The notion of „socialism” in political thought of Alexis de Tocqueville

The article presents an analysis of an original conception of socialism outlined in the works of Alexis de Tocqueville. The author begins with a brief presentation of historical context in which the views of French thinker were shaped, referring to his experiences from the period of the July Revolution of 1830 and the February Revolution of 1848. The author goes on to detailed analysis of his definition of socialism, making an indispensable reference to his republican conception of freedom and the role of a citizen in democracy. Finally, the author looks at Tocquevillian vision of genesis of socialist ideas, associated by him with anxiety, which democratic system inevitably generates.

Anti-terrorism policy as a dilemma of liberal democracy

Terrorism is harmful to democratic governments and societies. In addition to the visible and the direct effects of attacks on bystanders, aim bombers are undermining democratic values, including the weakening of confidence in state institutions and laws that regulate their functioning. As a result of the use of violence can permanently give birth to create a socio-political divisions, antagonize certain entities and groups, and thus provoke conflicts thus destroying the existing compromises, agreements or arrangements between the parties concerned. In matters of international terrorism it is not only a challenge for the rule of law, but because it also applies to relations between states, poses a serious threat to security and stability.

Two models of relationship between freedom and security

The subject matter of the article revolves around two classical models of relationship between freedom and security contained in the theories formulated by T. Hobbes and J. Locke, as well as their conceptual development in the theories by H. Kelsen and J. Rawls. The model presented by Hobbes accentuates the primacy of security, whereas the one proposed by Locke, the primacy of the rights of an individual. A critical analysis of those models illustrates that one may not interpret the necessity of existence of a political power, or the requirement to guarantee the rights of individuals in an absolutist way. The validity of Hobbes’s model is limited to the statement regarding the necessity to establish a „decision-centre” ensuring „collective security”. Locke’s model, on the other hand, is not established upon the construction of an „ideal constitution” but rather it points to democratic forms of guarantying individual rights. This does not mean that one should acknowledge the absolute primacy of legislature. In both the theories proposed by Kelsen and Rawls this function may be fulfilled by constitutional judicature. While the model established by Hobbes is appropriate for the descriptive conceptualisation of constitution, the one offered by Locke serves the prescriptive formulation of this concept.

In the present paper the author considers a challenge to libertarianism posed by G.A. Cohen. The charge issued by Cohen says that libertarianism defines freedom in terms of justice and justice in terms of freedom. The paper deals with an aspect of this charge as expressed by one of Cohen’s thought experiments according to which it is not the case that the answer to the question whether person B forces person A to do φ depends on whether person B’s actions are legitimate or not. Employing the Hohfeldian analysis of fundamental jural conceptions, the author demonstrates that if person B’s actions are legitimate, then making person A to do φ cannot, at pains of contradiction, be considered forcing. If person B is at a liberty to make person A to do φ, then person B cannot at the same time and in the same respect be at duty not to make person A to do φ. Yet, this is exactly what would follow if we adopted the stance that person B’s legitimate actions force person A to do φ. If they forced person A, then the expenditure of whatever labour needed to do φ would not be a voluntary expenditure and thereby would constitute a violation of person A’s rights to this labour. However, if person A’s rights were violated by person B’s actions, then via Hohfeldian Correlativity Axiom person B would have to be at duty not to undertake these actions. Yet, the whole reasoning started from the assumption that person B is at liberty to undertake them.

The Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Light of the Rulings of the German Federal Constitutional Court – Selected Issues

This article is an attempt on synthetic analysis of selected issues concerning liberty of conscience and religion in Germany, specifically, problems resulting from the jurisdiction of Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The introduction is dedicated to the short description of constitutional regulations of freedom of conscience and religion in Germany. What follows, are the most important principles adopted by the Court in the initial stage of its activity. The next part of the text presents recent trends in the jurisdiction. The article gives accounts of the Court’s adjudications upon cases concerning wearing hijabs in public schools, offering an animal sacrifices, the way in which public institutions inform the society of religious unions’ activities, the obligation imposed on churches to observe the constitutional laws and the protection of Sunday as a weekly day of rest. In conclusions some differences between standpoints of German and Polish Constitutional Courts were revealed.

