In 1991, the Knesset passed a package of legislation with the aim of preventing the rampant party switching and defections by elected representatives. At the time of its adoption, the so-called anti-defection law was supported by an all-party consensus. Although the legislation has remained in effect, its apparent continuity conceals the way in which it has become transformed from what was at first an “efficient” institution to a “redistributive” one (Tsebelis 1990). In this paper, I review the development of the Israeli anti-defection law and argue that whereas at the initial moment of its adoption the anti-defection law was considered to benefit all parties in the system, over time it has become an instrument in the hands of the governing coalition to manipulate divisions and engineer further defections among the opposition in order to shore up its often fragile legislative base.

Anti-Defection Law as a Remedy for Legislative Party Switching? The Case of New Zealand

The article addresses whether the enactment of anti-defection legislation reduces legislative party switching in parliament. This question is pertinent because some researchers cease to analyze cases of legislative party switching when anti-defection legislation is present in a political system. However, the example of New Zealand demonstrates the fallacy of such an assumption. Despite anti-defection legislation being passed twice, it has not effectively deterred parliamentarians from changing party affiliations. Instead, they have strengthened the position of parliamentary group leaders in relation to parliamentarians and the necessity for the latter to rely on loopholes that shield them from the severe consequences of party switching. A dogmatic analysis of the current legislation and a systemic analysis of the selected case lead to this overarching conclusion.