights set out in the UN Covenants, as well as the use of standards in their observance that are compatible with those made within the United Nations. Both – the so-called ideology of Asian values, as well as the concept of the ASEAN community is not conducive to the creation of international binding legal framework and does not allow (or even leading in the future) to create a universal system of human rights protection. On the contrary – it leads to the deepening ideological differences or even philosophical, in the further development of democracy among Western countries and Asia. From the perspective of European constitutional law, it may be interesting to see the arguments of post-colonial Asia judges on the issue of the division of power in the context of judicial activism and the protection of constitutional values. The purpose of this publication is to present the views of Singapore’s judiciary in connection with the reforms introduced in 2013 that abolish the mandatory death penalty for certain crimes together with the possibility of replacing it by a court decision with life imprisonment and flogging.

The importance of the stare decisis doctrine for judicial control of the constitutionality of US law – between the stability of jurisprudence and instrumentalism

All American courts have a right to examine the conformity of legal acts with the Constitution as the basis for issuing a decision, creating a diffused system of judicial review. Court precedents and the stare decisis doctrine become the stabilizing factor of jurisprudence. However, it is not easy to make an unequivocal assessment of the role of the stare decisis doctrine for judicial review due to a number of factors that affect its significance. They include the formal lack of absolute nature of the court decisions, or the fact that the Federal US Supreme Court is not bound by its own rulings. The latter fact seems particularly important in the assessment of the subject matter in the context of considerable judicial activism and the way the judges are nominated and approved for, in principle, lifetime positions. In this publication, all the above-mentioned factors have been analyzed in order to assess the significance of the stare decisis doctrine for judicial review in the US as accurately as possible.

The paper aims at analyzing the phenomenon of judicial activism in Poland against the background of a resolution of the formation of the combined Civil Chamber, Criminal Chamber and Labor Law and Social Security Chamber of the Supreme Court of 23 January 2020 (BSA I-4110-1/20). The author discusses the Supreme Court’s powers to resolve divergences in the interpretation of law and then provides an analysis of the nature of the resolution of the Supreme Court. The considerations made in the context of the paper lead to the conclusion that in situations of a threat to the rule of law the courts not only have a right but also an obligation to take active measures to protect the common good.

The flexible formula of the British Constitution results in a relative openness to external influences. Notwithstanding this fact, the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) membership in the European Union’s (EU’s) structures (1973–2020) resulted in a progressive limitation of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Brexit will not reverse the effects of the ‘soft’ modification of the foundations of the UK’s system, which occurred in the sphere of the practical implementation of the competencies of the branches of governance. Prima facie, the decision on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU should result in a ‘renaissance’ of the traditional doctrine of Westminster sovereignty, per A.V. Dicey. However, judicial activism, continued validity of the European Convention on Human Rights (incorporated on the basis of Human Rights Act 1998) and the irreversible consequences of the devolution of competencies in the UK for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are the factors that hinder the possible revitalisation of the sovereignty of the British Parliament.

In recent years, the United Kingdom has seen a growing doctrinal discourse around competing models of legal and political constitutionalism. The situation has been exacerbated by ongoing changes in both theory and practice, which have engendered a strong conviction that the UK is now departing from the political constitutionalism associated with the traditional model of parliamentary sovereignty, in which Parliament’s legislative power is unlimited by law and the courts have no right to question the validity of laws on substantive grounds. From a theoretical point of view, legal constitutionalists contributed to provoking this change while desiring to continue to promote it by moving almost completely and exclusively towards legal constitutionalism, thus supplanting its political formula. From a practical point of view, however, one should bear in mind that the events that led to a specific change in thinking about British constitutionalism encompass, in particular, the legal consequences resulting from the UK’s membership in the European Union, including the phenomenon of the so-called judicial activism. Nevertheless, these events were also induced by the expansion and strengthening of judicial review of administrative actions, judicial shaping of the principle of legality, as well as by the enactment and application of the Human Rights Act 1998.