Some methodological difficulties in studying and analysing China

The study presents various factors which obstacles adequate description and analysis of Chinese realities in Western scholarly literature. The first factor presented in the article is the psychological mechanism of a “mirror”. As Lynn T. White suggested, since the 17th century, that Westerners look at China not through a ‘window’ but through a ‘mirror’, in which their own fears or most treasured ideals are refl ected, not China itself. Hence their descriptions of China refl ect first of all their state of mind. Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen add to this metaphor another one, that of a procrustean bed. According to these authors, contemporary Western scholars procede like ancient Procrustes who made his captives fit his bed cutting their too long limbs or stretching these too short, in order to adapt Chinese realities to the Western schemes. Sebastian Heilmann and Matthias Stepan in order to explain Western mistaken views of China and expectations presented six wrong assumptions concerning developments in China. Their list is controversial, but it is true that on the Western side there are numerous wrong assumptions concerning China and other Asian states. Thus the Chinese realities are described in a wrong way, and the predictions of future developments are also false.
The Author put an emphasis on scientific categories and terms elaborated in Europe and the States and considered “universal”, which, however, are not adequate to the Chinese realities. Hence their use results in falsification of descriptions and makes previsions based on them – groundless. He distinguishes two essential kinds of categories and terms borrowed from the West but inadequate to the Chinese realities. The first constitutes the terms which significance does not fit to the Chinese realities, as “language”, “religion”, historical epochs such as “antiquity”, “,Middle Ages”, etc. The second constitutes the terms which meanings involve cultural values. Many of them are difficult to translate into Chinese and they acquire different meanings in the context of Confucian heritage. The Author analyses from this perspective: “human rights”, “democracy” and “freedom”.
Western scholars are also often mislead by Chinese sources. The study indicates another factor, which facilitates great misunderstandings. According to the cultural norm of the Confucian civilisation there is a “proper façade” presented in public, behind which there are hidden “internal realities”. Of course, such differences could be detected in each culture, but in highly ritualistic Confucian civilisation this distinction is essential, and both parts constitute “complex realities”, whereas Westerners presume that the façade constitutes a whole and complete reality. The Author presents as an example centralised, unitary Leninist state in Chin that is – in his opinion merely a false “public image”, whereas in reality there operate more or less innumerable quite autonomous units, which in fact are not subordinate. Under such circumstances all decisions must be consulted and negotiated among them, like in a federal system, although it does not operate formally. The Westerners also misleads themselves considering their peculiar civilisation as “universal”, whereas there are various civilisations, which will not amalgamate during the modernisation processes. Hence various societies function and change in their own ways, different from the western schemes and expectations.
The study indicates that the West still predominates and presents its civilisation as universal. However, its predomination faces growing resistance and numerous scholars recognise the existence of numerous civilisations, which will also develop in the future. The author enumerates the most significant concepts such as “dialogue among civilisations and cultures” adopted by the United Nations in 1989, Huntington’s warning against imposing western norms on other civilisations, which may result in their ‘clashes’, the concept of the Axial Age, of Multiple Modernities, and so on. The road to an equal status of all civilisations is long and tortuous. The elaboration of universal scientific categories and principles is even more difficult, and it is, perhaps, a task for future generations of Asian scholars.

Dilemmas of Freedom and their Legal Implications

Each legal institution begins from an idea, therefore a thought is primary in relation to the legal norm created by the legislator. This makes the analysis of this idea is significant and cannot be ignored. Freedom is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the contemporary constitutionalism. The article is an analysis of the philosophical and legal understanding of the concept of freedom and the ways of its transfer to the law. The author claims that the concept of freedom is a vague concept for a European lawyer, on the foundation of which it is difficult to build a legal system. On the one hand, this concept seems familiar and it is difficult to directly deny it, but its definition, and even more so, the adoption of the consequences associated with this definition is debatable.

