In 1991, the Knesset passed a package of legislation with the aim of preventing the rampant party switching and defections by elected representatives. At the time of its adoption, the so-called anti-defection law was supported by an all-party consensus. Although the legislation has remained in effect, its apparent continuity conceals the way in which it has become transformed from what was at first an “efficient” institution to a “redistributive” one (Tsebelis 1990). In this paper, I review the development of the Israeli anti-defection law and argue that whereas at the initial moment of its adoption the anti-defection law was considered to benefit all parties in the system, over time it has become an instrument in the hands of the governing coalition to manipulate divisions and engineer further defections among the opposition in order to shore up its often fragile legislative base.

Floor-crossing: peculiar features of party switching in Ukraine

The paper considers the meaning of the term “floor-crossing”, its basic kinds, legislative regulation and features of party switching in Ukraine since its independence. It has been found out that crossing the floor, change of political orientations and, as a consequence, adjustment of pre-election promises, the reality the Ukrainian politician face. Floor crossing in the Ukrainian Parliament has become a phenomenon that altered coalitions, generated opportunism and political corruption. It has been established that in modern practice there are two possible ways of influencing the process of inter-party switching: a legislative ban or a purely formal condemnation of the deputy’s/party’s actions on the part of the electorate and party members. To reduce the number of switching between factions, Ukraine has a so-called imperative mandate (a special version of it). It applies only to the deputies who are elected from the lists of political parties. Consequently, the problem lies in the partial legislative regulation of the problem of “floor-crossing”, which should be enshrined in new regulations /normative acts/. This acquires particular significance in the context of Russian military aggression and possible subversive activity of pro-Russian politicians, whose activities should be ruled out by such legislative acts. Any attempts to discredit the country on the part of deputies, making advances to the aggressor, should have legal consequences and the possibility for the electorate to influence the politician being elected. It has been found that frequent party switching discredits electoral and parliamentary system and shows flaws in the selection of personalities and why they go into politics; in addition, it can also indicate the strength or weakness of political parties. It has been proven that excessive and nontransparent motivated floor-crossing of deputies is becoming rarer with each new convocation, indicating a positive trend in the qualitative selection of candidates for deputies among party members. The final consolidation of the proportional system with open lists in the Electoral Code and the legislative regulation of inter-party/inter-factional switching should be the basis of qualitative deputy composition and commitment to declared political ideas.

Anti-Defection Law as a Remedy for Legislative Party Switching? The Case of New Zealand

The article addresses whether the enactment of anti-defection legislation reduces legislative party switching in parliament. This question is pertinent because some researchers cease to analyze cases of legislative party switching when anti-defection legislation is present in a political system. However, the example of New Zealand demonstrates the fallacy of such an assumption. Despite anti-defection legislation being passed twice, it has not effectively deterred parliamentarians from changing party affiliations. Instead, they have strengthened the position of parliamentary group leaders in relation to parliamentarians and the necessity for the latter to rely on loopholes that shield them from the severe consequences of party switching. A dogmatic analysis of the current legislation and a systemic analysis of the selected case lead to this overarching conclusion.