Otfried Hoeffe’s philosophy of political justice

The paper covers an issue of justice in the light of a new paradigm in political philosophy proposed by Otfried Hoeffe’s theory of the exchange of justice. The author analyses the impact of this approach to justice upon understanding of how could contemporary society develop its fair moral and legal grounds. It is proved that for an adequate understanding of justice is its understanding as a personal responsibility, organically related to guidance on solidarity and recognition. Their interpretations of as well attempts to join moral and material grounds of social life to overcome of injustice are in the author’s focus. It is showed that freedom and justice are enrooted in a lifeword, as well relay upon formal norms and procedures of moral and justice. It gives a methodology for understanding of O. Hoeffe’s philosophy of political justice that states freedom and justice as basic conditions of human being.

What kind of freedom? The dilemma of democracy

Since the ancient times there has been a continuing discourse on the nature and scope of freedom and civic and human right in the more or less liberal democracy. This paper contains a critical analysis and assessment of the most important opinions concerning the both political and economic freedom and the interpretations of that concept in the political practice. This article argues that, contrary to the beliefs of most people, freedom and human rights do not come from nature, but they are the result of the society’s consensus, especially that part of the society, which participates in the elections. The voters agree to allow the winning political party to realize its program also in the respect to freedom and civic (human) rights. On the other hand the politicians try to secure the appropriate equilibrium between the political and economic freedom, which supports the stabilization of a given political system and is conducive to the economic growth.

The purpose of this article is to present Hugo Grotius’s views concerning the idea of freedom. It must be pointed out that the idea of freedom was not the subject of a separate thought, except for the freedom of the seas, which Grotius dedicated a separate work. Theses on freedom were formulated in the light of other issues such as natural law or the essence and scope of state power. For this purpose, the first part of the article presents a historical background. In the second part, Grotius’s views will be presented in three contexts. First, freedom of the individual as power over oneself. Second, freedom in political terms, as a relationship of community. Finally freedom in the global aspect, as freedom of navigation, trade and migration.

Feminist deconstruction of the traditional image of women in Qiu Jin’s works

Women’s issues are a significant subject of study in the realm of Chinese literature. In many works, it can be seen to oppose stereotypes or norms imposed on the female gender and to take measures leading to the emancipation of the individual. Such literature is symptomatic of a desire for change in society, that is, the overthrow of the patriarchal system and the introduction of equal rights between the sexes. An example of such prose is the works of China’s first feminist, Qiu Jin, who decided to fight for women’s rights. She was sentenced to death for her revolutionary activities. However, her texts introduced a completely new image of women into the public sphere - different from the one that had been reproduced for hundreds of years in ancient China. The poet chose to endow her heroines with charisma, courage, intelligence and the will to fight for a better life. Her aim was to make women aware of their situation in life, their social role, and to encourage them to leave the male-dominated world. Michalina Koniuk, in the chapter “Feminist Deconstruction of the Traditional Image of Woman in Qiu Jin’s Works”, proposes to analyse Qiu Jin’s works and present that the characters created by the writer oppose and destroy the image of the obedient and uneducated woman that existed in ancient China. First, the social role imposed on women in Chinese society has been described, namely that of obedient daughter, wife and daughter-in-law. The requirements and rules expected of Chinese women have been presented, and how Confucian norms contributed to the belittling of women’s role and position in Chinese society. As the poet was inspired by her own life experiences, Qiu Jin’s life were briefly introduced. Her childhood, during which the first signs of dissatisfaction with the obligations and social norms imposed on girls could be observed. An unsuccessful marriage mobilised the feminist to fight for women’s rights, to oppose the doctrines of Confucius and to leave home and go abroad. This was a great act of courage and at the same time a struggle for freedom and independence in the life of a feminist. That part was followed by an analysis of Qiu Jin’s works, whose female characters exemplify the kind of norms and behaviours that Qiu Jin rebelled against. At the same time, these characters deconstruct the traditional image of a woman and introduce a new one of a strong and independent individual. In this chapter, all poems and quotations have been translated by the author from Chinese into Polish.